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Abstract   
The aim of this thesis is to understand India’s choices in public financing of 
infrastructure, using national highways as a case study. Its hypothesis is that, in order for the 
Indian state to achieve allocative efficiency in National Highway financing, improved 
financial intermediation is required through a combination of not only new and enhanced 
institutional and regulatory arrangements, but also financial system reform. 
In order to allow improvement in policy choice in efficiently financing highways, 
especially after the reform period (early 1990's onwards), this study argues that better 
institutional and regulatory arrangements (through infrastructure unbundling), and 
intermediation (through an expanding financial system) are indispensable to providing 
services of general interest (SGI). Public choice theory is used as the framework to 
understand the economic role of the state in terms of allocative efficiency, redistribution and 
macro-economic management (refer to the diagram below). 
Thesis Structure based on Public Choice Theoretical Framework  
 
 Since the late 1980s, India has undergone radical change, with decentralized politics on 
the one hand, and gradual economic liberalization and deregulation (after decades of 
financial repression), on the other. Faced with a resource crunch and supply side constraints 
in infrastructure provision and funding, public choice becomes valuable in elucidating the 
shifting role of the state in providing essential, monopoly-oriented public goods overlapping 
the public-private domain.  
Network infrastructures, being a particular type of public goods, are extensively used 
by, and at the same time benefit the users, and as such, in the long term shall be financed as 
tolled-goods to enhance their efficiency. Such is the case of the highways, in which the 
service is produced and financed through those who are willing to pay to consume the goods. 
Although (1) the introduction of market principles, (2) the involvement of long-term 
financial instruments, and (3) the private sector participation are all important, but they 
cannot replace the essential role of public spending in meeting the huge initial investments 
and providing steady flow of funds to highways financing. To complement the 
above-mentioned processes, financial intermediation through funding instruments (e.g., 
bonds, securitization, domestic institutional investments, etc.) shall be offered to both public 
and private sectors.  
It is crucial to align the National Highway sector (which comprises 2% of all roads in 
India but carries 40% of the road traffic) towards efficiency in financing, since the State, 
District and Village Roads are also competing for public investment. With huge capital 
requirements in the highway sector (US$ 49 Billion in the next five-year period 2007 – 2012), 
and with growing traffic volume and demand, there is also an immense potential for private 
investment, financial sector intermediation, and cost-recovery systems (through user charges). 
The analysis identifies how the Highway Sector, under the flagship of National Highway 
Authority of India (NHAI, the independent body and regulator since the 1990s) has been 
implementing a program for financing the construction and management of national 
highways through direct fuel taxation (cess), promoting private sector participation, and 
imposing direct user charges (tolling), and awarding more Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
Toll projects.  
The Japanese experience of highway development (and its financing) is used as a case 
study that provides India with lessons on public financing for highway network expansion. 
Although Japan through legislations, principles of equal access, various forms of 
cross-subsidization (including spatial and temporal), and cost-recovery system, succeeded in 
developing an efficient highway network, it eventually resulted in a huge over-investment, 
which in turn incurred mounting debts (mainly due to public financial mismanagement). 
Thus, the case of Japanese highway development is the epitome of public choice in network 
infrastructure financing. 
In regard to Indian National Highway financing, it remains to be seen, whether the 
National Highway Authority of India succeeds in reducing its dependency on borrowing and 
fuel taxation. In order to achieve this goal, private sector participation must be improved. 
This, in turn, is contingent upon the convergence of the following two variables: (1) 
infrastructure regulation (a shift from public to private domain) and (2) financial 
intermediation (a shift from bank based short-term orientation to capital market long-term 
orientation). 
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Since the 1980s India has been on the course of gradual liberalization after 
decades of financial repression. As the state was slowly shedding its ideological stance, 
the official rupture only happened in 1991, with the Balance Of Payments (BOP) 
financial crisis. The 1991 Balance Of Payments (BOP) crisis forced India to procure a 
$1.8 billion IMF loan and was the turning point of India’s economic history. In a way 
the IMF bailout marked India’s inability to contain the system that had striven above 
all for self-sufficiency through its post-independence socialist policies. The BOP crisis 
immediately confronted P.V. Narasimha Rao’s newly elected Congress government, 
which came into power in mid-1991 after the assassination of Gandhi. Rao had already 
appointed a non-political figure, economist Manmohan Singh, as finance minister in a 
gesture that symbolized Rao’s desire to charge forward with economic reform. In 
response to the crisis, the government immediately introduced stabilization measures 
to reduce the fiscal deficit. The fiscal tightening and devaluation of the rupee by 
approximately 25% adequately reduced the current account deficit.  
This prompted a multi-faceted economic reform program and gradual financial 
liberalization that has allowed public choice in providing public goods, and options in 
financing them other than public finance. This has brought the state challenges and 
opportunities, where fiscal limitations requires the state to withdraw from services  for 
which it was responsible during the pre-reform period; this included controlling the 
financial system (financial repression) and providing for infrastructure services. 
Reform also came with a new blueprint of gradually relieving the state of its stretched 
functions of being responsible for almost all areas of public life (a relic of Nehruvian 
socialist ideology). The government had to curb itself through prudential expenditure 
targets, at the same time setting forth to gain from disinvestment and contracting out 
public services. As the state withdrew, as the sole provider of some of the public goods,  
it took up its new role as the regulator of private provision of services that it was no 
longer efficient in providing.  Infrastructure services have elements of natural 
monopoly, as the service provider can set prices substantially in excess of costs; 
therefore in theory, states, especially governments in developing countries, have either 
owned these assets or introduced regulation to varying extents in order to curb abuse 
of market power. There was also a growing supply-side constraint, in terms of 
providing for the needs of a growing population (which was also largely impoverished 
by then) and rapid economic growth.  
By shifting its ideology-oriented approach to a norms oriented approach, the 
State could allow for efficiency and monetary gains through private sector development 
which would in fact participate in the economy raising productivity and capital 
accumulation. This process of reform has led to financial liberalization, where savings 
meet investment opportunities by developing financial markets that improve 
intermediation efficiency, in effect improving productivity, savings, savings and further 
investment. Since then there have been a series of reforms in the Banking, Equity, 
Securities, Insurance, and Pension sub-sectors, and more Bills in each of these sub-
sectors are now being passed in the Parliament. While the government is now 
considering allowing pension funds to invest in long-term infrastructure projects, there 
are already some foreign pension funds that have showed interest in investing their 
money here. As important changes have taken place in India’s financial sector, reform 
has transformed India’s equity markets more dramatically than its banking system. 
Trading in the equity market is now done on electronic terminals around the country, 
and this can be mainly attributed to the rising levels of international capital flows and 
the importance of international norms in finance. The political will behind these efforts 
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has been such that the Finance Minister expressed that overall, financial sector 
reforms are the key to creating a systemic framework for higher growth.  
As of late 2006 the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has projected financial 
sector reform and increase in investment in infrastructure as India's two biggest 
priorities (The Economic Times, October 10, 2006). He further stated that the country 
is better placed than at any time in the recent past to push for reform in two areas:  
- The financial reform to facilitate infrastructure and investment; and 
- Fiscal reforms to free resources for public and private investment and increase 
the efficiency of public spending(IMF 2010, p.6). 
He was confident of gathering political support for these twin initiatives, his case being 
that without a reform in the insurance and banking system the national social and 
economic objectives cannot be achieved. Infrastructure also requires long-term 
investment, while the current Indian banking system is essentially short-term oriented. 
In this context, sustaining high growth rates would depend on huge investments in 
infrastructure that would require India to mobilize long-term capital more effectively 
than was currently possible through a short-term oriented debt market. Infrastructure 
shortage has recently been well acknowledged as one of the most crucial impediments 
to India's recent rapid growth rates. With the infrastructure being stretched beyond 
capacity, the government is gearing up to relieve severe supply-side bottlenecks. 
Recent studies suggest that if infrastructure spending does not reach 9% of GDP 
(currently 5%) by the fiscal year 2011/12 it will become difficult to maintain growth 
rates of 9-10%. To avoid this capacity constraint, the Planning Commission estimates 
that India will need US$475 billion in infrastructure investment over the five-year 
period 2007-2012, with the Highway Sector demanding US$49 Billion. These ambitious 
investment targets, apart from adding to the financing woes of the central government, 
would keep on course if not further the various structural economic reforms being 
implemented since the 1991 Balance of Payments Crisis. 
The infrastructure sector in India, as in most developing countries, was for a 
long time under the direct purview of the government. These services were being 
provided directly through budgetary resources as they were considered to be under a 
condition of natural monopoly. This was based on the dominant idea during that time, 
that infrastructure provision required huge investments and depended on the existence 
of economies of scale in production; and due to its monopolistic nature the private 
sector’s involvement was mistrusted as it would only lead to profit maximization (as 
opposed to social equity). This perception, that competition is inherently infeasible in 
these sectors, was taken for granted for quite a long time, until government public 
resources were in danger of being exhausted. This also raised government deficits, and 
it soon became evident that infrastructure investment was impeding economic growth. 
But over time the global trend was for the gradual exit of the public sector in directly 
providing infrastructure services, and the growing recognition that private initiative, 
disciplined in part by regulatory forces and competitive market forces, often has the 
upper hand in efficiently delivering infrastructure (Mody, 1996, p. xiii). With this trend 
there were now more options for the public sector in providing public goods like 
infrastructure, as they could now be unbundled and regulated to allow the private 
sector to participate and cover the investment gap. In India the unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution in the electricity sector, and a credible 
competition policy in the telecom sector, raised efficiency through competition in these 
sectors.  
With a lack of funds, the Indian government has been in the process of 
implementing a range of changes in ownership, sector structure, and regulatory 
regimes in establishing long-term contracts between the government and private 
providers. The government has not only been developing regulatory authorities, 
financial markets, institutions, and intermediaries, but it has also set up earmarked or 
assured funds and used debt from international development agencies to allow 
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investment into the infrastructure sector. These arrangements would set the terms for 
financing urgently needed infrastructure projects, and especially projects developed 
under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme and its many variants have been the 
result. Such contractual arrangements were initially widely used to attract 
independent power generators, but they are now being used extensively to build roads 
and increasingly with water projects too. This study will seek to look at the evolving 
structure in which the national highway is being financed in India, especially under a 
broader context of reform in the infrastructure and financial sector, which allows for 
the expedition of investment to meet supply side constraints. This work proposes that 
the Highway Sector under the flagship of National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) 
since the 1990s, has been on the course of allocative efficiency in financing the 
construction and management of national highways through promoting Private Sector 
Participation (PSP), direct fuel taxation (cess), and imposing a direct user charge 
(tolling) by increasingly awarding more Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Toll projects. 
But there still remain issues as to what kind of cost-recovery system will evolve, and 
the nature of the next generation of financial reforms that will offer better financial 
intermediation in highway financing and Private Sector Participation (PSP).   
India, as an emerging economy, has supply-side constraints in infrastructure 
provision that have been well documented, this was largely due to a deficiency in 
public finance (ADB 2006; World Bank 2006). Although recent developments suggest 
that there is consistent political will to unbundle infrastructure and create highway 
assets, by attracting private sector participation and long term funds. The 
infrastructure sector? urgently? needs to implement public sector reforms to address 
supply-side constraints.?Changes in delivery mechanisms, processes, procedures, and 
institutional structures?need to be tailored towards client-focused outcomes and results.?
Financial sector reform and to increase investment in infrastructure were identified as 
the two biggest priorities for India by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in late 
2006  (The Economic Times, October 10, 2006).  Infrastructure development had also 
been accorded key priority in the 11th Five-Year Plan for the years 2007-2012 and the 
12th plan period of 2012-2017, with projected investment requirements of US$500 
billion and US$1.5 trillion, respectively, by the Prime Minister’s Committee on 
Infrastructure.?These initiatives pale when compared to China  spending about 11% of 
its GDP on infrastructure development, which indicates the scope and extent of scaling 
up needed in infrastructure development in India to match global standards. ?
Infrastructure investment in India has been a grave concern, due to the large 
constraints in public financing. Throughout the post-independence period, investment 
in infrastructure has hovered between 3-6% and it peaked in 1991, coincidentally the 
same year as the BOP financial crisis. Since then infrastructure investment declined, 
only partially recovered to 4.5% in 2003-04, and rose to 6% in 2007-08. However, the 
surveys conducted during the global financial crisis suggest that the government’s 
target of achieving an infrastructure investment of 9% of GDP would be a challenging 
task (thefinancialexpress.com Tue, 14 Dec 2010, accessed the same day). This only 
suggests the importance of further infrastructure sector reforms through unbundling 
and better financial intermediation to channel long-term contractual savings to 
infrastructure sectors on a much larger scale. India’s infrastructure investment as % of 
GDP has lagged behind China, which has been investing over 10% over the last decade. ??
National Highways has been an interesting case as it has been the target of the 
government with highest Public-Private partnerships in India although the scale is 
small. The comparison between the Indian and Japanese case was primarily chosen as 
the way in which the political economies of both these countries have differentiated 
between the national highways and other roads (State-Prefectural/District-Local-
Village) is similar. Apart from that, Japan served as a good case study as it was able to 
develop its national highways and expressways remarkably effectively during the post 
war period, despite facing issues of excessive cross-subsidization, over-investment in 
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asset creation, and accumulation of debts.?The underlying motivation that prompted 
this research has been the East Asian experience in infrastructure development, and 
other crucial studies that stressed the role of infrastructure development in economic 
development (World Bank 1994; Mody 1997; Estache 2006). This academic work 
identifies the weak link in the way infrastructure and a financial system are related 
with respect to each other, and seeks to develop an applicable framework. ?
This study uses public choice theory to achieve allocative efficiency through 
financial reform and vertical unbundling of infrastructure services. Vertical 
unbundling arrangements could range from? privatization, contracting out, de-
nationalization (divestitures), to Private-Public Partnerships (PPP’s). In the National 
Highways case PPP’s have been used extensively. While NH only constitutes 2% of the 
entire road network, it carries around 40% of all traffic, a fact that was largely 
neglected throughout the Indian post-independence era. On the contrary, due to the 
prevalence of populist politics, the government of India focused on expanding the rural 
and other district roads, which grew more than sevenfold between 1941-2001. The 
importance of developing an arterial highway network was only realized during the 
1981-2001 20-Year National Road Plan when national highway construction almost 
doubled. Especially after the post-1991 reform period, highway investment has been 
prioritized, and the investment for the current 5-year plan (2007-2008 and 2011-2012) 
is estimated to be US$45 Billion, of the total US$92 Billion investments required for 
the entire road and highway sector. Private sector investment is expected to exceed 
over half the required investments, expected to constitute US$24 Billion of the total 
US$45 Billion investments in highways. 
At the outset, it should be clarified that this thesis will only focus on the Indian 
National Highway development and achieving efficiency in its financing. It is based on 
established principles of infrastructure provision and financial intermediation, which 
will be explained and analyzed in the Indian and Japanese contexts. The result is a 
trend inference of highway infrastructure development and advancing a simple model 
to understand the chosen variables (public - private provision in infrastructure and 
financial sector development) interrelationship. The quantitative data used in this 
paper is illustrative and deliberately simple. Also, the quantitative exercise will be 
based entirely on the data for highways (efficiency sector) in India and Japan rather 
than all roads (equity sector). Ideally, the study should cover public policy issues in 
fund allocations and institutional development of all road and highways, but the focus 
on highways is a choice dictated by data availability. This research’s narrow focus is on 
the public choice in highway financing: to use data and simple quantification to review, 
encompass, and shed new light on, in achieving efficiency in highway funding (that is 
through private sector participation, user charges, financial intermedation, and so on). 
The National Highways is defined through the National Highways Act of 1956, 
which declares certain stretches of the road network in India as scheduled National 
Highways. The power to develop these highways rests with the Union. Therefore the 
central government has the right to acquire land, and charge user fees on these 
highways. But in principle the government only charges toll on two-lane or multiple-
lane highways (in other words tolls are not charged on single lane highways). The 
divide between central government and state governments also extends to the types of 
tax collected on vehicles and user charges. While the central government is responsible 
for taxes relating to vehicle purchase and vehicle use (especially fuel surcharges and 
taxes) and road-user tolls on national highways, state governments are mostly 
responsible for taxes on vehicle ownership and vehicle use, and for collecting road-user 
tolls on state highways when applicable. The National Highways Act of 1956 was 
amended four times consecutively, most recently in 2002, giving more power to the 
highway authority to manage the assets, and allowing for private participation and 
user-charger tolls (http://morth.nic.in/writereaddata/sublinkimages/NH-
ACT19568462823618.pdf accessed 15th December, 2010) 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 While Figure 1.1 above displays the structure of the thesis, Figure 1.2 displays 
the major themes and the analytical framework used for analysis, and Table 1.1 
enumerates the major works and proponents that are used in this work that will be 
elaborated in the chapters. The thesis aims at understanding the norms and 
institutional requirements in allowing a country like India to develop two indirect 
determinants of growth and development: namely the financial sector and 
infrastructure provision. The study uses the case study of the National Highways 
development and its financing. In order to understand the nature of institutions and 
the policy-making environment, Chapter Two discusses the theoretical aspects of 
Public Choice and the political economy of India, by looking at the opportunities 
available and constraints in developing intermediaries, regulatory bodies and norms 
that promote vertical unbundling of infrastructure services. Chapter Three discusses 
the Financial System, especially in the context of the post-reform period (1991), to 
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understand the nature of Public finance and the impediments to developing a financial 
market that intermediate for long term funding, especially for an efficiency sector like 
the National Highways.  
Chapter Four discusses the nature of Infrastructure services and why it would 
naturally take so long for a country like India, that has to shed its Socialist-style 
machinery, to find new ways of providing for its citizens, or in this regard users. 
Chapter Five discusses the way in which India has been financing its National 
Highways through its National Highway Development Program (NHDP), considering 
pros and cons and alternatives; it also suggests the option of creating a more 
liberalized financial system that could provide the long term funds, and a user-charge 
oriented system to sustain and expand the networks that will be built. Chapter Six 
presents the Japanese case of National Highway Development, and the principles that 
guided public undertaking of the Japan Highway Public Corporation. Chapter Seven 
presents the results of the comparative study by tracing the legislations, principles and 
institutional development to observe trends in developing highway network 
infrastructure, using the Indian and Japanese case. Further a model is introduced, 
deduced from the inter-relationship between infrastructure and financial 
intermediation that was used to understand the Indian highway infrastructure 
development and financing. This model attempts to include essential indicators that 
could be used to profile the direction of infrastructure development demarcating the 
shift from public to private provision; and assessing the mix of financing instruments 
used including i) general pool funds from indirect taxes, 2) ear-marked funding from 
direct taxes, 3) borrowings from international lenders, 3) long-term funds from the 
financial system, 4) and cost-recovery systems through user-charges. 
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Figure 1.2 Thematic Diagram of Thesis and Nature of Analysis 
 
 
 
8 
 
Table 1.1 Major Works and Theories Used in this Study 
!   Public Choice Theory:  
 • Public Choice Theory – the growing importance of public choice when states have to 
make decisions in the providing for their citizens, then being involved intensively and 
exhausting public finances (Jennings and Mclean 2008 {University of Strathclyde, Glasgow}) 
Public Choice and Efficiency (McCartney, 2009 {University of London}) 
 • Economic Constructivism Theory: the growing importance of norms (as opposed to 
ideologies), institutions, standards, and better information to make decisions (Seabrooke, 2006 
and 2008 {Australian National University}) 
!  Indian Political Economy:  
 • Fiscal Federalism: Constitutional Federal System, Center-State Division of Jurisdiction 
and Functions (OECD 2008) 
 • Political decentralization and Coalition Politics: The emerging new weak minority 
coalition governance that still is persistent in setting up institutions and norms that are pro-
reform (Malik, Kennedy 2009 et al.) 
 • Public Sector and Infrastructure Reform has been crucial in promoting efficiency in the 
way states govern themselves and provide public services, enabling public choice through 
disinvestment and private sector development and participation (World Bank 2004 {IBRD / 
World Bank, Washington})  
!  Financial Reform:  
 • Indian Financial System Profiling: Profiling of the Indian Financial System: Banking, 
Securities Sectors, and the scope for capitalizing on the growing domestic savings (ADB 2008, 
OECD 2007, Shah, 2008 {IIFP}) 
 • Financial Intermediation theory: Post-Keynesian theory on Financial Intermediation, 
theoretical framework for developing financial systems  (Studart, 2000 {University of 
London}) 
!  Infrastructure Regulation  
 • Options in regulation and finance: vertical unbundling, regulatory economics that provides 
options for choosing the best form of infrastructure provision under a monopoly environment 
(Gomez-Ibanez 2003 {World Bank}) 
 • Public Investment in highways: (Mody, 1998{World Bank}) 
!  Japan's Experience with Highway Development and Financing 
  •   Contracting out through JH and eventual Privatization: Social cross-subsidization, pooling 
system and horizontal unbundling through privatization (Mizutani and Uranishi 2006 and 2008 
{Fukuyama Heisei University}) 
 • Targeted Funding through FILP and User-charge system: Social Costs and Rate of Return 
(Iwamoto 2002 {Hitotsubashi University}) (Doi and Hoshi 2003 {Keio University and 
University of California) 
!  Indian National Highway National Financing: 
 • Targeted Financing, Fuel Tax, Borrowings and their viability: The need for definition of 
motives and developing sound financing alternatives through user-charge systems (for cost 
recovery) and new long-term financing instruments (through intermediaries) (David, 2009 
{Waseda University}) 
 • Concessions and Public-Private Partnerships: The current trends in Private Sector 
Participation in India, and the trend in PPP’s in Indian highway and road sector (Harris and 
Tadimalla 2003 and 2008 {World Bank}) 
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Hypothesis  
 
In order for the Indian state to achieve allocative efficiency in National Highway 
financing, a combination of new and improved institutional and regulatory 
arrangements and financial system reform to improve financial intermediation is 
required. 
 
Research questions:  
 
! What is the general trend, and in particular how has the Indian state perceived 
Infrastructure provision, in terms of the public-private, state-market domain?  
! How can public choice be used within the Indian political economy to improve 
allocative efficiency and redistributive functions, and manage and stabilize macro-
economic conditions? 
! What have the trends been in financing National Highways in India, and why 
should highway financing achieve more allocative efficiency by improving 
institutional and regulatory arrangements to improve cost-recovery using user 
charges, and seek more private financing through the financial system?  
! What is the general relationship between infrastructure investment and the 
financial system, and how could understanding this provide more feasible funding 
for network infrastructure investments. How can the highway sector with longer 
gestation periods capitalize on these developments, and what further reforms 
would improve long term funding?  
! Why did India adapt to global trends in infrastructure financing, including the 
introduction of PPP’s, and has the financial system reform (since the BOP 
financial crisis in 1991) introduced more specialized financial instruments and 
arrangements that ease long term funding towards infrastructure development? 
 
Research Assumptions: 
 
! Given that use of National Highways is much greater than that of local roads, to 
accommodate the growing volume of traffic (due to increased economic activity - 
production/consumption functions, mobility, and vehicle ownership) requires the 
expansion of highways.  
! This calls for large investments in the Highway sector (for the 11th Five-Year 
Plan is estimated currently at US$55 Billion of the total US$92 Billion for Road 
and Highways), and a shift from the public to the private sector in the way these 
services are provided and financed. 
! This has essentially occurred due to the constraints in public funding of public 
goods including infrastructure (where infrastructure investment in India is quite 
low at 5-6% of GDP). But the ability of the highway sector in attracting the 
private sector in the development and financing of these services; calls for the 
Indian state to re-assess the nature of the service and provide for natives in 
management of these services and funding mechanisms.  
! In India this has finally led to the vertical unbundling of highway development 
and provision, through the establishment of institutions and regulations (to 
promote concession agreements), special purpose vehicles (SPV’s to fund and 
provide viability gap funding), and allow for public-private partnerships (to allow 
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private sector developers to provide investment, better quality services and 
manage the assets). Infrastructure reform has occurred against a backdrop of 
continuing financial reforms that are leading to the development of markets and 
instruments that will improve financial intermediation and eventually promote 
infrastructure investment. 
! What is now essential are clear principles and a more integrated approach to 
highway infrastructure development and management, that that is based on the 
trends in developing and financing this public asset. Although there is continued 
political intent in India, to expand the highway network at a faster rate, this 
study suggests that the incentives for private sector developers (through 
regulations) to be involved, and providing more alternatives to financing (through 
better regulated markets and appropriate instruments) should be the direction in 
which policies can be developed. 
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India, the world’s most populous democracy, has attracted a lot recent media 
attention for its rapid economic growth, and its status as a Newly Industrializing 
Nation among the developing nations. This trend of economic growth only began some 
25 years ago when the Indian economy was able to outgrow the so-called the ‘‘Hindu 
rate of growth’’ (that is 3%) era, where it has seen growth rate three times as much 
recently. But the growth that initially brought the fiscal expansion of the 1980s was 
unsustainable as it eventually led to an Economic Crisis, which was triggered off 
through a balance of payment problem.  These times it was not like the earlier crises 
that were weathered through short-term borrowing from the international lending 
agencies coupled with various short-term remedial measures pertaining to the economy. 
This time substantive reforms were taken on through policy that reflected fundamental 
changes in the development strategy. Since then significant reforms were put in place, 
altering domestic investment barriers, foreign trade, financial market development, 
the private sector, and in infrastructure - unbundling has taken place. These reforms 
have seen a surge in economic growth and activity, and the potential for further 
development is still being assessed.  
In spite of the political instability that was ushered in by the era of coalition 
politics, the consensus in economic reforms continue, especially with the Congress 
party’s coalition voted back into power in the recent elections (of 2009). This is a 
reflection of the mass support to provide continuity to the reforms in progress, in spite 
of criticisms that the benefits of growth are not being shared equitably across the 
economy. In the post-1991 period, although both central and state fiscal deficits were 
brought down significantly in the initial years, they expanded to unacceptably higher 
levels in the later years. The current state of the finances does not leave much scope for 
development expenditure. If this situation is to be improved, tax and expenditure 
reforms, reduction in outright subsidies, and disinvestment in (mostly loss-making) 
public sector firms cannot be avoided. 
This study also assumes that every country is in its own unique stage of 
development therefore it is imperative that development strategies are prepared by 
learning from the experiences of other countries, both successes and failures, and by 
rightly recognizing the country’s developmental stage (Kaneko & Metoki, 2008, p. 250). 
In that regard, this study takes the political economy approach, to understand the 
various factors that influence the way actors perform their roles, as the variables that 
affect their actions are innumerable. In the case of India, this study argues that by 
allowing the efficiency sectors (in the economy) to be contracted out and regulated, the 
economy has more to gain through the added revenues from user charges and tolled 
services (for example in telecom), so that it can use its own limited resources in 
providing other equity oriented services and redistribution. Like the software sector 
development that has been the leading sector in the private sector development of the 
Indian economy, only heightens the inequality in the larger context of uneven and 
combined development. The imperatives of a market-driven global order suggest an 
open-ended process of development, making some economic and technological 
convergence realizable but also generating contradictions at various levels is 
unavoidable (D'Costa, 2003, p. 211).  
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Apart from understanding the political economic changes occurring as part of 
the reforms, this work will trace the economic regulations being put in place, of which 
the two core regulatory tasks of the state is to set, monitor, and enforce the maximum 
tariffs and of minimum service standards (World Bank, 2006, p. 16). Of the two, control 
over the maximum prices that enterprises can charge is the more visible and 
controversial regulatory task. Although tariff levels usually receive the most public 
attention, they are by no means the only dimensions of economic regulation. Economic 
regulation may also include controls over tariff structures, quality-of-service standards, 
and the use of automatic pass-through and adjustment mechanisms, access conditions 
to networks, entry and exit conditions for participants, and investment obligations 
relative to existing and new customers. In this regard the options available to the state 
to regulate public services, including access to infrastructure has been recently 
generated a lot of literature and public choice effectively provides a framework. 
BGB !C%'=%+A@"$&2,,?DE+A'*,H&:?#$A@&)C'A@%&"*>&+C%&7'*I
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 Public Choice literature has expanded since the 1950s to expand from fields 
close to political science to public finance and the provision of public goods (refer to 
Table 2.1 for the list of Proponents of Public Choice Theory). Public Choice has been 
crucial in addressing the questions of goods, financing and the systems of organization 
within the public domain, as the assumption is that a public good is peculiar as they 
are non-exclusive. Where contrasting to the private good and the market mechanisms, 
a public good is when the good is available to a person, it is available to use by all 
people (Feldman & Serrano, 2006, p. 168). Then the question arises as to how much of 
the public good should be produced, and what is the people's demand for it, and how it 
should be provided and financed. It also raises questions as to whether resource 
allocation should be allocated to the market mechanism or to the non-market 
collective-decision-making process of a political system. The public choice theory in this 
context has been crucial to liberate the market-mechanism as an autonomous resource-
allocation mechanism, in solving issues of allocation and distribution. This has come to 
form the core concept of Public Choice in contrast to individual choice (Kirchner, 2007, 
p. 21). 
 The limitation of the economic approach to the concentration of individual 
choices in markets is limited to just one segment of resource allocation while neglecting 
resource allocation by non-market mechanisms, for example the state with its voting 
mechanism and its bureaucratic system. Where economics is concerned with 
methodological individualism combined with the assumption of scarcity of resources 
and the assumption or self-interested rational behavior, markets produce prices 
according to relative scarcity of resources (for both factor and product markets). Apart 
from these concepts in economics, private property, freedom of contract and a stable 
currency have been the essential prerequisites for a functioning market. This simple 
model where distribution is affected by input factors that are remunerated according to 
their relative scarcity is not applicable in the competing mechanism for allocation and 
distribution in a non-market-resource-allocation process. Where in a non-market, 
political-decision-making mechanism of resource allocation of resources, the issues 
with allocation and distribution can be separated and dealt with differently (Kirchner, 
2007, p. 28). In this context Public Choice also expands to provide insight on how 
different institutional frameworks in political systems are set up and are functioning 
(positive analysis), and their scope for improvements (normative analysis). According 
to Kirchner (2007, p. 22), “Institutions in that context mean rules or set of rules. These 
rules are not rules of law in the books, but those of law in action”. 
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Table 2.1 Proponents of Public Choice Theory 
Early 
Predecessors 
Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, James Madison, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Abram Bergson (1938 on Social Welfare Functions), Paul 
Samuelson (1947), John Stuart Mill (1861), Josef Schumpeter (1942), 
Knut Wicksell (Wicksell 1896), Howard Bowen, Paul Samuelson, 
Richard Musgrave 
Founding 
Theoretical 
Contributions 
Duncan Black (1948), Anthony Downs (1957), and James Buchanan 
(1954 and 1959) and George Tullock (1962), Kenneth J Arrow (1951), 
Mancur Olson, Jr. (1965), John Rawls’s (1971), Richard Abel Musgrave 
(The Theory of Public Finance 1959), George J. Stigler (1965 The Theory 
of Price), Gary Becker (1983), Robert D. Tollison (1989), Sam Peltzman 
(1976), Dennis C. Mueller (Public Choice. 1979) Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
Principal 
Centers of 
Public Choice 
Work 
• Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University: 
Primarily trained in political science, with the notable exception of 
Buchanan. Developed a detailed theory of political motivation, 
mechanisms of collective decision-making, and their potential flaws, 
while devoting less attention to particular policies that the political 
process might generate  
• Economics Department University of Chicago: principally 
composed of economists, focused on identifying socioeconomic inputs of 
interests or demands and evaluating the form and impact of government 
intervention in the economy (outputs), without emphasizing the 
conversion process by which interest groups obtain the policies they seek 
• Notable outposts also found at the University of Rochester and 
Indiana University – Bloomington 
Source: Created by the Author from various Sources including  
 The economic paradigm, which is more a research program than just a 
methodological approach, is concerned with how individual actors co-ordinate their 
activities by social interaction, where they pursue their individual goals in a rational, 
utilitarian manner and deal with the problem of scarcity or resources.  When 
individual actors are confronted with the dilemma of how to allocate resources for the 
purpose of producing goods, it is usually in line with serving the needs of those, who 
are allocating the resources. Conversely the question arises as to how distribute the 
yield of that production. Public Choice assumes that although the methodological 
individualism solve the initial problem, where the allocation of resources for production 
of private goods could be left with the market mechanism, when it comes to public 
goods the market mechanism simply will not work. This is primarily because the 
nature of public good is in terms of consumption and distribution, where it is not 
possible to exclude actors from consuming these goods even though they are not willing 
to participate in the financing of production of these goods. With public goods the 
market-mechanism supposedly is inferior because it leads to systematic 
underproduction of such public goods, and therefore the financing of the production of 
such goods has to be organized through a collective-decision-making process (typical 
examples are the police, fire service, basic education, and so on). The political decision-
making process has been effective here in deciding which resources should be allocated 
to the production of such public goods, the quality and quantity of the public good and 
how they should be distributed to those actors, who are participating in financing their 
production. 
 This leads to the logical question as to when to apply the market-mechanism of 
resource allocation and distribution and when to apply the non-market-mechanism. In 
modern economics the dividing line is the distinction between private and public goods, 
although there is a difficulty in delineating the difference between public goods and 
private goods. Toll goods are a good example of how to exclude those who are not 
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willing to finance the production from consuming the goods, although most collective 
approach systems would have an alternative open or free access service of lower 
quality (for example dedicated expressway and alternate general routes). Thus the first 
decision in any society is to decide which goods should be put into which basket, and 
this strictly a collective decision and not a market decision (Kirchner, 2007, p. 29). 
Public Choice in this sense is more than applying the methodology of economics to 
politics. It seeks to re-define the agenda that begins with the group of individual actors 
who are making collective decisions on the allocation mechanism that serves their best 
interests. Public Choice is focusing on the citizen as a decision maker on the allocation 
mechanism (first decision making level) and decisions within that system (third 
decision making level). In the political sense public choice is interested in the voting 
process and rules on voting, as this process determines the principal-agency relation 
between citizens and political decision makers, the latter ones being agents who pursue 
their individual interests but under the given control of citizens. In this Public Choice 
approach prior to citizens making decisions on the allocation mechanism have to decide 
whether they are in favor of direct or representative democracy. 
 Understanding representative democracy (as in the case of India too) as a 
resource allocation mechanism Public Choice-analysis is not interested in the political 
process as such but in certain functions of that process.  Up to now the distinction 
between two levels of decision-making had been outlined, but there is also a third level 
that is crucial in the public choice analysis. The process as can be seen in (refer to 
Figure 2.1), first citizens have to decide which mechanism should be chosen, then they 
have to agree on rules to make the mechanism function and finally they have to make 
decisions within given rules. Public Choice has been developed in order to deal with 
decisions concerning non-market mechanism on the second and third level of decision-
making. From this perspective it becomes possible to compare governance structures in 
the political system, effectively using a normative analysis challenging traditional 
political science on the old paradigm of the model of the benevolent dictator and of a 
collectivist approach. Public Choice later has turned to positive analysis as well (p. 31), 
as this study also seeks to use in understanding public choice in highway financing in 
India.  
Figure 2.1 The Collectivist Approach of Public Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Model developed by author based on Kirchner (2007) and Leight (2008) 
 
 
 In his seminal work, Mueller (Mueller, 2003) explains that:  
“Public choice can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision-
making, or simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter 
of public choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting 
rules, voter behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of 
Level 3: Then they have to make decisions within 
given rules 
 
Level 2: After that they have to agree on rules to make 
the mechanism function 
 
Level 1: Citizens have to decide which mechanism 
should be chosen: Market or non-market 
 
Public Choice 
has been developed in 
order to deal with 
decisions concerning 
non-market mechanism 
on the second and third 
level of decision-
making 
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public choice is that of economics, however. Public choice has developed as a separate 
field largely since 1948. During the thirties, disenchantment with market processes was 
widespread, and models of “market socialism” depicting how governments could 
supplant the price system and allocate goods as efficiently as markets do, if not more so, 
came into vogue.”  
He further explains:  
“If the state exists in part as a sort of analogue to the market to provide public 
goods and eliminate externalities, then it must accomplish the same preference 
revelation task for these public goods as the market achieves for private goods. The 
public choice approach to nonmarket decision making has been (1) to make the same 
behavioral assumptions as general economics (rational, utilitarian individuals), (2) 
often to depict the preference revelation process as analogous to the market (voters 
engage in exchange, individuals reveal their demand schedules via voting, citizens exit 
and enter clubs), and (3) to ask the same questions as traditional price theory (Do 
equilibria exist? Are they stable? Pareto efficient? How are they obtained?). (Mueller, 
2003, p. 3) 
 The essence of this study will in line with Public Choice where normative and 
positive question will be asked. Normative will address what ideally should be done or 
what ideally should happen, this includes looking at the institutional and regulatory 
setups that allow for developments to occur. Normative questions are distinct from 
positive questions, which on the contrary make predictions and offer explanations. The 
primary normative question this research will seek to address is to demarcate the 
institutional development, legislative and regulatory developments in the 
infrastructure sector (especially the National Highways) and financial system. The 
positive question that this thesis seeks to address is to comprehend the trends in the 
outlay for National Highways, and predict how the governments will fulfill its 
obligation to the taxpayers and voters through public finance and public policy. The 
issue is also the continuity in government’s policy where today’s budget is not 
necessarily tomorrows, nor can the current public policies sustain themselves or be 
appropriate in the future. This study will refrain from looking at all the political 
details of a particular government’s budget or public policies, as this will not provide 
useful, long-lasting knowledge. On the contrary lasting knowledge requires 
identification of general principles that remain applicable anywhere at any time 
(Hillman, 2009, p. 3).  
 
 This work will be in line with public choice theory where it will be in line with 
public choice assumptions: 
-  The three social objectives the state seeks to achieve through public finance 
and public policy include efficiency, social justice (distribution), and macroeconomic 
stability (expressed in avoiding inflation and unemployment and maintaining stability 
of the banking and financial system), although approach will not focus on 
macroeconomics. 
- The scope of the study will also will extend beyond the narrow definition of 
economics as choice when resources are limited. Where the normative justifications for 
collective action is to improving the two activities – of allocative efficiency and 
redistribution. 
- Public choice will be consistent with ideas within political economy, which is 
the interface between economics and politics and studies the economic consequences of 
political decisions and the economic role of the state (Hillman, 2009, p. 3).  
- Focus will remain on (1) How much of the public good should be supplied? (2) 
How should the public goods be financed? It is obvious, although that the answer would 
differ for pure and congestible public goods? 
 The reason the public choice approach justifies researching how National 
Highways are to be provided, financed and regulated, is because if a free-access road 
was to be built, single individuals cannot imagine the use or simply be able to or 
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willing to build it. But considering that highways is a public good, beneficiaries of the 
road can get the government to levy taxes and build the road. However, with allocative 
efficiency as a social objective, it has to be determined whether building a road is 
justified as efficient public spending, and alternative methods of providing the service 
can be considered. The final decision whether to build the road will be most 
advantageous when cost-benefit analysis and applied. The cost-benefit criterion is that 
change is justified as efficient if (Hillman, 2009, p. 24):   
ΔW = ΔB − ΔC > 0 
In evaluating whether public spending or public policy proposal "B > "C, the 
government requires information of the benefits generated to the user or beneficiaries. 
This for example, in the case of benefits achieved from highways or road would include 
reduced travel time with faster vehicle speeds, safety through reduced likelihood of 
accidents, while on the contrary the costs would include for example the environmental 
damage through pollution, social damage through land acquisition, or pollution and 
waiting time through congestion. However markets do not exist to reveal such benefits 
and costs as the nature and provision of public goods is beyond the scope of the market; 
and the benefits and costs are “externalities” associated with the proposed road, which 
cannot be grasped by rational, utilitarian individuals (Hillman, 2009, p. p25). The road 
as a public good is a pure public good as many people can simultaneous use the road, 
although owning the road has elements of monopoly, non-rivalry and requires 
immobile, scale economy investments that the market cannot conceive. Cost-benefit 
analysis helps governments indirectly seek to compute costs and benefits that are not 
revealed in markets for the earlier mentioned reasons.  
Public choice started as an interdisciplinary field of study, since the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, outside the mainstream of both economics and politics. Many 
economists were, at the time, wary of applying economic models where there were not 
formal markets and price mechanisms to govern relationships, while political scientists 
were skeptical of rationality assumptions and formal modeling techniques inherent in 
economic study (Heckelman & Whaples, 2003, p. 797). Public choice literature has now 
left a deep imprint as a framework for analysis of the modern state in three areas that 
explores: mechanisms of collective choice; the behavior of voters; and the causes and 
consequences of government intervention in the market. As Leight (2008) broadly 
outlines the substantial body of literature in the broader public choice canon has now 
come to encompass: Interest Groups, Legislators and Regulators and the Issues of 
Capture, Voters and Rational Ignorance, The State and the Market. As over the last 
years, public choice work has also been criticized and over the last decades in this area 
new work has been extending into other fields, such as under political economy, new 
institutional economics, and positive political theory (Leight, 2008, p. 4). 
 The work of Jennings & Mclean (2008) remains very pertinent to this study as 
it discusses in detail the scope of public choice in achieving allocative efficiency as 
opposed to public finance approach which relies excessively on the government to 
protect citizens from market failure and redistribution (as summarized in the Table 2.2 
below). Public choice in its purest form may view policy advice as largely pointless, 
while the best way to influence policy is through a common agreement at a 
constitutional stage to introduce institutional reform, which implements procedural 
rules and substantive constraints (Jennings & Mclean, Political Economics and 
Normative Analysis, 2008, p. 64). Although in solving the institutional principal–agent 
problem, democracy develops as a sequence of compromises between the ruler and the 
ruled and these institutions that still remain controversial. This is because government 
remains too powerful with too great an opportunity to be corrupt, as the policies in the 
end may move towards satisfying powerful interest groups rather than towards the 
public interest.  
Therefore, while reviewing institutions and the regulatory development it is 
important to keeping mind that they do not happen in some ideal setting, but they 
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rather have evolved over time. These institutions may be efficient or inefficient, where 
they could be institutional inefficient of the kind of productive inefficiency of 
government institutions (which would include corruption); or where redistribution 
occurs although at a higher cost. This explains why inefficient policies and institutional 
arrangements can continue to exist, as there is sometimes no clear way of separating 
efficiency and distribution. This is exacerbated when citizens may not understand the 
policies being proposed have no economic incentive to become informed (owing to the 
probability of determining the outcome of elections being effectively zero) and thus are 
believed to choose irrationally. But even then a non-benevolent politicians although 
may not have any incentive to attempt to correct this ignorance but still may provide 
the policies that the people want regardless of their implication for social welfare. 
 
Table 2.2 Public Finance and Public Choice in determining the Role of the State  
Pure Public Finance Public Choice 
In an institutional vacuum, where the task is the 
technical one of devising policies to achieve 
maximum social surplus 
Policy advice may be ignored by politicians as it 
may conflict with the self-interest of government 
Focused on prescriptive analysis 
(Taxes/subsidies) 
The electorate depends on the altruism of 
politicians to receive benefits of collective 
decision making 
Institutional development through regulatory 
bodies policy advice as largely pointless. Policy 
will emerge as the equilibrium of ‘in-period’ 
political play between the various political actors 
in a society, crucial to introduce institutional 
reform which implements procedural rules and 
substantive constraints. 
Focused on the creation of innovative and good 
institutions which align the self-interest of 
political agents with the electorate 
Citizen’s are passive, populism Citizens are rationally ignorant, but there is 
vibrant political competition  
Government is a benevolent dictator: 
To provide for efficiency, redistribution and 
macroeconomic stability (the traditional tripartite 
roles for public finance as defined by Richard 
Musgrave) 
Is focused on trust in the ability of government to 
intervene and solve for market failures, so 
government’s become responsible for 
redistribution 
Institutions are well designed to ensure the agent 
(the government) will take actions that serve the 
principal (the electorate) if it leads to being re-
elected and being re-elected is attractive for the 
politician. 
Public Choice economists prefer the use of 
market forces in public provision on efficiency 
grounds. 
Focused on the danger of putting too much faith 
in government to solve these failures. 
Big Governments  Small Efficient Governments  
Public funds using direct/indirect taxes and Bank 
borrowing  
Private sector participation and funding sought 
from Financial Markets 
Move towards privatization and reduced taxation 
and eventually the introduction of market forces 
in the provision of public services 
Source: Compiled by Author from Jenning & Mclean (2008) 
 
This work aims to look at the political economy of reforms (since the late 1980s), 
by creating a narrative and evaluating the overreaching changes in financing 
infrastructure in India, especially using the highway sector as an example.  The 
broader study will attempt to look at changes in the structure of the Indian political 
economy within which economic reforms are taking place so as to go beyond a 
capitalistic approach of separating politics from economics (Dunn, 2009, p. 129). In 
other words a political economy approach seeks to be integrative and holistic in 
understanding issues related to policy and the real sector. While free-market models 
are most cogent at the level of individual consumption financial globalization has 
become more dangerous than we have realized (Krugman, 2009, p. 190). Even recently 
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with the Financial crisis since the late 2007, major rescues and restructuring are 
rightly being performed by the state, what often is ignored are the policy and 
regulations that govern capital and legislation of institutions. Further, approaching 
politics and the state as only consisting of parliaments and elected governments, only 
depoliticize the economy (Dunn, 2009, p. 220), and miss out on capturing various other 
aspects of the political economy. It is also to understand capital as incorporating both 
power and productivity. A broader definition could prove important for a political 
economy (PE) analysis, so as to help us re-interpret state and capital not as separate 
entities standing against each other, but rather as party overlapping institutions with 
intimately intertwined histories (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002, p. 51). 
 The nature of reforms in India, and the stress in policy circles to continue 
building efficient structure is a significant step in terms of not making collective 
decisions on basis of ideology but in terms of norms and their applicability. Most 
prevalent of studies on how states conform to a standard of civilization has been the 
early constructivist work in international relations. For this literature a norm may be 
spread through the creation of a ‘civilizing’ discourse. States willingly adopt the norm 
in order to demonstrate that they measure up to a standard of civilization, so that they 
can be good members of international society (Bowden & Seabrooke, 2006, p. 4). This 
has been the case with India, where the author argues that India is also adopting 
international standards and norms not only to be considered a civilized nation in the 
international arena, but also to benefit from the ideas that contributed to economic 
development and inclusive participation in the process of democratic collective 
decision-making. Much of the focus within political economy and international 
relations literature is on the processes through which global standards flow down to 
states, sometimes no often attributing to role of agency that is the receiving end of such 
standards. So developments that have occurred in India will also be put into 
perspective, with justification of why the government chooses a particular policy, and 
the rationalization behind it. 
Though standards are implemented through a policy framework, by building 
technical capacity, in terms of a shift in the exercise of ‘structural power’, as authority 
shifts from states to markets under neo-liberal globalization regime, or through the 
inculcation of norms on what is appropriate behavior. “Similarly, in political economy 
literature on policy diffusion, particularly the notion of policy convergence, has been 
challenged by ‘varieties of capitalism’ scholarship that emphasizes how institutional 
change takes place along national path-dependent lines” (Bowden & Seabrooke, 2006, p. 
5). Recent ‘economic constructivist’ work has also become sensitive to how essentially 
ideas are linked to interests, and how the spread of ideas requires struggle and 
contestation among social groups within a polity. This idea by itself, in the context of 
infrastructure development or financial reform would become a thesis by itself, as the 
political contestations of forward minded private sector specialists and government 
bureaucrats in India would like to see more far fetched reforms in India to improve 
productivity and efficiency. On the contrary the larger political machinery, with other 
inefficient sectors, labor unions, and interest groups would want to continue programs 
that support rather inefficient practices and economic assistance to corrupted 
institutions. As markets in India develop and evolve it remains to be seen as to how 
practices in institutional development will be benchmarked, by setting standards for 
countries and in the international arena, in the era of modern capitalism. An example 
being the way in which concession contracts are awarded in terms of building national 
highways (NH), when the associated traffic risks are high.  
Considering state-centric constructivism where states can, not only change 
their identity and social norms, the state is both a product of and creator of normative 
structures (Hobson, 2000, p. 166). The trend has been in identifying and specifying the 
mechanisms of change through institutions, rather than the power of ideas themselves 
as independent variables. Different actors play an important role in which institutions 
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change and the way in which they draw authority and their ability to enforce. A good 
example of this would be the Bretton Woods system’s capacity of reflexivity and its 
intention of eliminating uncertainty with deregulation (Seabrooke, 2007, p. 378). Using 
this fundamental framework, the discourse will seek to explain the terms in which 
actors within the political economy of India, have implemented the reforms through 
liberalization of the financial system, and unbundling of infrastructure activities. 
Financial liberalization is taking place through deregulation and the creation of 
various financial institutions. The aim in this regard is to achieve a post-Keynesian 
type of financial system, with well-developed banking and non-banking financial 
institutions and markets for a diversified range of financial assets. As in most 
developing countries, India too does not have developed financial markets, and growth 
has to depend heavily on bank credit. Especially with infrastructure investment, there 
is a strain on the credit-based financial structures and there remains a need to develop 
alternative institutions to finance long-term investment, to avoid the risk of financial 
instability and other adverse side effects of growth (Studart, 1995, p. xii).  
 For much of the period between 1930 and 1980, the dominant idea in most of 
the world on the delivery of infrastructure was that the infrastructure provider has the 
social obligation for universal service at a regulated price. Especially monopoly services 
which were in public hands. But this old system could not hide the cumulative 
economic failings with operational inefficiency, lack of technological dynamism, poor 
customer service, poor management accountability which resulted in a substantial 
waste of resources including overstaffing (Mody, 1996, p. xvii). This was exacerbated 
when the social objective of universal access, especially in providing public services to 
rural and poor areas was far from met. Infrastructure provision was reduced to a 
source of political patronage in a system where the consumer had virtually no voice. As 
this legacy is difficult to dismantle, this study aims at differentiating services into 
subsectors, where it is important to make a distinction between efficiency and equity 
subsectors. For example it is crucial to differentiate between the highway sector, that 
can attract more investment and PSP, and the road sector where the creation of 
capacity is costly and usage disparate. 
In this regard, the theoretical supposition behind using the NH as a case study 
is that highways financing should be oriented towards efficiency as opposed to the road 
sector (that is state highway (SH), district and rural roads). This would allow equity 
gains by eventually freeing up more public resources that could be allocated towards 
the road sector. But the purview of the thesis will only be towards building the 
narrative and evaluating the efficiency of financing the NH. Putting efficiency in 
perspective, can take advantage of the gains from economies of scale and scope, 
alternative financing opportunities through developing financial markets, 
institutionalization that provides arm's-length regulation towards competition and 
between providers, accountability to shareholders, and profit incentives that will 
increase PSP (Figure 2.2). Although there is no doubt that the National Highway 
development will contribute to economic growth but it certainly also has a political 
economy benefit of connecting major regions and metropolis, in due course reducing 
transaction costs, time saving and in the long run reducing transportation, 
maintenance costs. Under normative considerations the use and importance of the 
National Highway sector (discussed in the next section) should decrease its dependence 
and burden on the public exchequer. On the contrary there is a need for the Highway 
sector to increasingly use market mechanisms and attract more PSP and finance that 
will also necessitate a road user charge regime. 
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Figure 2.2 Hierarchy Chart of the Model to be Tested 
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This study seeks to use an integrative, multi-disciplinary approach to document the 
financial sector and infrastructure sector reforms. In so doing it attempts to deduce any 
parallels in the way they these reforms have been implemented, and create a narrative 
to identify areas where reforms are being carried out to instigate economic efficiency in 
sectors like the highway.  The thesis at large will attempt to use public choice to 
outline these developments and suggest possible policy implications. The Financial 
System is undergoing rapid transformation, but the issue is how intermediation will 
cater to the specific needs in financing different infrastructure sectors, by offering more 
alternatives for funding and PSP. The end goal is to evaluate if the reforms in the 
financial system actually benefit infrastructure investment, where the requirement is 
for large and long term financing.  While previous studies have been mostly discussing 
few aspects of reform, political economy of a single sector, trends in the infrastructure 
or sub-sectors or aspects of the financial system, this study seeks to add value by being 
more integrative in its approach. By using the political economy approach, the parallel 
developments in the financial and infrastructure sector are laid out, as it will seen 
using the Highway sector as a case study, these two sectors complement and cross 
affect each other, and are important on a whole in the efficient allocation of resources 
that will not only promote economic growth, but also strengthen governance. The 
methodology is provided below in Table 2.3, and the data sources and their nature 
(primary or secondary) is provided in the Table 2.4 further below. 
 
Liberalization, Deregulation, Developing Markets, 
Unbundling and PSP 
 
Efficiency in Financing Differentiating sub-sectors 
Infrastructure Investment 
Equity/Redistributive 
(Road Sector) 
Institutional & Regulatory Development 
Redistributive Functions Allocative Efficiency 
Public Choice in Funding 
 
Efficiency 
(Highway Sector) 
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Table 2.3: Thesis Methodology 
Methodology 
Political Economy 
Theoretical 
Descriptive Analyses: Survey of Literature (Secondary) and 
Developing a Model to understand Public Choice and the 
relationship between Financial System and Infrastructure 
Normative Approach 
 
 
Descriptive Analysis (World Bank, 2006, p. 29): Outlining 
regulation in Financial Sector and Infrastructure Sector in India. 
Case Study of National Highways 
Case Study of Highway Development and Public  
Policy Choice Analysis  Public Choice (Policy Principles) (Thomas & Mohan, 2007) and 
Regulatory Options: “A regulatory system is defined by the 
combination of institutions, laws, and processes that give a 
government control over the operating and investment decisions 
of enterprises that supply infrastructure services.” (World Bank, 
2006, p. 17) 
Policy Making Arrangement Single Country Structure Case Study (World Bank, 2006, p. 29) 
Evidenced Based Policy Making (EBP) (Thomas and Mohan 
2007) rather than an Ideology based policymaking. Case of Japan 
Highway Development and Financing 
Methods and Policy making process essential in influencing 
Policy Outcomes, that improve evidence: Policy as a process 
Organizational Arrangement 
and Institutions 
Owner, Financer, User, Regulator, Political Superior   
Broader Institutional Environment:  
Performance, Transparency, and Accountability  
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Table 2.4: Data Sources by Thematic Sections 
Data Sources by Thematic Sections Data Type 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) P 
Planning Commission of India P 
Asian Development Bank P 
Public Sector 
Spending 
 
Interviews with National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
(NIPFP) 
P 
Reserve Bank of India P 
OECD P 
Asian Development Bank P 
Indian 
Financial 
Sector 
 
Shah, Thomas, & Gorham (2008) NIPFP, Interviews with Shah and  
Rajaraman 
P&S 
Planning Commission of India P 
Committee on Infrastructure (CoI) P 
Infrastructure 
Spending 
 
ADB, Interview with Dr Rajaraman P 
National Highway Authority of India P 
World Bank (PPIAF) and Interview with South Asia Transport 
Engineer 
P 
 
National 
Highways  
Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways P 
Japan Highway Public Corporation, Ministry of Land Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, Ministry of Finance 
P 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), Ministry of Finance P 
JEHDR P 
Japan 
Highway 
Japanese Expressway Rate of Return (Iwamoto 2002) S 
Abbreviations: P – Primary (from Organizations and Institutions as well), S – Secondary (from other 
literature and other readings) 
 
 This study will concentrate solely on the National Highway sector, as 
attempting to cover the financing of the State Highways (SHs) and other roads is too 
deeply interlocked into the complex center-state federal relations in India. Just to 
elaborate using the transport tax regime: such as on vehicle, licenses, registration, and 
so on, most of these taxes are collected by the state governments (refer to Table 2-5). 
The way these collected funds are allocated back into states would be scope for another 
study. Although it is not under the purview of this research, but is becoming more 
important to separate the functions and the accounting of the state and the federal 
government. Without undertaking efforts to differentiate more accurately between the 
revenues from the direct tax/user charge and from indirect road/vehicle taxes and 
expenditures, it will become laborious to even see how funds are being allocated to 
deduce the trends in financing.  
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Table 2.5 Classification of Road Taxes/Charges in India 
Category Central Government State Government 
Vehicle 
Purchase 
Central Customs Sales tax on vehicle/chassis and 
cab/body 
?  Excise duty on motor vehicles ?  
?  Central sales tax on inter-state 
transactions and shipment of vehicles 
?  
Vehicle 
Ownership 
?  Motor vehicle tax (annual or lifetime 
?  ?  Registration fee 
?  ?  Certificate of fitness 
?  ?  Taxes Levied on passengers and goods 
vehicles 
?  ?  Entry Tax (vehicle brought from one 
state to another) 
Vehicle use Excise Duty on fuel Sales tax on spares/lubes/accessories 
?  Cess on fuel Sales tax on fuel 
?  Excise duty on spares/lubes accessories Cess on fuel 
?  Road user tolls Road user tolls 
?  ?  Permits & licenses 
?  ?  Fines & penalties 
Source: World Bank 2004  
 
The main limitations of the study is India’s size; diversity and institutional 
complexity increase the difficulty of applying lessons from any case study to broader 
contexts (Rao & Singh, 2006, p. 22). The study can only evaluate the changes that have 
thus far taken place and further evaluate the plans and policy in terms of efficiency. 
This is due to the fact that even the early phases of the National Highway 
Development Program were only implemented in 1999, and there are some projects 
that are still being identified. With the sector evolving and new trends being observed, 
apart from all the changes in the international financial system, it is difficult to deduce 
the possible modifications in how the future phases are to be implemented. This study 
will only focus on the National Highway phases that are currently under 
implementation and the future plans outlined in the Authority’s documents. Any 
attempt to evaluate the equity side allocation of funding in Roads would be scope of 
another study that would need to investigate into the intricate federal – state financial 
relations. Moreover, the authority to overlook the benefits of involving and regulate the 
private sector, profitability, and creating a user-charge regime only rests with the NH 
and the SHs (each state has its own regulation and financing plan), and so the 
National Highway sector is poised to reap rewards through the financial reform to be 
implemented with the central government.  
As any research must set itself some limits, I will attempt not to delve into the 
vast issues in India’s economic development but stick to the public choice in financing 
the National Highways in specific to the reforms underway in the Financial Sector and 
the unbundling and regulatory developments in the Infrastructure Sector. As the effect 
on both of these sectors on a country’s economic development is not well established, 
they still remain crucial in providing the soft and hard infrastructure that is required 
to establish and maintain the path of growth and development.  
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As this work is also an exercise on understanding the regulatory economics 
governing highway development in the context of a larger political economy. The 
author has chosen Japan as another case study to understand the basic regulatory 
options for two major reasons in order to explore how these regulatory options work in 
the real world by examining specific cases in which they have been applied in the past. 
The first reason being the most important, the regulatory framework governing 
Highway and general road policies are separated in both countries (that is India and 
Japan). And the other being the speed and rate at which Japan developed its highway 
program using a public agency. In this regard the author’s interest is in the way Japan 
initially tried to build its highway based on a user-charge system, which could be a 
possible policy suggestion in the case of India. Although in reality the system never 
took off in Japan, as a different policy of large-scale public financing was implemented. 
Understanding the case-study approach is critical, in this study as it also provides key 
questions that are empirical. Each regulatory strategy has its strengths and 
limitations in theory, but it is important to understand how powerful these strengths 
and limitations are in practice. Cases are also valuable because as studying them is a 
good exercise in understanding the interplay of economics, politics, and institutions 
affects regulatory commitment and performance (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003, p. 14).  
 Extreme caution is also taken as to not make any direct comparisons, as the 
differences between the countries are too vast. Although there are great difficulties in 
conducting international comparative studies, relating political economies, regulatory 
economics, finance and infrastructure related studies. But conditions under which 
Japan developed its National Highways post war time and the conditions in which 
India has started developing its network post financial crisis are similar in that the 
national government’s general account was insufficient to finance construction of a 
road network. Although the time and options available were entirely different, Japan 
sought to borrow from the Postal Savings system and the World Bank apart from 
developing a fairly effective user-charge system, while has for now started borrowing 
from the Multilateral Development Banks, fuel tax, and private participation. There 
are opportunities for India, through looking at Japan’s experience to develop a more 
efficient user-charge system and private participation (through concessions) over time 
and to decrease its reliance on debt. 
 This study will only look at policy options in the context of time and evolving 
trends in the world, as just comparing countries absolutely will only be in vain. As 
countries are obviously in different development stages so that institutional settings, 
human capital, and the level of governance are necessarily different.  Countries are 
also under different macroeconomic environment in terms of macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal situation, the government-private relationship, financial institutions, and the 
market of debt, equity, securities and bonds.  Furthermore, surrounding international 
environment is different in mobilizing foreign financial and human resources.  
However, it would nevertheless be a good exercise to assess both successes and failures 
of country experiences to draw lessons that are worth learning from. As experiences 
are based on sound principles that are all not incontrovertibly successful, but the 
public policy choices, institutionalization through regulation, there is a growing need 
for systems to become flexible in order to face the challenges that are imminently 
ahead. This becomes essential as the ultimate goal of public infrastructure 
development and provision is to provide the public with quality infrastructure services 
at low costs (Imamura, 2002, p. 40). 
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Apart from the evident similarities of the political economic systems of India 
and Japan outlined below: 
Similarities: 
Both India and Japan accepted a Westminster parliamentary model as the 
basis of their respective constitutional systems but also selectively incorporated 
features of judicial review and of federalism that have been more closely associated 
with the U.S. Presidential-Congressional model than with the British model (Anderson, 
2000, p. 146).  
Both also adopted a political party system that allowed for dominant-party 
governments until recently are dominated by coalition politics. As in the case of India 
Congress Party and, and Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. 
Both the cases of India and Japan have existing constitutions representing an 
essential continuity of the political order, although they have been amended over time. 
Differences:  
Their landmasses, size and geography, population, cultures, path of economic 
development, are just a few of the differences. Just looking at history especially 
following World War II presents to entirely different sets of foreign policies and 
political economies that put in place their own development paths. Where in order to 
promote democracy in Japan the U.S. military required the revision of the Japanese 
constitution to incorporate a “principle of local autonomy” through a two-tier system 
separating the local administration of prefectures and municipalities from national 
administration. Although Japan’s structure is that of a unitary state, with its recent 
rapid urbanization and industrialization and concomitant growth in transportation 
and pollution problems, more public demands are being addressed through the local 
administrative structures. While India followed a more post-colonial path of socialist 
development, closing itself and  
 
But for this study, the goal of rapid Highway development, the principles in 
which it was developed and financed, the institutional development and the context in 
which it was developed, and the exercises in regulatory economics will be used as the 
learning’s for India’s development of Highways. Although it is easy to label Japan as a 
bad example of Highway development in terms of the massive debts accrued and the 
eventual privatization, that is still under intense political limelight is by far misleading 
in the showing the successes in rapidly developing a system, over-emphasis of equity, 
and system that sought hard to develop a national highway network entirely on user 
charges (at least in principle). This has many implications for India, as the government 
has not been able to bring in any principle whereby it can justify its spatial and 
temporal cross-subsidization. Also a major similarity, and something of dire 
importance is the way in which Highways is segregated from the other roads in both 
countries, in order to focus and understand the issues only related to the Highway 
sector development, and treat it in terms of efficiency; leaving the other general road 
sector to solicit government funding and other equity benefits. 
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 This study will add value to the existing body of resources by evaluating the 
infrastructure orientation of financial reforms, especially by looking at the highway 
sector, which requires large investment and a prolonged timeframe for financial 
closure. As in this article it can be seen that there have been various institutional 
developments, regulations, financing options that have evolved over time in the Indian 
Political Economy. This study will stress that the way infrastructure investment was 
understood has changed over time, and in the recent period this has led to setting up of 
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institutions such the NHAI that regulates competition, management and execution of 
projects, promote PSP, MDB and market borrowing, provides viability funding to 
projects that are not so profitable and have high traffic risks.  
 This academic work seeks to outline the trends in the way India has developed 
its infrastructure sector, especially its national highway sector that has had serious 
supply side constraints due to the way it was perceived before the reform period. As it 
is been indentified as a sector that can gain greatly from economic efficiency, and less 
dependence on the public sector resources, it becomes crucial to evaluate the various 
policy options. With an increasing trend in revenue generation from treating the 
highways as an asset, there are also limitations on financing especially in crucial a 
time of rising inflation and interest, and liquidity constraints. The last few sections 
highlighted the growing opportunity for PSP and the active role of NHAI as regulator 
and mediator in implementing projects. But these trends still do not point to the 
financing regime that the NHAI wants to implement, and the resulting policy 
implications. Where financial reform in attracting intermediation to fund long-term 
investments in highways is a near possibility, the eventual evolution of a user-charge 
regime to recover costs to some extent is crucial. 
 The efficiency gains arising out of PPP’s, especially through concessions have 
been documented in studies particularly to experience of many Latin American 
countries, which was the region where the system of concessions evolved systematically. 
In the case of countries like India with limited experience in competition law, although 
with the Competition Act, 2002, and a Competition watchdog CCI there is still a need 
to amend existing rules to allow more competition in maintenance of highways and 
airports under the public-private-partnership model (livemint.com, accessed August 4th 
2008). However, concessions create privately operated monopoly or extreme cases of 
dominant position, with consequent market power, which is prone to be abused. This 
leads to the relevance of competition policy in the handing out of concessions, and over 
time the Indian experience will be an interesting case study hopefully probably with 
policy lessons.   
  The future scope of study depending on more access to data would 
enable studies on India’s experience with concessionaires, especially in the case of 
competitive bidding experience, re-negotiation of contracts, oversight by the 
governmental agency with anti-competitive practices. With India’s complex federal 
state and decentralization process, the success of the National Highway financing and 
development will further benefit the SH sector, by offering policy lessons and 
standardization in institutions and procedures. Where eventually principle of fairness 
would imply that the cost should be recovered from beneficiaries, it still remains 
unclear as to how user charges levied on in proportion of actual consumption will 
evolve in this exercise, so as to eventually also recover cost on the infrastructure 
development. Issues regarding Highway Infrastructure provision including prices, 
quality, access, rebundling, multi-modalism will not be addressed in this study due to 
the complexity and these issues will add future scope to research in highway 
infrastructure provision. 
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The Figure 2-3 provides the basic political and economic timeline with growth 
and inflation date obtained from the World Bank data. Table 2-6 provides the key 
macro-economic data from the ADB (India - 2008 Fact Sheet, 2008). India’s planned 
economic development that was set in place in the 1950s have been directed toward  
1) Achieving a high economic growth rate,  
2) Building the country’s industrial and technological self-reliance,  
3) Creating full employment, and  
4) Achieving social justice by re- moving gross social inequalities.  
 (Malik & Kapur, 2009, p. 140) 
These goals have been constant over time in India’s political history providing 
consensus between the diverse-left-centrist-right political and ideological spectrum of 
political parties and the divisiveness of regional aspirations across India. This has 
allowed planning to continue to India giving it a new context in which to guide 
development. But controversies still exist about the nature of policies and methods to 
secure these aims. The early period in the political economy had Nehru’s Congress 
Party provided socialist policies, in the direction of economic nationalism, autarchy, 
limited dependence on economic links with Western powers, and an abiding suspicion 
about Western economic colonialism following India’s independence (2009, 141). These 
characteristics still exist in the economy, where economic planning had a strong bias 
toward state regulations and a preference for public sector enterprises, checks on 
private sector development, and development of a vast bureaucracy to exercise the 
controls and direct economic activity. The statist and socialist economic culture 
naturally distrusted market principles and globalization imperatives were shunned for 
the a few decades.  
 In order to not get into the details of the historical changes that took place, and 
in order to summarize the recent trend; apart from the countries undergoing great 
transformations since 1990s from a communist system to a capitalist system, India, for 
example had been operating on a mixed system. India in fact offers a prime example of 
a mixed-economy, with much more state-ownership and bureaucratic control than most 
other capitalist countries, and a ruling party with an ideology exhibiting some socialist 
features for first two or three decades. However, the party did not include in its 
program the elimination of private property nor the market, nor did it seek the 
retention of power at all costs. The big change that came in the 1990s was the then 
Prime Minister Narashimha Rao political approach that shifted toward partial 
economic reforms. The crucial aspect there was that he recognized that India was 
lagging behind China, a communist country that had accepted capitalist principles as 
the basis of its development, while India, a liberal democracy, remained tied to the 
principles of a socialist economy.  
The dichotomy between the capitalist and socialist mode of production is that it 
will continue to persist, considering the size of the economy and the variety of interests 
that need social and economic protection from the state through voicing their political 
freedoms. In spite of this the ideas of free market, importance of private sector, and the 
vitality of global competitiveness took on national policy. The next regime that came 
into power, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for the first time brought Hindutva 
politics to the center stage, actually vigorously continued the reform process. BJP’s 
focus on a strong U.S.-India, India-West, and India-Israel strategic relations also took 
economic partnerships of private sector between India and the West. The Manmohan 
Singh government that came into power since 2004, with the regime reelected again 
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last year fortified the political support and the space for reformers despite initial 
resistance by their leftist coalition partner. This has left India with a new system of 
coalition politics, as the minority governments, both the BJP and Congress, have 
become weak and are in effect dependent on negotiating shared interests with allies 
especially in the area of economic reforms. Weak minority government leaders, 
whether economic nationalists or economic rationalists, are expected to contend on the 
approach for economic reforms, although it seems quite likely that the direction of 
reform will not divert. 
Another crucial aspect has been India’s look East Policy, where it has been 
intellectually grappling with catching with China and the rest of East Asia in terms of 
economic growth and international trade. India’s path of economic development behind 
the Hindu rate of Growth from the 1950s through the 1980, which was coupled with 
food shortages and dependence on foreign aid, was fundamentally put to question. 
India’s occurrence of poverty increased, although there was no famine or extreme food 
shortage (unlike during the British Raj). When India was faced with a serious economic 
crisis and an acute shortage of foreign exchange because of mismanagement of the 
national economy, it was the opportune moment to put in place the reforms that would 
contribute to growth, jobs and competitiveness. So by 2006 its gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew by 9.2%, with a foreign direct investment that grew 44% in 2006–2007 
(US$16.0 billion, up from US$2.2 billion in 2003–2004) (2009, 143). The pace of reforms 
is expected to assist India in enhancing the human resource pool of 500 million young 
people who can engage the world and raise India economic performance. 
 As the political regime under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has already 
become self-conscious of the infrastructure lag and deficiency, especially in comparison 
with China, institutions and systems have already been put into place to oversee 
developments. This actually includes the Committee on Infrastructure (CoI) that is 
under the direct purview of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet that has already 
started micro-managing infrastructure development across all sub-sectors (including 
NH). The trend is that in spite of the nature of the domestic politics and weak minority 
coalition governance and the theory of state controls and bureaucratic rule trumps 
economic rationality of the Indian and global marketplace and the social and economic 
needs of India’s poor. Furthermore, apart from increasing productivity within the 
economy, there is a daunting task of reducing poverty that still stands at 30% of the 
population, despite significant growth in India’s middle class and a slight reduction in 
the population pool that lives below the poverty line.  Despite the lofty economic co-
ordination goals that guide the Planning Commission, the Indian economy does not 
have much to boast about, as there are still grave concerns in the areas of social justice, 
economic disparities and the elimination of poverty. Although India’s socialistic 
experiment has contributed to keeping the federal and state relations strong, it still 
remains to be seen as to how the public sector adopt to changing times and reduce its 
own size and operating inefficiency. 
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Figure 2.3 Indian Political Economy Timeline 
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Indian Political Economy Timeline (Continued) 
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Table 2.6 Key Macroeconomic Indicators for India 1990 - 2007 
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Six decades of democracy has increased the capacity of the political system, to 
deal with the kind of tensions that accompany such diversity, including communal 
rioting, violent expressions of linguistic sub-nationalism, religious clashes, and 
territorial claims made by regional elites, and the continuing conflict between the 
traditional and modern elements in Indian society. The divisive potential of extreme 
ethnic and linguistic diversity as well as religious segmentation in India have been 
mitigated by the division of the Union into federal states, often along linguistic and 
religious lines. Although at the time of during the 1950s when the original demarcation 
was done, many feared that redrawing state boundaries to conform more closely to 
linguistic and ethnic boundaries would lead to the breakup of the country. If fact if the 
country had actually broken apart, this would have been no surprise, to a casual 
observer of the Indian political economy as it was predicted fifty years ago. The 
combination of the parliamentary model with a federalist system has allowed the 
creation of regionally based parties and state governments for groups that otherwise 
might have scant influence or effective power sharing in a purely majoritarian system 
(Anderson, 2000, p. 146). 
Although the ethnic and regional diversity of India and the decline of single 
party control at the level of national government have led many observers to predict 
secession and civil war, all this would in the real sense be a gross underestimation of 
the resilience and flexibility of Indian democracy.  Part of the secret of this resilience 
has been the ability of the imported party system both at the federal and the state level, 
to be adapted to the pre-existing traditional identities grounded in religion, caste, and 
language. Another success factor has been the novice of Indian leaders, in contrast to 
those of its neighbors and many other third world countries, had drafted, adopted, and 
implemented a constitution that would become the pillar in providing stability and 
unity. India’s leaders perceived the consolidation of the state through territorial 
integration and the establishment of effective political institutions as preconditions for 
steady economic growth. 
Under the guidance of its charismatic leaders in the twentieth century, the 
Indian political system developed an institutional structure capable of facilitating the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts. Three key institutions that have also kept the fabric of 
the political system intact are the Congress party, the federal structure of the 
government, and an apolitical bureaucracy— aided the smooth transition of India from 
its colonial stage to political maturity since 1947. In the 1950s and the 1960s the 
Congress party functioned as a federal organization, with a consistent accommodative 
interplay of power politics between the regional and national elite and with strong 
grassroots support. Moreover, regional political leaders, especially after the states were 
reorganized along linguistic lines, were able to get their regional demands conceded at 
the national level. A combination of regional political pressure and mass agitation 
worked to produce political accommodation within the framework of Indian 
constitutional arrangements and its political nationalism. That way, sub-national 
tendencies were contained by political means rather than by armed struggle, and 
Indian leaders have experience and convictions to resolve disputes. 
 The Indian political system’s resilience to extreme pressure was even seen with 
Prime minister’s Indira Gandhi’s efforts to manipulate the country’s political 
institutions to achieve her personal and partisan goals, but the constitutional system 
has remained intact. The system of checks and balances exist in the Indian political 
system that was designed to be provided through as a result of work by the judiciary, 
media, and other opposition parties (especially the BJP), regional state administrations 
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and parties, civil society groups, and occasionally the president, despite the asymmetry 
in the distribution of political power in favor of the Gandhi family, who maintains the 
right to refer decisions (Malik & Kapur, 2009, p. 142). The stability and strength of 
India’s political system had also been tested by the peaceful transition of power not 
only from one leader to another but also from one political party to another. Even when 
the assassination of two of the most important prime ministers of the country 
(members of the Gandhi Family), Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the 
new prime ministers were sworn in smoothly and without any constitutional crisis. 
Although part of the explanation for this orderly transfer of power may be found in the 
institutional framework created by India’s political system, but another important 
factor though not mentioned are the informal rules and procedures developed by the 
leaders to resolve succession struggles and intra-elite conflicts. 
 
Figure 2.4 Results of General Elections 2009 
 
Source: Election Commission of India 2009 ((Election Commission of India, 2010) 
 
As the map above in Figure 2.4 depicts the results of the 2009 elections suggest, 
there is a growing diversity in the political parties that have evolved, replacing the 
single majority party regime till the early 1990s. The interesting fact is that there are 
certain pockets where National Parties (especially both the Congress and the BJP) 
have popular support. Other regions especially further away from the center have more 
regional parties that join coalition governments. Although sometimes seen as weakness 
and sign of instability, the growing number of and increasing power of national parties, 
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and the weakening of the major party power, could also mean more inclusiveness of 
electorate demands. Where negotiations and regional policies and development could 
be the result of the diversification and decentralization in politics. Given the 
population and size of India, it is important to growingly empower regions (especially 
through political representation through parties) and share the benefits of the political 
economy. In spite of more power sharing arrangements to form governments, it would 
surely provide more cohesiveness at the center in terms of evolving a culture of 
negotiations and reducing parochial interests.  
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In order to understand the Federal structure using the case of Tamil Nadu 
State (located in the Southern-East part of the country) is explained here. Where the 
policy and regulatory framework is defined by the various Central and State level Acts 
and Nodal Agencies, a number of reform measures have been undertaken at the policy, 
institutional, and regulatory level in each of the transport sectors for attracting private 
sector investment, improving institutional capacity for project delivery and enhancing 
efficiency of services. The road sector is a concurrent subject, where the jurisdiction of 
Central Government is limited to NH, while the jurisdiction of State Governments is 
across SHs, Major District Roads, Village and Other Roads. At the Central Level, the 
overall policy and program development and planning is done by the Planning 
Commission in consultation with the Ministry of Shipping, Roads, Transport and 
Highways (MOSRT&H) and Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD). Refer to the 
length of highways and roads that pass through the state as listed below in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7 The Statistics of Various Classifications of Government  Roads in 
Tamil Nadu as of March 3, 2007 
Sl.No Classification Length/Km Maintained by 
1 National Highways 4,483 3329 Km – NHAI, 1244 Km – Chief 
Engineer N.H., Highways 
Department (HD), Chennai – 5 
2 State Highways 9,256 Chief Engineer (General) HD, 
Chennai - 5 
3 Major District Roads 
(MDR) 
9,451 Chief Engineer (General) HD, 
Chennai – 5 
4 Other District Roads 
(ODR) (including 1746 
Km of Sugarcane 
Roads) 
38,256 Sugar Cane Roads – Chief Engineer 
(Projects), HD, Chennai. ODR’s- 
Chief Engineer (General) HD, 
Chennai-5 
 Total 614,446  
Source: (Government of Tamil Nadu - Highways Dapartment, 2010) 
 
At the State Level, the overall policy and program development and resource 
planning is done by the State Planning Cell in consultation with Central Planning 
Commission and State Ministry in charge of Roads. Many State Governments have set 
up State Road Development Corporations for the Development and maintenance of 
Roads. The Government of Tamil Nadu has the unique distinction of creating a 
separate Highways Department as early as 1946 exclusively to attend to "Roads and 
Bridges” in the State. It was a part of the Public Works Department earlier but is now 
a separate department with seven Chief Engineers and other engineers and 
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administrative Staffs. A separate Highways Department was formed in the Secretariat 
under the Secretary to Government, Highways Department in 1996. The objectives of 
the department are to maintain and improve the roads under the control of the 
Government and to provide all weather road connectivity to rural habitations. Tamil 
Nadu was the forerunner in bringing out a standard specification for roads and bridges 
in the year 1954.  
 
Table 2.8 Major Regulations, Developments in the State Arena: Case of Tamil 
Nadu 
Year: Regulation, Legislations Other Related Developments 
1998 Tamil Nadu Transparency in 
Tenders Act 
Other Manuals put in place, for example TN 
Budget Manual,  
1946 creation of Highway Department 
2001 Tamil Nadu Transparency in 
Tenders Act 
There have been other State Financial and 
Accounts, and Financial Codes developed to 
maintain standards 
Tamil Nadu Highways Manual Includes: TN Highways Engineering Service 
Rules, and Subordinate Service Rules 
2005 Tamil Nadu Infrastructure 
Development Corporation 
Also includes a TN State Construction 
Corporation 
Source: (Government of Tamil Nadu - Highways Dapartment, 2010) 
 
The Jurisdiction communications, namely, roads, bridges canal banks and tank 
bunds rope way and other means of communication excepting Highways declared by or 
under law made by Parliament to be NH rests with the state. Criminal Appeals: 
jurisdiction rests with the state where public services - Statutory Rules of the service 
with which this Department is concerned - Revision of and amendments to these rules. 
In terms of financing too, a center-state divide exists where Indian state governments 
raise finance through omnibus issues organized by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI, 
Central Bank). However, the state issues are not government guaranteed. The 
omnibus issues are sold at fixed coupons and prices (the same for every state). 
Potential buyers subscribe at the fixed-coupon rate for the bonds of a particular state 
(the amount on issue for each state is not announced). The subscription is closed after 2 
days even if some issues are under subscribed. 
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The current Union finance minister Pranab Mukherjee faces a grave task of 
reducing the combined fiscal deficit of the Centre and the states, which stood at an 
estimated 8.09% of GDP in 2008-09 (livemint.com, accessed January 30th 2010). 
Although over the years this was on the decline, and there was even a regulation put in 
place to reduce the fiscal deficit by law (refer to Figure 2.5), where even in 2007-08, the 
corresponding figure was only 5% of GDP. The deterioration of the public deficit 
reached its 16-year high, where the last time the country witnessed a considerable 
deterioration in its public finances was in 2001-02, when the combined weight of the 
Fifth Pay Commission payout and greater interest burden caused the fiscal deficit to 
balloon to above 10%. This time around the “real” figure stands even higher at 11.5% if 
bonds issued to oil and fertilizer companies are included. 
The initial enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 
(FRBM) in 2003 was the culmination of a lengthy attempt to devise a control strategy 
for public finances. The act requires the government to follow a strategy to reduce the 
fiscal deficit to less than 3% of GDP by 2009. But in the last few year when precisely 
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the global financial crisis hit India and, then finance minister P. Chidambaram 
abandoned the discipline of the FRBM Act. While FRBM targeted revenue deficit at 1% 
of GDP in 2008-09 and the fiscal deficit at 2.5% of GDP, the figures shot up to 4.5% and 
6%, respectively. The Centre’s “true” fiscal deficit is actually at around 8.5%. Giving up 
of FRBM targets is only partly responsible for the fiscal mess, where there are 
structural features that are believed to have caused the problem. Much of the reduction 
in the revenue and fiscal deficits was due to the extraordinary buoyancy of tax 
revenues from 2003-04 onwards and not due to prudent expenditure management. As 
in 2001-02, the inability to neutralize (or anticipate) the effects of pay commission 
awards, the refusal to pass on the burden of oil prices and under-funding of social 
sector spending had caused the deficits to balloon. Table 2.9 provides the Interim 
Budget spending for the 2009-10, with a trend in deceleration of expenditure 
represents where the government spends.  
 
Table 2.9 Union Interim Budget 2009-2010 at a Glance (all figures % of GDP) 
 2008-09 2009-10 Growth rate (%) 
Item (RE) (BE) 2008-09 2009-10 
1 2 3 4 5 
1) Revenue Receipts (i+ii) 10.4  10.1  3.7  8.4  
I) Tax Revenue 8.6  8.3  6.0  6.8  
ii) Non-Tax Revenue 1.8  1.9  -6.0  16.4  
2. Non-Plan Expenditure 11.4  11.1  30.9* 8.1  
of which: ?  ?  ?  ?  
i) Interest Payments 3.6  3.7  12.7  17.0  
ii) Defense Expenditure 2.1  2.4  25.0  23.7  
iii) Subsidies 2.4  1.7  82.2  -29.9  
3. Plan Expenditure 5.2  4.7  38.0  0.8  
4. Revenue Expenditure  14.8  14.1  35.1  5.6  
5. Capital Expenditure 1.8  1.7  17.9* 7.8  
6. Total Expenditure 16.6  15.8  33* 5.8  
7. Revenue Deficit 4.4  4.0  359.0  -1.1  
8. Gross Fiscal Deficit 6.0  5.5  157.3  1.9  
9. Gross Primary Deficit 2.5  1.8  -403.3  19.8  
*: Adjusting for acquisition cost of RBI’s stake in SBI at Rs.355.31 Billion in 2007-08. 
Source: RBI 2009  
 
In terms of financing the Central government the gross and net market 
borrowings (dated securities and 364-day Treasury Bills excluding allocations under 
the Market Stabilization Scheme) of the Centre for 2008-09 were budgeted at Rs.1.785 
trillion and Rs.990.00 million, respectively. Extra-Budgetary items of the Central 
Government has been supporting Food Corporation of India (FCI), fertilizer companies 
and oil marketing companies through issuance of special bonds in addition to providing 
explicit subsidies on food, fertilizer and petroleum through the budget. These bonds are 
considered to be fiscal deficit neutral since they do not involve immediate cash flow and 
are, therefore, not treated as part of budgetary expenditure/ receipts. However, these 
bonds have fiscal implications as they carry an obligation to repay at a later date and, 
hence, add to the fiscal liabilities of the Government. Furthermore, as interest 
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payments on such bonds are treated as part of the revenue expenditure, they affect the 
revenue deficit and, thereby, the fiscal deficit. And during 2008-09, special bonds 
amounting to Rs.759.42 million and Rs.200.00 million were issued to oil marketing 
companies and fertilizer companies, respectively, together accounting for 1.8% of the 
GDP. Table 2.10 shows the gross fiscal deficit and their financing patters for two years. 
 
Table 2.10 Financing Pattern of Gross Fiscal Deficit (amount all in Rs. Billion) 
Item 2008-09 (RE) 2009-10 (BE) 
1 2 3 
Gross Fiscal Deficit 3,265.15  3,328.35  
Financed by: ?  ?  
Market Borrowings 2,665.39  3,086.47  
?  81.60% 92.70% 
Securities issued against Small Savings 13.24  132.55  
?  0.40% 4.00% 
External Assistance 96.03  160.47  
?  2.90% 4.80% 
State Provident Funds 112.06  10.22  
?  1.50% 1.50% 
National Small Savings Fund (NSSF) 112.06  10.22  
?  3.40% 0.30% 
Reserve Funds -168.08 33.58  
?  -5.10% -1.00% 
Deposit and Advances 127.88  9,026.00  
?  3.90% 2.70% 
Postal Insurance and Life Annuity Funds 25.94  26.72  
?  0.80% 0.80% 
Drawdown of Cash Balances 299.84  0.00  
?  9.20% 0.00% 
Others 44.86  194.77  
?  1.40% 5.90% 
Source: RBI 2009  
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As Indian Government deficits have also been large so has been government 
borrowing since the late 1990s has been large and has grown rapidly. The revenue 
deficit increased to 5% of GDP in fiscal year 2001–02. Since then, although the deficit 
appears to be more under control at about 2.5% of GDP, growth has remained strong 
and suggests the actual deficit has continued to increase, calling for further 
government borrowing. India’s issues are an average of less than US$75 million, with 
the largest below US$350 million, small by the standards of international benchmarks. 
The RBI has followed a policy of passive consolidation that reduces the number of 
bonds for the fiscal years 2007/08 and 2008/09 saw the retirement of 14 separate bonds 
for the addition of four new bonds reducing the number of bonds outstanding by 10 to 
95. However, of the four new bonds, only one was over US$2 billion, representing an 
international benchmark bond, while the other three ranged from US$250 million to 
US$530 million. Significant characteristics of the government bond market include a 
large number of issues that can be quite small; a large proportion of electronic trading; 
the absence of bond- related derivatives; and (iv) statutory requirements on investors. 
Further below Figure 2-5, that depicts the size of government borrowing is, Table 2-11 
that periodically lists the major legislations and regulations relating the government 
fiscal area. 
Figure 2.5 Government Borrowing for Deficit Financing 
Source: ADB (2008) 
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Table 2.11 Important Legislations and Developments in the Fiscal Area 
Year and Legislations Development and Details 
Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management Act, 
Enacted by Parliament, 
2003 
Target of reducing fiscal deficit; FRBM Act mandated the 
government to cut fiscal deficit by 0.3% every year to make it 3% of 
GDP, and revenue deficit by 0.5% to eliminate it by 2008-09 from 
2004-05 
 The government has announced a target of moving to a nationwide 
goods and services tax by 2010. This will allow a consolidation of 
the whole indirect tax system, by abolishing the central VAT 
2001 The Clearing 
Corporation of India Ltd. 
(CCIL) was set up and 
went live together with 
the Negotiated Dealing 
System (NDS) of RBI. 
CCIL set up for providing exclusive clearing and settlement for 
transactions in Money, GSecs and Foreign Exchange. Its function to  
Improve efficiency in the transaction settlement process, 
Insulate the financial system from shocks emanating from 
operations related issues,  
Undertake other related activities that would help to broaden and 
deepen the money, debt and forex markets in the country. 
2002 NDS of RBI set up NDS is an electronic trading platform set up to manage the 
exchange of government securities (GS) and other money market 
instruments. The NDS will assist the RBI 
Enhance the dealings of fixed income investments,  
Hosting new issues of GS. 
Eventually eliminate the physical exchange of forms between its 
trading members. 
2006 the primary dealer 
structure was modified 
 
 
Government Securities 
Act, 2006 
To allow banks to operate directly as primary dealers (separate 
primary dealer subsidiaries of banks were permitted to reintegrate 
into the parent bank).  
With currently six primary bank dealers and 11 "stand-alone" 
primary dealers.  
Primary dealers have privileged access to preferential finance at the 
RBI through the liquidity access facility, through repos and RBI’s 
open market operations (permitted to borrow and lend in the money 
market, raise resources through commercial paper, and have the 
same access to finance from commercial banks as any other 
corporate borrower).  
2005 Negotiated Dealing 
System–Order Matching 
Segment (NDS-OM) 
introduced by RBI 
. This is a screen-based anonymous trading and reporting platform 
enabling electronic bidding in primary auctions and disseminates 
trading information with a minimum time lag. NDS-OM has had 
considerable success and has taken a dominant share of GS market 
trading 
2006 RBI starts 
publishing a yearly 
issuance timetable for 
dated bonds 
This Issuance Timetable seeks to increase transparency of issuance 
allows  
Issuers of government bonds and investors to plan their cash flows 
and investments more accurately,  
Prevention of market distortion by temporary excess supply and 
ensures better prices.  
Although since 2001, Treasury bill auctions (and not longer-dated 
bills) a published timetable was introduced for but not for longer-
dated bonds. 
2007 Government 
Securities Regulations, 
 
Compiled by author from various sources 
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As Figure 2.6 suggest in 2009–10, eight of the issues are due to mature. It is 
clear that at most maturities there are several issues, none of which is very large (or 
therefore very liquid). Other Asian markets have realized that small issue size does not 
enhance liquidity. India’s issues as mentioned earlier are an average of less than 
US$75 million, with the largest below US$350 million, small by the standards of 
international benchmarks. The RBI has followed a policy of passive consolidation that 
reduces the number of bonds—the fiscal years 2007/08 and 2008/09 saw the retirement 
of 14 separate bonds for the addition of four new bonds reducing the number of bonds 
outstanding by 10 to 95. However, of the four new bonds, only one was over US$2 
billion, representing an international benchmark bond, while the other three ranged 
from US$250 million to US$530 million. India retains a number of statutory 
requirements on investors. Banks, insurance companies, and pension funds are 
required to hold 25% of assets in GS. In contrast, foreign investors have only limited 
access to GS. 
 
Figure 2.6 Indian Government Bond by Maturity 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
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As discussed in the previous section with difficulties for the government to 
appropriately allocate its dwindling public financial resources to wide range of uses 
gets intensified with growing fiscal issues and public deficit. The same time 
government expenditures is also more closely scrutinized by the public that are now 
becoming more aware of the government accountability than before.  As a result, the 
monetary resources that can be allocated to infrastructure provisions are becoming 
scarce. In this regard infrastructure supply is also being constrained especially in a 
fast growing economy like India not only requires funds for green field projects but also 
for the maintenance and rehabilitation. Such problems as under-maintenance of 
existing facilities and inadequate funds for new capital investment may trigger the 
privatization decision by the government. In such a case, the specific goal of the 
government for privatization is to find additional funding for infrastructure that 
government cannot otherwise provide. In other words, the private sector is expected to 
bring additional source of money from the private capital markets to help the 
government fund their infrastructure investment. 
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 First motive is that the government tries to achieve fiscal restructuring through 
privatization of its public infrastructure provisions. Due to growing oppositions against 
taxation the governments in general are experiencing difficulties in raising tax rates 
higher than they currently are. Also, some governments are in effect reaching their 
borrowing capacity, which makes it difficult for them to obtain additional funds for 
infrastructure development through bonds or loans. While government finance is 
dwindling their demand to put into use for different spending purpose is expanding. 
While private firms that perform poorly are taken over or go out of business, 
Government agencies that do poorly are immune to takeovers and even may be given 
bigger budgets under the name of an attempt to improve their performance. (Savas, 
2000, p. 112) 
 
Figure 2.7 Specific Examples of Infrastructure Provision Arrangements 
 
Source: Gomez-Ibanez 2004  
 
Additional support for privatization comes from commercial reasons. At the 
same time there are also efficiency gains through dividing up the gains to leave all 
parties better off (Jennings & Mclean, 2008, p. 68). The problem is that such moves 
would not be rational for the government if they led to a change in political equilibrium 
that resulted in a loss of power or income. Inefficient policies and institutional 
arrangements may continue because no clear way of separating efficiency and 
distribution can be found. In many occasions it is argued that the public sector is 
inefficient. The poor performance of the public sector may appear in such observations 
as (1) inefficiency through overstaffing and low productivity (2) poor quality of goods 
and services (3) unresponsiveness to the public (4) obsolete practices or products and 
little marketing capability, and (5) underutilized and under-performing assets. But is 
not possible to compensate the losers of political change, because the winners will have 
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no ex post incentive to do so – there is a time-inconsistency problem. Inefficient 
institutions create a paradox at the heart of public choice analysis.  
2.10.1 !"#$%&#'%&#()*
As privatization accompanies the need for the new funding sources, 
privatization may also promote the development of capital markets (for example by 
creating and selling shares for the private companies). Also since the market for the 
construction industry is generally at its infant stage in developing countries, this will 
provide the construction with new opportunities in economies of scale within the 
infrastructure industry. When privatization is chosen as a method of reforming public. 
As "privatization" is a broad concept, within infrastructure provision there are still a 
number of possible arrangements broad policy concept that includes various kinds of 
possible arrangements that can be used to allow private sector provide on behalf of the 
government’s in fulfilling its responsibility in public service provision.  The literatures 
dealing in this area are broadly defined into the three broad categories: contracting out, 
denationalization, and public-private partnership. They are different in the scope of 
works delegated to them, ownership of physical assets, and the duration for which the 
arrangement/contracts lasts, and the risk allocation between the parties involved.  
2.10.2 +()&"%,&#)-*./&**
The government can contract out operation and maintenance (O&M) contracts 
to a service provider of an existing project. This type of privatization is also sometimes 
called alternative service delivery mechanism where the government allows the public 
infrastructure services to be provided by private company serve the users on behalf of 
the government. In this way the government can, as a service provider serve the users 
using the private company's efficient delivery capabilities. This category is further 
subdivided by the payment mechanisms and resulting risk allocations into contracting 
(the private delivers services to the users and collects fees from the government) and 
franchising (the private delivers services to. and collects fees from. the users).  
 But these contracts again are based on user-charges if the contract is for the 
private sector is to handle its own finances. But in the case of goods or services where 
exclusion of free riders allowed, the government provision is the only possible option 
because the private is unable to charge users and cannot undertake the project by 
themselves. However, the delivery of the goods or services can be independent from the 
provision thereof and the delivery method with the best efficiency should be chosen. 
Otherwise the government could also use the private company out-sources the services 
to the company. For example by providing shadow tolls, as in the case of UK Highways, 
where since the government collects indirect transport taxes, it allows user to use the 
highways free of charge, and pays the private contractor annuities or compensates 
them on a fixed annual return.  While the services are provided by the private sector 
the government retains the overall responsibility for the provision of the public service. 
The government specifically decides the scope of the contract. 
 
2.10.3 01)%&#()%2#'%&#()** * * * *
Denationalization is also sometimes know as divestiture, entails the transfer of 
the ownership of an existing public service venture from the government to a private 
company. That is, the government actually sells existing facilities to the private 
company. It can take many forms- including public offerings of shares, or private trade 
sales of assets themselves. Once a public service is denationalized, the created private 
company becomes responsible for service provision to users, however the government 
can still regulate the industry (through creating a watchdog or regulating authority).  
This role of the government reduces the scale of government involvement, and can also 
be revenue generating, fixing public sector deficits, but still keeps the government 
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involved through legislations that allow it to either oversee service provision or 
regulate it. For example in India, the government completed the 3G mobile telephony 
auction in May 2010 that raised US$14.6 in government revenues. The government 
also considered the fee for spectrum allocation to be met out of rupee resources by 
successful bidders, which could then be refinanced through long-term external 
commercial borrowings (ECBs) under the approval route, so that companies could 
capitalize on the foreign exchange rates later. These kind of financing methods are also 
specific to countries and industries, and cannot be applied to all sectors, or experiences 
cannot be the replicated in the same way, everywhere. 
 
2.10.4 !/32#,4!"#$%&1*!%"&)1"56#75**
Since the 1990s governments have been looking for alternatives to deliver high-
quality public services at low cost to the taxpayer and users. This led to the 
development of public–private partnerships (PPPs), both in industrialized countries 
(for example the United Kingdom, as in its Private Finance Initiative launched in 
1992) and in the emerging economies (for example Latin America, Eastern Europe, and 
Asia in the 1990s) (Maskin & Tirole, 2008, p. 412). Where a PPP is usually defined as a 
long-term development and service contract between the government and a private 
partner. The government typically engages its partner both to develop the project and 
to operate and service it, usually taking up the political and legal risks. The partner 
may bear substantial risk (mostly financial and economic) and even raise private 
finance. Its revenue derives from some combination of government payments 
(annuities in the case of India) and user fees (for example tolls). PPPs were created and 
effective in developing large-scale projects with large immobile investments with long 
gestation periods, including those in transportation (rail systems, high- ways, subways), 
medical care, telecommunications, energy, water systems, and even orphan drugs. But 
sometimes projects that are undertaken may not align with public's best interest: as 
government officials may have a preference that differs from that of a social welfare 
maximizer. More specifically, ideology, social or political ties, or the incentive to pander 
may induce an official to favor the pet projects of particular interest groups, and induce 
“pork-barrel” politics—as many of these projects may not be justifiable from a social 
welfare standpoint (Maskin & Tirole, 2008, p. 413). Sometimes more regulatory setups 
and legislations including spending caps could mitigate the bureaucratic and political 
excesses. 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) although broadly is thought of as any 
arrangement where the public and private sectors cooperate to produce or deliver goods 
and services, it is specifically defined here in infrastructure projects to mean more 
specifically as to how the government and the private company share the risks and 
responsibilities of a project that would otherwise have to be assumed fully by the 
government. Conceptually PPP’s consist of criteria in evaluating the viability of a 
project: and the private sector accepts a project and assumes more risk only if it is sees 
the likelihood of a profit. While for the public the incentive to do so, have both non-
monetary and monetary benefits that are greater than the costs involved. When both 
parties cannot achieve its task by itself, the PPPs are more effective. For example 
when public finances are limited in terms of funds and ability to create infrastructure 
assets (and service delivery), it can capitalize on both private funds and efficiency 
through know-how from the private sector. 
 The government may enter into a contract with the private sector to build a 
brand new infrastructure projects (that is greenfield projects). In practice, it can take a 
number of structures with varying degree of transfer of risks and responsibilities. 
Build-Operate and Transfer (BOT) model and its variations are among the most 
common in this category. Under the generic BOT model, a private consortium receives 
a concession to finance, build, control and operate a facility for an agreed upon time, 
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after which the facility is transferred back to the government. According to Estache 
2000, the relative importance of BOT types of projects is likely to further increase as a 
result of PFI in the U.K. Urban roads in the U.K. and Australia are increasingly being 
procured under the PPPs.  
 The justification as to which form of privatization is chosen rests primarily on 
the key element of competition as the amount of private participation improves quality 
and interest in the project (again regulated through competitive bidding). It is the most 
important for the government to establish a competitive environment where the 
private sector is motivated to maximize the efficiency and improve performance. 
Although the general theory is that the private firms can do better than the public it is 
only possible when such an environment is provided (through arms length regulation 
and yardstick performance ratings). This is especially important when the private 
operator is to undertake monopolistic services (which includes most large scale 
infrastructure projects) where market pressure does not exist.  
 First, these arrangements can be distinguished by the scope of delegated 
responsibility. In the initial state of government direct provision the private sector 
works under a direct supervision of the government. The contracts are closed for 
relatively small and segmented portion of the project and the private sector companies 
do what the government assigns them to do with no level of freedom and private sector 
contribution. In the next stage, the government delegates a wider range of activities to 
be provided by PSP for the project. The government defines general and functional 
requirements (in terms of design and minimum quality requirements) and the private 
sector decides the way to meet the requirements (can propose innovations for example), 
while the government retains the overall responsibility for the project, the private 
sector is allowed to make day-to-day management decisions. The financing of the 
project is also partly taken up by the private sector, where the government can also 
provide viability gap funding. In the last option, the government delegates all the 
components in a specific project to the private sector including the design itself. While 
the government is to establish overall development strategy for the infrastructure, 
most of the responsibilities at the project level are assumed by the private sector. The 
design, construction, financing and operation (DCFO) are managed by the private 
sector that also arranges the financing of the project. 
Risks: The general rule often found in literatures dealing with the risk 
management issues is that risks (and associated costs) are to be minimized when they 
are assigned to the party that can best bear them. Also an additional notion would be 
that the risks are minimized when they are assigned to the party that is given proper 
incentives to manage them. In the initial state of government direct provision, the 
government assumes all the risks for the entire infrastructure development. Generally, 
the private sector is better at managing commercial risks and responsibilities such as 
those associated with construction, operation, and financing. In contrast, highway 
projects often depend on public participation and assumption in areas such as right-of-
way acquisition, political risk, and in some cases traffic and revenue risks. Few of the 
risks according to Estache, Antonio et al. (2000) that are associated with different 
stages are mentioned below. 
Construction Phase Risks: Constructions risks, Environmental and Land risks, 
Starting-up and Operation Phase Risks: 
Traffic Revenue Risks 
Financial risks: Interest rates, Price Caps, Inflation 
Political Risks (usually assumed by the government) 
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The BOP financial crisis in 1991 triggered an era of multi-sector economic 
reform, and since then India has been coming to terms with its public finance 
constraints. Under these circumstances public choice argues that states are at the 
center of non-market collective-decision-making process, and can opt for various ways 
to finance and regulate their public goods and services. Some essential features of 
public goods (including highways) especially in developing countries has traditionally 
been provided by the public sector,  leaving it outside the purview of the market. These 
characteristics include: 1) elements of monopoly, 2) right-of-way, 3) non-exclusivity, 4) 
non-rivalrous, 5) equitable access, 6) associated externalities, 7) network and 
economies of scale, and 8) durable and immobile investments. However this does not 
free the state machinery's responsibility from achieving allocative efficiency, which is 
one of its major roles under the assumptions of public choice. Under the public choice 
approach the other two main roles  of the states includes achieving distribution and 
macro-economic stability. In this regard it becomes essential to separate services that 
seek efficiency in the allocation of dwindling fiscal resources so that they can be used 
for more distributive purposes. This treatise assumes that providing more choice in the 
financing of Indian National Highways, would eventually allow the state to relieve 
more resources towards the road sector (public good that is redistributive in nature; 
expansive with low demand and usage). With the economy of India developing rapidly, 
the demand for improved infrastructure services has become a supply side constraint, 
calling for more expeditious and innovative choices in financing. Although the Indian 
political economy is going through an era of coalition politics and its complex-federal 
nature limits uniform implementation of policies, there is a growing consensus in 
economic policy making and expanding public goods. This academic research will limit 
itself to normatively framing the role of public sector (public choice), financial system 
(financial intermediation), and infrastructure (unbundling) in achieving more 
allocative efficiency in financing National Highways. This will make the Japanese Case 
Study of Highway and expressway development pivotal as it offers key public financing 
lessons and understanding principles that guide policy development. 
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This section will seek to outline the Indian financial system in terms of the 
reforms that have been put into place since the early 1990s. This has fundamentally 
altered a system that defaulted with a financial crisis (BOP Crisis of 1991) that 
eventually triggered the broad based economic reforms that literally spread across all 
sectors including infrastructure and finance; which becomes the purview of this study. 
But the issue is how financial reforms have increased intermediation (especially 
towards long-term funding) that is crucial in developing and sustaining large and long-
term finance requirements for infrastructure projects, such as the highways. As 
previous sections have already discussed that although India had already promoted a 
public sector oriented industrializing policy, it did not fair well in the general overall 
economic growth, in fact the allocation of public finance has been a problem, especially 
with financial repression. But the issue here is to track the systemic changes that are 
now being put into place as the economy moves from a bank-dominated financial 
structure in to developing credit-based system that would potentially increase financial 
intermediation.  
In order to not to diverge from the purpose of this volume, this section seeks to 
profiling the financial system and tracking the reforms being implemented, so as to 
suggest the future scope of financing long term projects, and options that are available 
in order to keep the focus on investment, and funding (long-term as opposed to short to 
medium term financing) of infrastructure sectors, the markets and the instruments 
that have resulted from the financial liberalization will be elaborated here. As the 
various financial sub-sector interact with each other: Internal sector: Banking system, 
Securities Markets (Bond Market: government and corporate, Equities, including repo 
market, Mutual funds), Insurance and Pension, and the External Sector (Exchange, 
Foreign investors and their regulation). As each of these sub-sector’s are in themselves 
expansive, the aim is not to delve into the details but to keep the study generic so as to 
understand the implications of the reforms in the financial system as India becomes 
more and more of an open economy. In order to bring into context the profiling of the 
system, a brief theoretical framework follows. 
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Studart ((1995) in his thesis ‘Investment Finance in Economic Development’ 
suggests the alternative approach to the role of banks, savings and financial markets 
in the process of economic development along post-Keynesian lines. While the post-
Keynesian theory is based on a well developing financial market such as a developed 
banking and non-banking financial institutions and markets for a diversified range of 
financial assets. In this regard, it is crucial for developing countries to develop 
financial system that extend primarily beyond bank credit. The issue is as to how the 
so called ‘late coming’ industrializing countries tend to start with a bank-dominated 
financial structure and then move on into developing Capital-Market based systems. 
This is essential in establishing a functional financial system, which can finance 
accumulation without allowing for any financial instability, which is often a side effect 
in the process of rapid growth. This fundamentally requires efforts in establishing a 
credit-based financial system that will provide ‘funds’ – or long-term investments to 
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avoid the risks that are inherently associated with the financial fragility that is 
associated with economic growth. In the words of Studart (2000, 1): 
 
“In contemporary post-Keynesian theory, finance in a monetary production 
economy is sharply distinguished from saving—which is said to derive from, rather than be 
a pre-condition for, growth. Investment is the motor of accumulation and finance is what 
permits investment decisions to materialize. The supply of finance is causally determined 
by banks: it is banks, and not savers, who hold a key position in the process of growth. Only 
if they share the optimism of entrepreneurs in periods of growth or are led, for any other 
reason, to accommodate the demand for investment finance, can the monetary production 
economy grow. This conclusion would appear to leave no role for savings and, hence, for 
capital markets, but such is far from being the case. Saving, which funds (but does not 
finance) capital accumulation, has an important role, as we shall see, in maintaining the 
financial stability of the growing economy.”  
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One major assumption in models of finance and economic development has been 
the idea of the ‘prior savings’ (PS) argument that implies a hierarchy in the dynamics 
of a capitalist economy: where savers, as suppliers of saving/capital, ultimately 
determine the pace of accumulation. The PS argument finds its origin in the 
agricultural economy, where income through the harvest is predetermined; suggesting 
that seeds that are saved, already need to exist before the act of investing them into 
the next planting season. This concept became the basis of the barter economy, where 
output and income were predetermined and hence the process of exchange, rather than 
production which is the main concern for the capitalist economic analysis. In terms of 
policy, PS based argument emphasizes the development of internal institutional 
mechanisms to stimulate saving; to attract foreign saving by opening the internal 
financial system (through foreign capital inflows); and to eliminate ‘financial 
repression’ and to correct other constraints to the functioning of the market-clearing 
mechanisms. 
 However, economic systems that have moved beyond metallic money to the use 
of credit and loans, investment can be financed by ‘new money’ as much as by the 
transfer of existing money savings. This within the eventual transition into a monetary 
economy, the only possible association between the finance and saving is the use of 
accumulated stocks of money to finance investment, rather than consumption. In this 
context another theory that has been crucial in the analysis of a monetary production 
economy is the Loanable Funds Theory (LFT). In an economy where metallic money 
prevails, the evolution of bank money does not change this postulate as long as banks 
as well as other financial institutions are pictured as mere intermediaries between 
saving and investment. That is, as long as credit, financial markets as efficient 
intermediaries are all neutral in the sense that it does not interfere with the real forces 
behind accumulation (thrift and productivity). This has allowed mainstream economics 
to address saving without even mentioning the mechanisms and aspects of financial 
system that are essential in transforming it into investment. But these new Keynesian 
models completely avoid explaining the availability and distribution of information 
between borrowers, lenders and financial institutions, basically running on a perfect 
information hypothesis. 
These issues immediately make the modern financial systems really complex in 
dealing with financial intermediation which can jeopardize the allocative role played 
by intermediation: adverse selection, where trading parties have asymmetric 
information prior to contracting, and moral hazard, where the asymmetries arise after 
contracting. Asymmetric information occurs when lenders have trouble determining 
whether a borrower is a good risk (that is good investment projects with low default 
risk) or a bad risk (bad investment projects with high default risk). This will result in 
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the decrease of loanable funds when interests rate increases and lenders cannot 
identify the riskiest projects, on the other hand when interest rate decreases moral 
hazard may prevent lenders from extending credit. Thus in both cases asymmetric 
information does not allow financial system to play its role as a broker in saving-
investment process efficiently, as lending would be at sub-optimal levels. In this sense 
it is not easy to just assume that financial markets are efficient allocators of capital, 
although there were considerable literature that suggested so.  
By bringing production into the picture, where in an entrepreneur economy, the 
means of production are privately owned, so that a profit-seeking class through hiring 
labor organizes production. Assuming that the costs of production are known, output 
decisions will be based on the expected demand. Since time is irreversible and 
production must precede demand (1995, 10), production decisions have to be taken in 
an inherently uncertain environment. Where uncertainty becomes the trademark 
regarding production the issue is about the return on long-lived assets, which is more 
uncertain than the return on current production. Given the fact that investment 
generally involves long-lived assets, the volatility of investment is greater than that of 
production. This brings in the factor of speculation on investment decisions, which has 
a negative impact, raising uncertainty on the return on any productive activity in a 
decentralized economy. Apart from that a further source of volatility to investment is 
the fact that, it property as a store of wealth, it competes with other assets and means 
to accumulate. This is where the rate of interest enters Keynes’s principle of effective 
demand. In a monetary production economy, money is demanded both as a medium of 
exchange and as an asset. As an asset, it provides its holders with the ability to carry 
wealth into the future, which then also introduces the concept of the rate of interest. 
As entrepreneur economies are in essence forward looking systems, where 
production is a time-consuming activity, which requires that entrepreneurs commit 
(their own or borrowed) resources before the return on the output is known. This 
substantiates Keynes law of production the process of production will not be started up, 
unless the money proceeds expected from the sale of the output are at least equal to the 
money costs which could be avoided by not starting up the process (1995, 29). As an 
entrepreneur economy is based on decentralized contracts (between entrepreneurs, 
workers and suppliers) they denominated with money; which would then be the 
accepted medium of exchange and store value that has the power to discharge 
contracts. Money allows the entrepreneur to have access to the physical resources and 
labor required for production thus whoever has money or the capacity to create money 
(for example the State and banks) can influence the allocation of resources. This would 
suggest that a in an entrepreneur economy, finance and investment again precede 
savings; in a credit based bank system banks can create credit independently from 
previous deposits.  
However in mainstream economics saving has been associated with finance in a 
different way through models concerned with finance and development. As capital is 
commonly assumed to be the scarce factor in less developed countries (LDCs), so saving 
is thought to be constraining growth. Although it from the discussion above it expected 
that development would be somewhere associated with debt issue at some points in the 
economic system and corresponding accretion of financial assets elsewhere (1995, 17). 
This would also be in line with Keynes’s paradigm of a monetary production economy 
in confirming that banks (and not savers) are the suppliers of finance this was however 
not the case. While in fact development economics has treated finance for the last 
thirty years mainly as a problem of availability and allocation of internal and external 
saving (2000, 18). In this regard the two models that have dominated the literature: 
Two-Gap Model (TGM) and the Shaw-McKinnon both which are based on the ‘PS 
argument which are outlined below. 
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Table 3.1 The Two Main Models that have Dominated Development Finance 
Two-gap model  
The TGM is concerned with the external finance for resources to support development and 
with development planning; claiming that external saving is required for development if both 
the investment-saving and the import-export gaps are to be overcome.  
Two-gap models are based on the idea that since there is a lack of internal saving usually in 
developing countries, due to financial repression policies this in turn would constrain economic 
development.  
This would call for external saving in two initial stages of development: first, to overcome the 
difference between planned investment and saving; second, to finance the increasing gap 
between planned imports and exports.  
The short-term disequilibrium between internal saving and investment will be overcome in the 
long run when per capita incomes increase (allowing for a higher propensity to save) and its 
export capacity (by improving productivity in export sectors), it can finally achieve self-
sustaining growth and even repay the debt acquired in complement of financial aid (Chenery 
and Strout 1968: 913, cited in 1995, 21).  
This became the official theory on which policies were formulated by International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank till the 1980s. But in reality after the interest rate shock of 
1979 and the Mexican de facto moratorium in 1982 led to a fast contraction of credit to the 
highly indebted LDCs, the growth-cum-debt strategy was completely discredited and a but 
later abandoned due to the debt crisis in the late 1980s. 
This was because, for instance if a continuous balance-of-payments deficit problem is 
interpreted as scarcity of internal saving, then the solution is to increase internal saving. But, if 
the PS argument were carried out consistently this would exacerbate the situation, as it requires 
raising interest rates and internal absorption must be reduced in order to re-establish the 
external sector equilibrium.  
Shaw-McKinnon Financial Liberalization Model (FLM) (Shaw and McKinnon 1973) 
McKinnon model deals with the increase and mobilization of internal resources, mainly 
through the liberalization and deregulation of internal saving.  
The prior-saving argument is also present in the FLMs, which maintain that internal saving/ 
investment can be increased by stimulating savings with positive interest rates and by 
enhancing the competition between financial institutions through financial deregulation. 
Since the 1980s the FLMs substituted the Two-Gap model, which emphasizes the need for 
LDCs to increase internal saving rather than counting on external saving. The PS argument 
remained; it was only the historical circumstances that changed. 
The FLM exerted considerable influence on macroeconomic policy in developing countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s, again particularly through the recommendations of the IMF and the 
World Bank.  
The analysis is based on the idea that many developing economies suffer from financial 
repression, a ‘misguided’ development strategy of low interest rate ceilings and selective credit 
policies. It is argued that financial repression inhibits saving by deliberately maintaining 
interest rates below their natural level. With financial repression, the argument goes, even 
though investment opportunities abound, growth is kept below its potential 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect about most FLMs is that they are completely devoid of 
institutional content; they completely disregard the institutional aspects of LDCs financial 
systems. Thus, within its rationale, solutions to problems related to the financing of 
development need only consider re-adjusting relative prices.  
For instance, the lifting of deposit ceilings is pictured as a panacea that would lead to the 
establishment of a superior equilibrium position with higher levels of savings, investment and 
growth. It is also assumed that a less regulated and less ‘repressed’ financial market would 
equilibrate saving and investment optimally. 
Given the above framework, the policy of ‘financial repression’ is about promoting investment 
by maintaining the real deposit interest rate below its (positive) equilibrium levels. Such a 
policy would result in the rationing (non-price allocation) of scarce saving—which is seen as a 
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fertile ground for inefficiency and an easy source of windfall profits to the banking system. 
When associated with government deficits, it would reduce the availability of scarce resources 
to the private sector, leaving savings to be unproductively allocated by a shortsighted 
bureaucracy. 
Source: Studart 1995 
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 This finally brings in context a post-Keynesian model of finance-investment-
saving (FIS) circuit as a substitute to process of investment finance that is based on the 
finance-investment-saving-funding (1995, 48). The FIS model integrates finance into 
the multiplier to show how saving is created as a by-product of the process of income 
creation. For this reason it has been used by many post-Keynesians to demonstrate the 
precedence of investment over saving, and it has been used as an analytical tool to 
develop a systemic view of the role of banks, saving and financial markets in the 
process of growth. Studart (1995) proposes that the FIS model when actually used in 
the context of Minsky’s hypothesis: a growing market economy is inherently more 
fragile. This can be seen through borrowing from banks to finance investment 
increases short-term indebtedness, exacerbating firms’ capacities to repay with their 
own cash flows, as they have to wait until their investment projects mature and their 
productive capacities expand. Therefore, a bank-financed expansion leaves the 
corporate sector in a more vulnerable financial position. But if the firm finds 
difficulties in selling its liabilities during the period in which it is refinancing debt, the 
firm’s liquid assets are rapidly depleted simultaneously eroding its equity. 
Where Studart’s thesis makes a diversion and is pertinent to being used as the 
analytical tool in this section relates to the question of ‘funding’. Where the argument 
goes beyond a post-Keynesian theory for individual savings and financial 
intermediation are secondary in the determination of the aggregate supply of 
investment finance, they do matter in a different context of funding. Seen from a 
microeconomic perspective, entrepreneurs and bankers desire to fund their long-term 
commitments on a stable basis because of the uncertainty about the prospective 
conditions of credit and levels of interest rates. Funding by nature increases the risk of 
both borrowers and lenders, where investment finances in a world of uncertainty 
becomes characteristically a two-fold process of ‘finance’ and ‘funding’. 
From a microeconomic perspective, they may increase the tendency of firms and 
banks to engage in the financing of long-lived assets. This by far requires regulation 
and specialized institutions that are crucial in the provision of information for firms 
issuing securities, underwriters and demanders of securities. This also requires 
secondary markets that will enable investors to evaluate the prospective profitability of 
newly issued securities by enhancing the flow of information. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, funding especially developed through 
financial markets bears a crucial role in mitigating the increasing financial fragility 
inherent in a growing monetary economy. This macroeconomic role of funding will also 
depend on the interrelated characteristics, the size and stability of the respective 
financial markets. A thin financial market is unlikely to be able to protect the economy 
from the phenomenon of short-term speculation and volatility, which tend to disappear 
in the long run. Moreover, contradicting expectation the very existence of the 
secondary markets (where old securities are sold and bought) relies on continuous 
trading, and this in turn is expected to provide the liquidity that makes it less risky for 
wealth-owners to hold long-term securities. Supposedly this provision for liquidity can 
be expected to make long-term bonds and securities attractive to savers, as they are 
searching for safe liquidity time-machines (1995, 60), and rarely wish to be locked in to 
holding an asset for a long period of time. 
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Under this new model, although financial markets have an important yet 
ambiguous role in supporting growth, they intermediate between the demanders of 
securities and those firms wishing to fund their short-term liabilities. However the 
adverse effect of instability brought by the speculative nature of these markets cannot 
be ignored. One element that is largely taken for granted is the role of financial 
intermediaries in the process of financing/funding investment is the assumption (of the 
FIS model) that savings are automatically somehow held as long-term securities. This 
is assumption is not only idealistic, but also reduces the importance of the financial 
intermediaries (middlemen/broker) in the process of funding accumulation. In this 
regard, what makes financial markets crucial in reducing the financial fragility 
inherent in growth is their ability to transform short-term assets (which are demanded 
by savers as forms of ‘liquidity time-machines’) into long-term sources of funding.   
One good example of this phenomenon is illustrated in the segmented financial 
markets which existed in the USA before the deregulation of the 1980s, the commercial 
banks provided sight and short-term deposits against short- term commercial and 
industrial loans; investment banks were specialized in converting short-term 
borrowing into long-term borrowing through underwriting operations; and institutional 
investors (for example insurance companies and pension funds) would invest savings 
on behalf of the general public (1995, 60). Another development that has occurred in 
the last century, is that in most countries domestic banking was generally subject to 
heavy regulation, and the traditional role of banks have been fundamentally altered 
from collectors of deposits and granters of loans. As initially international banking had 
to cope with the restrictions of capital controls, recently the process of deregulation and 
the world-wide removal of restrictions on international capital movements have led to 
the integration of global capital markets. The integration of world capital markets has 
shifted the role of banks to become arrangers of bond and equity issues, that is, 
investment banking. Under this finance-funding mechanism of this specific 
institutional structure is illustrated by Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Finance-Funding Mechanism of FIS model 
 
Source: Adapted from Studart 1995 
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While applying these distinctions in the analysis of LDCs’, suggest one of the 
main problems with the debt problems. The crucial problem with LDCs’ debt was that 
even though the international banking system substantially increased their capacity to 
finance firms in developing countries, the institutional mechanisms to fund them were 
not available in the 1970s and 1980s. The reasons for this are many, the most 
important reason being that there were hardly any companies in LDCs that could raise 
funds abroad through floating stocks and long-term securities in a more organized 
international financial market. This was supposed to be reason why in the 1970s there 
was only a significant increase of international bank loans with floating interest rates 
(or at short maturities), on top of that banks required the guarantee of LDCs’ national 
governments. The rapidly increasing loans with short-term maturities to LDCs almost 
immediately not only put the LDCs and the international banking system into a more 
fragile position, but also triggered the debt crisis of the 1980s when the monetary 
polices of LDCs caused an increase in interest rates. For though technically these 
borrowings were used to finance expansions of the productive capacity to export (which 
was not always the case), LDCs could not repay their debt, sometimes even before such 
capacity could be put into place.  
According to the mainstream view, this institutional underdevelopment of 
financial markets  (either thin or unorganized) was the result of the ‘long history of 
financial repression in developing countries’ (1995, 22). Further, the general 
assumption to launch financial development could be promoted by financial 
liberalization, which was alleged to increase saving and therefore investment. In this 
view, the role of banks in the process of growth was to supply finance, whereas saving 
and financial markets provide funding. Therefore, in order improve capital market 
efficiency it becomes important to shift from a neoclassical perspective (where the main 
role of the financial system is to allocate saving between competing investment 
projects) by using other tools to assess how different financial structures function as 
promoters of growth. The neoclassical perspective also assumes that the competitive 
capital market saving/capital is allocated optimally spontaneously, and further real-life 
institutional arrangements are also seen as implicitly distorting in relation to the 
optimal outcome of the idealized structure. Therefore there is an apparent danger in 
assuming that there is an ‘optimal’ financial structure that does not really exist, 
instead different financial structures are required to sustain growth and funding 
according to the nature of the respective economy. 
Studart (1995) suggests that from a post-Keynesian perspective, financial 
systems are more than intermediaries between saving and investment: they create 
saving (through finance) as much as they allocate saving (through funding). The role of 
finance and funding therefore becomes pivotal in an entrepreneur economy: where 
finance creates the means of commanding resources that will permit entrepreneurs to 
implement their production and investment decisions; funding represents an incentive 
for both banks and wealth-holders to hold securities and, additionally, reduces the 
financial fragility inherent to growing monetary economies. Further, financial 
institutions (and especially banks) will, because of the liability structure, prefer to 
remain in the shorter end of financing if that is possible. In a fast-growing economy, 
with constant pressure on finance, banks and financial institutions can profitably grow 
simply by providing short-run finance to credit thirsty enterprises without creating the 
competitive stimulus to finance long-term positions. In this case, in order to grow, 
firms will have recourse to renewable short-term credit, self-funding or foreign 
indebtedness in order to implement their long-term and large scale investment projects. 
This would by far be the case with firms providing infrastructure services in India too. 
To slowly develop structures to support funding, it becomes important to 
recognize the development of stable financial markets as a long-term strategy and 
progress from simply providing short-term incentives to securities buyers. Thin 
financial markets which are thin, as typically found in LDCs tend to be highly 
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speculative and manipulated by a few big insiders, which creates a comprehensive 
mistrust by most small savers and even some potential institutional investors, such as 
those using pension funds. Especially with fast developing countries, it becomes crucial 
to slowly bring in place and development financial structures that are overseen and 
regulations by regulatory authorities. With most countries, regulation is gradually 
loosened according to the development and increase in efficiency of such markets, but 
on the contrary it is unlikely that complete deregulation will ever be compatible with 
financially stable growth (especially after the course of events that have followed the 
sub-prime debt crisis). In this regard Figure 3.2 will discuss the characteristics and the 
vulnerabilities of Credit Based Systems and Capital Market Based Systems. This will 
be essential in providing for the framework in understanding the financial reforms 
being implemented (and many being proposed) in India, through profiling the system. 
 
54 
Figure 3.2 Characteristics and Vulnerabilities of Credit Based and Capital 
Market Based Systems 
Credit Based Systems: 
Characteristics 
Typical of credit-based financial systems are found in LDCs, as they are primarily agricultural 
oriented economy; the needs for financing are relatively small, and if credit is needed, the 
producer can always use his/her own land as collateral for borrowing, land is the main physical 
capital and can be expanded by simple incorporation. 
Mostly finance is very short term oriented and credit rationing may occur in times of growth; 
when finance is forthcoming to sustain growth (depending on the rate) the financial position of 
both firms and banks will become more fragile as the supply and the average maturity of loans 
made available for investment will be determined by the banks’ liquidity preference. 
Banks will almost certainly prefer short-term loans (say towards the financing of consumption, 
working capital and/or speculation) to longer term, and hence riskier, investment projects. 
Financial Institutions (especially banks) because of the liability structure, prefer short-term 
assets. Moreover, financing the accumulation of physical capital requires increasing the 
vulnerability of financial institutions. Therefore banks will only accept the risk of financing 
long-term projects if competition drives them to and if they can mitigate their risk through 
funding. 
First, growth depends on additional credit, whatever the existing type of financial structure. 
Second, if growth is high, only if the marginal propensity to buy placements out of households’ 
savings is equal to one, long-term funds will not be available to fund all existing outstanding 
debt. Third, if development creates constant excess demand for financing short-term operations 
(working capital, for instance), financial institutions (especially banks) may have no 
competitive stimuli to finance long term or to promote funding. 
Vulnerabilities: 
Extremely vulnerable to changes in credit conditions in times of growth, because the weight of 
speculative funds. 
If the financing of long-lived assets is supplied mainly through short-term renewable loans, a 
change in the rate of interest will represent a significant rise in firms’ financial expenditures; if 
firms try to adjust by cutting other expenditures simultaneously, this may set in motion a 
vicious circle of financial reactions which could reduce effective demand even further. 
Bank gets the bulk of the money it uses from funds deposited for a short term at the going 
interest rate. If it lends a firm money for five years, during the period, the depositors may 
withdraw their funds at which point the bank’s reserves drop and it must reduce its loans: in an 
extreme case it might not be able to pay claims presented to it.  
Another, potentially more serious, problem may occur should interest rates change in 
unexpected ways. If the short-term rates go down and the bank has lent long, its margin of 
profits increases, but if the rates go up, its profit margins are cut or it loses money. 
This may partly explain why in countries where funding channels did not develop, 
compensating structures are normally found, such as a strong commitment on the part of 
private banks or close government intervention - for example the creation of development 
banks and the use of a regulated selective credit mechanism (good and obvious examples being 
Germany and Japan). 
In many LDCs the process of growth and structural change is faster than one can expect the 
financial structure to develop, especially as regards the capacity to fund ongoing investments. 
This means that, unless other arrangements exist to overcome the gap between financial and 
economic development, growth will be constantly constrained by the lack of sources for 
financing or surges of financial instability. 
The Capital Market Based System 
Characteristics: 
The capital-market-based system is one where securities (stocks and bonds) are the main 
source of long-term funding. There is a wide range of capital and money-market instruments, a 
55 
large number of specialized financial institutions offer competing services and prices are 
determined by the interplay of supply and demand. In credit- based financial systems, on the 
contrary, the capital market is weak and firms depend heavily on credit for raising finance 
beyond retained earnings. 
This system can be observed in developed countries and in countries where economic growth 
and structural changes are rapid, including high levels of accumulation in the form of industrial 
investment, also countries in transition from an agrarian to an industrial urban economy. 
Industrialization and urbanization also changes the composition of investment towards sectors 
with higher capital intensity, larger scales and longer terms of maturation. Where spatial 
detachment stretches the process of intermediation and creates new financial requirements. In 
addition, the change in techniques of production may require non-conventional inputs and 
equipment, which again creates new sources of demand for long-term financing. 
To sum up, different financial structures may be viewed as the institutional means of 
overcoming the problem of financing growth. It seems, however, that the faster the pace of 
growth and structural change in the productive sector, the more unlikely it will be that 
investment finance and funding will develop spontaneously. 
Postwar experiences of growth in developed countries were biased toward investment 
spending, and developing capital-market systems especially after 1970. But as mentioned 
earlier it surely also depends on the economy in question, its characteristics and its needs in 
developing financial system where funding will be forthcoming to support investment needs. 
Vulnerabilities: 
Especially in the context of rapidly growing LDCs that are in the process of developing capital 
market based financial systems the rule is to have a long-term policy in institutional 
development. As thin financial markets, can be debilitative as they can be highly speculative 
and manipulated by a few big ‘insiders’. This creates a comprehensive mistrust amongst most 
small savers and can reduce the interest of institutional investors in funding desirable and 
worthy projects.  
The roles of the institutions and the government depend upon the current stage of development 
of the financial structure. This institutional evolution is not always spontaneous, especially 
with regard to mechanisms for funding. Experiences of successful models and developed 
countries suggest that the evolution of credit-based financial structure was part of a wider 
development strategy. 
As the financial system broadens, a simplistic monetarist view that the primary role of 
regulator and the government to "control" the money supply and thereby the economy as a 
whole is not possible. This can induce the regulator to constrain reserves only inducing 
innovative bank practices and encourage expansion of "non-bank" sources of finance, as seen 
with the recent financial crisis gripping the world 
Ultimately requiring the government to act as a lender-of-last-resort interventions and even 
bailouts that validate riskier practices (Minsky 2008, 106). In general indebtedness is major 
concern that results in budget deficits that add to the public debt; that has resulted in the US’s 
current record of budget deficit of US$1.56 trillion resulting in US’ public debt to GDP ratio of 
62% (www.livemint.com/2010/02/02212341/A-fiscal-mess-in-the-US.html) 
Another characteristic of these economies is the dangers where financial instability and 
inflation can worsen inequality, supporting Keynes's General Theory which already identified 
two fundamental flaws of the capitalist system: chronic unemployment and excessive 
inequality. Minsky added a third: instability is a normal result of modern financial capitalism 
(p. 112, 315). 
Securitization allows opportunities in packaging debt through, financial engineering creating 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), but this packaging financial paper that is freed from 
national boundaries and in times of crisis (through insolvency and illiquidity) can cause a 
global financial meltdown. 
Regulation mainly becomes almost becomes an impossible task, as the rise of the commercial-
paper market that allowed firms to bypass commercial banks, could not be regulated by 
government. 
Whereby there are great financial innovations (especially in the past decade) providing for the 
56 
greatly expanded availability of credit which then pushed up asset prices. This in turn, not only 
encouraged further innovation to take advantage of profit opportunities but also fueled a debt 
frenzy and greater leveraging. 
Source: Studart 1995 and Minsky 2008 
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 Although there is no direct relationship to suggest that financial development is 
fundamental to growth, but the role of a stable, diversified financial system especially 
for a growing industrializing economy is slowly being appreciated. The goal of such a 
system is to intercede between savers to entrepreneurs by transferring funds seeking 
capital for productive investments. Considerable recent research underscores the 
importance of financial markets for economic development, where the size of a nation's 
financial market (the sum of bank assets, equity market capitalization and value of 
outstanding bonds) is positively and significantly correlated with its level of economic 
development (Barth, McCarthy, Phumiwasana, & Yago, 2006, p. 11). As this section 
seeks to expand and reveal that especially these three individual components of a 
nation's total financial market are positively and significantly correlated with its level 
of economic development, using the case of India.  
Studies suggest that the composition (that is bank assets relative to equity 
market capitalization plus bonds outstanding) of a nation's financial market, more 
generally, is not significantly correlated with its level of economic development. But is 
consistent with the view that banks and capital markets should be viewed as net 
complements, not substitutes therefore policy is going in the right direction where 
capital markets are being strengthened, shifting it away from a bank based system. By 
having both banks and securities markets can provide for a more diversified financial 
system. Yet, the general view is that while having a securities market cannot fully 
substitute for a healthy banking sector, it can reduce the pressure on a weakened 
banking system in time of crisis by providing an alternative source of credit when 
banks' curtail lending. Table 3.2 below explicitly reveals the global inequality not only 
in terms of GDP but also in financial market size; the trends are clear. India has a long 
way in developing the size of its financial markets in order to efficiently and 
intermediate the needs of saving and investment to eventually provide the rapid 
growth rates that the subsequent governments are promising. 
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Table 3.2 Differences in S ize and Composition of Financial Markets Around the 
World, 2003 
 
The Authors Note: Economies are divided among income groups according to 2003 GNI per capita, 
calculated using the World Bank Atlas Method. The groups are: low income, US$765 or less; middle 
income, US$766-US$9,385; and high income, US$9,386 or more. 
 
Source: (Barth, McCarthy, Phumiwasana, & Yago, 2006, p. 13) 
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There are innumerable studies and papers that have been calling for the 
reduction in government interference, most often suggesting that it is a barrier to 
growth. The call is in other words for a financial sector that would strengthen its 
market orientation, so that it can allocate capital efficiently and meet the needs of 
savers. India apart from a large banking sector has recently been able to develop a 
strong equity market. Although the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) along with many of 
India’s venerable banks trace their ancestry to the era of British rule, the financial 
system has been characterized by excessive government intervention that is sometimes 
associated with the distortion of capital allocation of capital and not supporting growth. 
The government has been absorbing a good deal of the country’s capital to finance its 
rural investment priorities and large fiscal deficit, which becomes essential to 
supporting the larger political economy. Prior to the reforms of 1991, in state control 
and regulation was even higher; where state-owned banks controlled 90% of bank 
assets they also channeled high proportions of funds to the government. Interest rates 
were determined administratively; credit was allocated on the basis of government 
policy and approval from the RBI was required for individual loans above a certain 
threshold. Although India had the oldest stock market, capital markets were 
underdeveloped, and major stock markets acted mainly in the interest of its members, 
not the investing public. Derivative markets did not exist and comprehensive capital 
controls meant that companies were unable to bypass domestic controls by borrowing 
abroad. 
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But the issue was about capacitating the financial system, not only through 
building the necessary institutions and regulatory environment that allow for more 
capital market based system to evolve and support funding for firms that involved in 
long term projects. As this section will display, this process has been fairly gradual, 
and this can be understood considering the size of the political economy. Although the 
major thrust of financial reforms commenced in 1992, in order to develop a corporate 
sector and expand the already existing bank based credit system, there still requires a 
lot to be done in developing securities market that would potentially fund large scale 
and projects with longer gestation. In face the contours of the debt market are already 
beginning to take shape. The idea of the financial reform by far has been involved in 
the development of a different range of markets, to ensure so as to not leave the whole 
task of financial intermediation with banks. The reform process attempted at doing 
away with regulations in favor of controls based on market forces that is an era where 
the interest rates are governed more by the market forces of demand and supply and 
less by centralized supervision.  
 Slowly, but steadily, the market has been expanding with fresh players and 
novel instruments. Several measures have added to greater transparency, reduction in 
transaction costs and have brought the issuances closer to the market levels. As Graph 
3-1 suggests India has developed a world-class equities market that developed rapidly 
in spite of earnest beginnings. The ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP has 
more than tripled, from 32.1% in 1996 while the banking sector expanded to 74% of 
GDP from 46.5% in 1996. The lagging sector however has been the development of 
government and corporate bond markets, which although doubled but only reached to 
about 40.0% of GDP. A starker characteristic of the Indian government market is the 
fact that bond market is by far composed of government bonds, which accounts for 
about 90% of the entire bond market at about 36% of GDP as of March 2008. But the 
financial reforms have been based on financial liberalization in order to develop a more 
diversified and competitive financial system that would improve resource allocation 
and efficiency through developing instruments, financial viability, and institutional 
strengthening. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Financial Sector Development in India 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
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But after the mid-1990s, the Indian financial system was progressively 
liberalized, deregulated and more exposed to international financial markets. This 
shift in financial policy has been accompanying strong economic growth, market 
robustness, and a considerable increase in efficiency. This has been characterized by 
the development of institutions (regulatory agencies, regulations through legislations), 
improving efficiency in reducing transaction costs through associated payment and 
settlement system, and gradual integration with financial markets (including allowing 
foreign banks and Foreign Institutional Invertors (FIIs). The ultimate goal eventually 
to develop a diversified, efficient, and competitive financial system, which would 
ultimately improve the efficiency of resource allocation through operational flexibility, 
enhanced financial viability, and institutional strengthening. Table 3.3 also depicts the 
recent data on the domestic financial markets published by the RBI. While Table 3.4 
provides the major general developments in the financial market that occurred during 
the post reform period, although sub-sector specific regulations will be outlined in the 
respective sections to follow. These developments also continued in the context of 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis and its contagion effects further spurred Indian 
authorities to strengthen the domestic financial system. So although financial 
liberalization was being carried out, there were also reforms that were put into place 
based on principles such as mitigate risks in the financial system; increasing allocation 
efficiency of resources to the real sector; and gradually opening the external sector and 
making the financial system competitive globally. 
 
Table 3.3 Domestic Financial Markets at a Glance 
 
Cited in: RBI 2009  
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Table 3.4 Financial Regulatory Agencies and Regulatory Legislations in India 
Industry Sector Year 
Opened 
Legislation Regulator 
Banking, and 
Government 
Securities 
Market, and 
Financial Market 
1934  Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. 
RBI, originally privately owned, nationalized since 1949 
Committee on 
the Financial 
System 
1991 Committee on the Financial System (Narasimham Committee) 
that was published in 1998 
Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (later setup in 1998) 
Capital Market 
and Securities 
1992 Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
Board for 
Financial 
Supervision 
(BFS)  
1994 BFS introduces an Off-site Monitoring and Surveillance System 
(OSMOS), later it also introduced the CAMELS (Capital 
Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Earnings, Liquidity and 
Systems) and CACS (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Compliance and Systems) for rating of banks to help identify the 
banks, which need special supervisory attention  
BFS set up oversee Capital to Risk Weighted Asset ratio 
(CRAR) of 8% by March 1995. 
Insurance 1999 IRDA Act, 1999 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
Commodity 
Markets 
2000 Forward Markets Commission is the regulator for Commodity 
markets that is part of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and 
Food Trading in derivatives and three new commodity markets 
were created in 2000, based on National Stock Exchange (NSE) 
architecture. 
Pension 2003 Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) 
Bill, 2005 still awaits approval of Parliament 
Interim pension fund regulator: PFRDA 
Source: Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites including RBI, SEBI, BFS and 
livemint.com accessed on 25th May 2010 
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India was known to be a bank-dominated market, as it has been common in the 
region (comparatively lower than the rest of East Asia refer to Figure 3.4), and the 
relative importance of bank assets as a percentage of GDP has continued to grow. The 
reason for the increase is partly because the banking penetration has deepened with 
financial liberalization, and also in order to finance government deficits. But the size of 
the Banking sector still has a long way to go, to develop the sector to reach East Asian 
standards, although there is a reverse trend as financial markets diversify and the 
banking sector starts contracting relative to other sectors. But reform of the banking 
system has been gradual as with Indian’s economic reforms, and prudential control; 
recapitalization of public sector banks and the introduction of greater competition has 
been the priority. A BFS within the Reserve Bank was set up as the control system in 
1994 to provide supervision, and subsequently the rules governing the recognition of 
bad loans have been substantially tightened. Regulatory norms have been reformed to 
converge with international best practices, as Figure 3.4 suggests. 
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Figure 3.4 Relative S ize of India’s Banking Assets (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
 
Competition was also gradually introduced into the banking system, initially 
through the creation of dozen private Indian banks, eventually allowing foreign banks 
to enter the market (where there 30 of them operating by end 2006). When prudential 
reforms were undertaken, bank interest rates were deregulated, and by 2007 controls 
only remained in four areas – saving deposit accounts, small loans in priority areas, 
export credits and non-resident transferable rupee deposits. The tighter regulatory 
structure and the increased competition also resulted in greater pressure on bank 
managements to consider the profitability of their operations. As a result, the net 
revenue of banks has improved. In particular, public sector banks increased the ratio of 
their net profit to assets from 0.57% in the year to March 1997 to 0.82% in the year 
ending March 2006, their profitability are growing in line with the new private sector 
banks (OECD, 2007, p. 148). However, a problem that still persists is the directed 
lending that, is imposed by the government on public sector banks. 
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Table 3.5 Legislation and Important Developments in the Banking Sector 
Year & Legislations Developments and Details: 
1934 Reserve Bank of 
India Act, 1934 
Banking, and Financial Regulator: RBI, originally privately owned, 
nationalized since 1949 
1994 Setting up of the 
Board for Financial 
Supervision 
Board set up under the aegis of the RBI to be the apex supervisory 
authority for commercial banks, financial institutions, urban banks 
and Non-banking Financial Companies (NBFCs). Consistent with 
international practice, the Board’s focus is on offsite and on-site 
inspections and on banks’ internal control systems. 
1994 – 1997 Series of 
Interest Rate 
Deregulation (and deposit 
rates fully deregulated in 
1997) 
To Enable better price discovery and imparting greater efficiency in 
the process of resource allocation. Interest Rates Deregulated, but 
controls still remain—savings deposit accounts, small loans in 
priority areas, export credits, and nonresident transferable rupee 
deposits. 
2002 Securitization and 
of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security 
Interest Act, (Sarfesi) 
and Secured Lending 
Law 
Sarfesi act empowers Banks / Financial Institutions to recover their 
non-performing assets without the intervention of the Court. The 
Act provides three alternative methods for recovery of non-
performing assets, without the intervention of the Court: 
• Securitisation 
• Asset Reconstruction 
• Enforcement of Security  
2003 Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio (SLR) Reform 
The reduction in the lending requirement to government from 63.5% 
to 30.0% of bank assets 
2006 Number of Non-
state Banks 
12 Domestic Private Banks and 30 Foreign Banks started operation 
2006 RBI withdraws 
from lending to the 
Government 
The RBI ceases to participate in the primary market for government 
securities and following FRBM Act (2003) the RBI no longer lends 
to the government.  
2006 Amendment of Two 
Acts dealing with CRR 
and SLR. Where earlier 
in the1999 CRR was 
reduced from 15 to 10 % 
and  SLR from 38.5 to 
25% 
Removal of the legal ceiling on SLR and abolishment of limits on 
both the floor and ceiling of the cash reserve ratio (CRR), allowing 
RBI to alter these ratios depending on prevailing monetary and 
economic conditions. Trial was done in 2003. The CRR raised in 
2007 to counter the likely inflationary consequences in build up of 
foreign exchange reserves. 
2009  Basel II regulatory system to be implemented 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com 
 
However, public banks still have a somewhat higher incidence of bad loans in 
priority areas, especially in lending directed credit programs including agriculture. 
International experience suggests that directed credits in the long term suffers from 
abuse and misuse of preferential funds for non-priority purposes resulting in a decline 
in financial discipline including low repayment rates that also end up indirectly 
causing an increase in the cost of funds to non-preferential borrowers. Directed lending 
or funding results in banks acting as a quasi-fiscal body that provides virtual subsidies 
to selected segments of the economy which do not appear on the general government 
balance sheets, obstructing the natural function of banks as autonomous profit-
maximizing entities. Other countries that continue this practice are Nepal, Pakistan 
and the Philippines; China, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Vietnam have similar programs 
(OECD, 2007, p. 149). 
Committee on the Financial System (Narasimham Committee), as early as in 
1991, had already called for the phasing out of the credit programs as although they 
were being used for equity purposes in assisting disadvantaged classes. According to 
the governments strategy, it seems that directed lending to agriculture and small scale 
industries has not been provided with adequate credit, although programs have been 
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set up for almost the last four decades. These are surely issues of a larger political 
economy, and vested interests in capturing political support. But as a result of the 
reforms, government funds were used to recapitalize banks through the issue of bonds 
to the banks. By 2001, bonds amounting to INR 225 billion (nearly 1% of GDP in fiscal 
year 2003) were issued. Another characteristic in India was that bad loans were not 
sold to an asset management company, and banks were expected to gradually use their 
income and capital to provision the loans. Since 1994, when bad loans represented one-
quarter of the total advances of public banks, this figure has been considerably reduced.   
 
By 2006, the bad loan situation of Indian banks was comparable to other high 
performing countries across the world and the difference in bad loans of public banks 
and the new private banks was almost completely eliminated. But this was also an 
advantage for newer private sector banks as they started with a clean slate, as the 
older ones private and public banks needed to perform to bring down their 
indebtedness. Apart from the priority lending regulations, banks were also subject both 
to CRR (6.5% of assets since May 2007) and SLR that requires 25% of their liabilities 
to be kept in specified public sector securities. In the macro-perspective sectoral 
allocation accounted for 59% of bank assets being determined by regulation. In the 
early part of this decade, the SLR was not a constraint on the lending behavior of the 
banks. In spite of effort to decrease the SLR and new regulations being developed to 
bring it down, public sector banks in general held a higher than required proportion of 
their assets in such investments, comparing to new private banks. But in general the 
gross net non-performing loans for public and private sector banks as (% of advances) 
has greatly reduced. 
 
Figure 3.5 Development of Gross and Net Non-Performing Loans for Public and 
New Private Banks (as % of advances) 
 
Source: OECD 2007 
 
Apart from these restrictions, banks were also to consult with the Reserve Bank 
about the structure of their branches. For example, all specific proposals relating to 
opening, closing and shifting of all categories of branches, including off-site ATMs, are 
required to be included in their annual plan that would be reviewed by the Reserve 
Bank once it was submitted. The RBI had the final say in the decision on whether or 
not to allow a new branch to open depends on the bank’s performance in a number of 
areas such as how banks price their products; actual lending to priority sectors; and 
whether the bank is committed to providing basic banking services. Finally in 2005, 
individual authorization has been replaced by aggregate approval allowing a degree of 
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flexibility for banks to decide on opening and closing of branches and upgrading 
facilities, although the basic criteria for approving plans continues to rest with the RBI. 
In terms of the corporate governance, banks are neither controlled by the 
Companies Act nor by the stock market regulator (SEBI) for listed banks. The 
legislations under the Bank Regulation Act actually override any provisions made for 
stock market listing or by the Companies Act. At first, shareholders owning more than 
10% of the equity of a bank have their voting rights capped at 10% although this was 
relaxed through an amendment Act in May 2005 in order to remove this restriction but 
the bill had not been passed by Parliament. For public sector banks, the limit on voting 
rights was set at 1% until 1994 when it was raised to 10% and this ceiling still remains. 
Foreign shareholders are still limited only 20% ownership of public banks. They can 
own up to 74% of private banks but their voting rights remain capped at 10%. Another 
Act passed in 2006 ended the direction that Reserve Bank was obliged to place one 
director on the board of every public bank.  
 
In this regard the RBI, although being the regulator of the entire financial 
market (including the banking sector),has been so far-flung and has exceeded that of 
any other central bank in other countries. This automatically led to a number of 
possible conflicts that exist and are slowly being resolved:  
- The Reserve Bank lends directly to the government and is the 
government’s investment banker, arranging sales of government debt. It is also 
the banker for state governments, under the authority of the RBI Act. 
- It is the owner of several financial institutions, including the largest 
commercial bank in the country, as well as the regulator of banks. As to the 
ownership of banks, the government has already suggested that the Ministry of 
Finance acquire the RBI’s majority holding in the State Bank of India.  
- Its holdings in the National Agricultural Bank and the National 
Housing Bank may be acquired at a later date. These changes will reduce any 
possible conflict of interest between its ownership and regulatory functions. As 
announced in the 2007-08 budget speech, a new debt management agency is 
proposed to be created in the Ministry of Finance. 
- The passage of Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRBM 2003) forbade the 
Reserve Bank to lend to the government; although it still continues to manage 
the debt of the central government by issuing new debt, as mandated by law. To 
this end it is also largely responsible for government bonds as it continues to be 
the owner, manager and regulator of the government securities market. 
- It is also responsible for foreign exchange controls and managing the 
regulations in the foreign exchange market and regulates FIIs 
- It no longer appoints directors to the boards of public banks but is 
responsible for undertaking due diligence process prior to their nomination by 
the government. 
 
Apart from the developments mentioned in the table above the independent 
BFS under the aegis of the Reserve Bank is the apex supervisory authority for 
commercial banks, financial institutions, urban banks and Non Bank Financial 
Corporations. Consistent with international practice, the Board’s focus is on offsite and 
on-site inspections and on banks’ internal control systems:  
Where offsite surveillance has been strengthened through control returns, role 
of statutory auditors has been emphasized with increased internal control through 
strengthening of the internal audit function. Significant progress has been made in 
implementation of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The 
supervisory rating system under CAMELS has been established, coupled with a move 
towards risk-based supervision. Consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates 
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has since been introduced with bi-annual discussions with the financial conglomerates. 
There have also been initiatives aimed at strengthening corporate governance through 
enhanced due diligence on important shareholders, and fit and proper tests for 
directors.  
A scheme of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is in place for attending to banks 
showing steady deterioration in financial health. Three financial indicators, viz. capital 
to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR), net non-performing assets (net NPA) and Return 
on Assets (RoA) have been identified with specific threshold limits. When the 
indicators fall below the threshold level (CRAR, RoA) or go above it (net NPAs), the 
PCA scheme envisages certain structured/discretionary actions to be taken by the 
regulator. The structured actions in the case of CRAR falling below the trigger point 
may include, among other things, submission and implementation of a capital 
restoration plan, restriction on expansion of risk weighted assets, restriction on 
entering into new lines of business, reducing/skipping dividend payments, and 
requirement for recapitalization. The structured actions in the case of RoA falling 
below the trigger level may include, among other things, restriction on 
accessing/renewing costly deposits and CDs, a requirement to take steps to increase 
fee-based income and to contain administrative expenses, not to enter new lines of 
business, imposition of restrictions on borrowings from the inter bank market, and so 
on. 
In the case of increasing net NPAs, structured actions will include, among other 
things, undertaking a special drive to reduce the stock of NPAs and containing the 
generation of fresh NPAs, reviewing the loan policy of the bank, taking steps to 
upgrade credit appraisal skills and systems and to strengthen follow-up of advances, 
including a loan review mechanism for large loans, following up suit- filed, setting up 
credit risk management procedures in reducing loan concentration, and so on. Other 
discretionary actions may also include restrictions on capital expenditure, expansion in 
staff, and increase of stake in subsidiaries. The Reserve Bank with the government 
may take steps to change promoters or ownership and may even take steps to 
merge/amalgamate/liquidate the bank or impose a moratorium on it if its position does 
not improve within an agreed period. 
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Apart from setting up a new NSE the post reform period also saw the drastic 
change to the equity markets through a new regulatory authority for capital markets 
the SEBI in 1992. Prior to this new regulator, the regulatory regime, where significant 
elements of the capital markets was again under the control of the RBI. The regulator 
has helped establish corporate governance rules for listed companies that are above 
average for emerging markets (OECD, 2007, p. 151). However, enforcement of the rules 
can sometimes be held up by delays in the legal system. The capital market regulator 
does not, however, have full reach over major financial markets. With the strong 
growth in equity markets, at a time when India’s GDP has itself been increasing more 
rapidly. The size of the equity market is similar in terms of % of GDP to Korea’s and 
relatively larger than other emerging East Asia equity markets as Figure 3.6 suggests. 
Equity trading declined in the early 2000s, when world equity markets were falling 
and Indian government debt was rising strongly, but has risen since. This trend 
repeated where trading declined to the lowest in years recently with the global 
meltdown, but is showing strong signs of recovery again.  
Equity markets have grown remarkably since the early 1990s and are now 
amongst the largest in the world in terms of transactions and have costs comparable 
with other major exchanges. The major determinant of this evolution, as mentioned 
above was the setting up of the NSE in 1994, a competitor to the BSE, both located in 
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Mumbai. This exchange was created in response to the poor performance BSE that was 
mutually owned stock exchange. Its founding shareholders were a number of public 
development banks (including one that founded the largest new private bank), 
government financial institutions and a private bank. The new exchange enabled 
participants from across the country to trade in one market. The new exchange was 
one of the first stock exchanges in the world to have a corporate structure. It rapidly 
became the largest market in India and, the third largest exchange in the world, 
measured by the number of transactions. It now has foreign shareholders (New York 
Stock Exchange and various banks) with up to a maximum of 26% allowed by foreign 
direct investment (FDI) regulations. Major development and regulations are 
highlighted in Table 3-6. 
 
Figure 3.6 Equity Market Capitalization (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ADB 200 
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Table 3.6 Legislation and Important Developments in the Equity Markets 
Year and Legislations Development and Details 
1956 BSE set up under 
the Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Act, later 
became the BSE Limited 
(in 2005 from an 
Association of Persons 
(AoP). 
BSE is the oldest stock exchange in Asia, and the first stock 
exchange in India that was established as originally as the "The 
Native Share & Stock Brokers' Association" in 1875. Its founding 
shareholders were a number of public development banks (including 
one that founded the largest new private bank), government financial 
institutions and a private bank. BSE Sensex index developed in 
1986, switched to Online trading (BOLT), an electronic trading 
system in 1995, and became a corporate entity in 2005. 
1992 SEBI Act Capital Market and Securities Regulator: Securities and Exchange 
Board of India  (SEBI) 
CRAs Ownership/Status 
CRISIL Standard & Poors is a major shareholder 61%  
CARE  
 
Owned by 3 major Indian banks (Industrial 
Development Bank Of India Ltd. (IDBI), SBI, 
Canara)  
ICRA  (Formerly Investment Information and Credit 
Rating Agency of India Limited) is a Public 
Limited Company (with its shares listed on the 
BSE and the National Stock Exchange) and 
Moody’s is a major shareholder 
Duff and Phelps  Indian Subsidiary  
Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs): since  
1991 
 
Fitch  Indian Subsidiary  
1994 Setting up of NSE NSE was Set up as a competitor in response to the poor performance 
of the existing mutually owned stock exchange BSE both located in 
Mumbai: NSE now has foreign shareholders (New York Stock 
Exchange and various banks) up to the maximum (26%) allowed by 
FDI regulations 
1996 Enactment of 
Depositories Act 
Law passed allowed for the creation of the National Securities 
Depository Ltd. (NSDL) for holding all stocks in demat form 
2005, the RBI introduced 
its Negotiated Dealing 
System–Order Matching 
Segment (NDS-OM). 
August This is a screen-based anonymous trading and reporting 
platform enabling electronic bidding in primary auctions and 
disseminates trading information with a minimum time lag. NDS-
OM has had considerable success and has taken a dominant share of 
government securities market trading. 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com 
 
Costs were also reduced with the introduction of new clearing and settlement 
institutions. An integral part of the new architecture was the creation of a centralized 
counterparty for transactions, established as a subsidiary of the National Stock 
Exchange and resulted in the elimination of counter-party risk in the market. At the 
same time, a law passed in 1996 allowed the creation of a new depository institution 
(NSDL) for holding all stocks in de-mat (dematerialized) form. This greatly reduced the 
incidence of settlement risk. Overall, these reforms created a national market in shares, 
eliminating price differences across the country. Overall, transactions costs were 
reduced by a factor of thirteen between 1993 and 2004, leading to a marked rise in 
turnover(OECD, 2007, p. 153). Since 2004, the liquidity of the market has further 
improved with the impact cost of a trade in a major stock falling to 0.07%, comparable 
to that found in major OECD stock markets.  
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Prior to the reform period there hardly existed a government securities market, 
as money was collected and lent according to Plan, according to the governments 
planning strategy. In order to keep the cost of government borrowing as low as possible, 
when planning went off-course the government would just send word to its banker. As 
in the central bank would make a few phone calls to the heads of banks and bonds 
were issued and the money arranged. Under this circumstance there was no 
government securities market as it lacked the institutional infrastructure and was 
inefficient. As there was no need for any justification for bond issue, a Government of 
India (GOI) bond market did not use trading on an exchange. Since it only featured 
bilateral negotiation and transaction between dealers imposed counterparty credit risk 
on participants, there was no market with a price-time priority. Until the reform 
period the government debt market only consisted of a group of securities with a group 
of homogeneous credit risks, and there was no way to evaluate their performance, and 
public sector banks and the government just dealt with each other. 
But ever since then the bond market has grown steadily ever since then, 
especially the government bonds which were largely issued in order to finance the 
fiscal deficit. The size in fact is comparable to many government bond markets in 
emerging East Asia at 36% of GDP, the Indian government debt market compares well 
with the markets of its neighbors in 2008 (refer to Figure 3-7). In absolute terms, 
however, given India’s greater overall size, the Indian government bond market is 
considerably larger than most other EEA markets. The need to finance a large fiscal 
deficit has stimulated issuance and growth of the government bond market. Since 1992, 
deficit finance has relied increasingly on borrowing from the market rather than the 
previous policy of monetizing the deficit. The government market comprises 
approximately 104 issues with a total nominal value of about US$364 billion (ADB, 
2008, p. 6). 
 
Figure 3.7 Relative S ize of India’s Government Bond Market (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
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Figure 3.8 India and EEA Government Securities Turnover (% Average 
Outstanding) 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
 
Government bond turnover has been fell from the peak reached in 2003 but has 
since been recovering on a strong but volatile course also swaying the turnover of 
repurchase agreements (repo). Repos have continued to increase, as more borrowers 
use them as a financing tool and had has now become considerably larger than 
government bond market turnover by investors. This trend implies the illiquidity of the 
government bond market, where liquidity is clearly concentrated in a few bonds and 
does not extend along the length of the yield curve of the previous 30-year spectrum. 
The liquidity was observed to be highly concentrated in 10-year issues (where the ADB 
(2008) suggests that the bonds maturing in 2016–17 comprised 50% of all trading) and 
5-year issues (bonds maturing in 2010–12 were also at 20% of all trading). Looking at 
this in perspective where between 1990-91 and 1998-99 there has been a ten-fold 
increase in G-Secs registered in the Primary market. The fall in RBI’s participation, as 
its absorption level from 45.90% in 1992-93 to 0.74% in 1994-95 also widened the 
market up slowly opening up to retail investors.  
These trends suggest one thing, although there has been significant 
improvements in the primary market, the secondary market is dominated by a few 
players that operate on a strategy of holding till maturity. This characteristic has been 
a continuation of the so-called pre-1992 “telephone market” that prevents information 
dissemination (limiting price discover) and eventually low retail participation in G-
Secs (Government Securities). The way in which these challenges can be overcome are 
by widening the investor base for Government securities among retail investors 
through increasing awareness and developing the infrastructure to deepen the market 
so that the exit routes are also clear. Current government bonds are fixed-coupon with 
maturities from 1 to 30 years. The RBI has experimented by floating different type of 
bonds over the years including (i) zero- coupon bonds; (ii) capital-indexed bonds 
(inflation-linked principal); and (iii) floating-rate bonds. After all these initiative failed 
RBI is in the process of develop a market for Separate Trading of Registered Interest 
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and Principal of Securities (STRIPS). The Table below illustrates the important 
legislations and regulatory measures taken since the reform period. 
 
Table 3.7 Legislation and Important Developments in the Bond Market 
Year and Legislations Developments and Details 
1992 Auction system for sale of 
dated government securities.  
This replaced the previous system where issues were 
allocated to investors—largely banks and state-owned 
investment institutions. Also signaled the end of the era of 
administered interest rates. RBI was the Regulator of G-Sec 
bond market.  
Computerization of the SGL and 
implementation of a ‘delivery 
versus payment’ (DvP) system. 
Zero Coupon Bonds and Capital Indexed Bonds introduced 
1996  
Primary Dealers system  
Wholesale Debt Market (WDM)  
 
 
Dematerialized forms of 
securities in G-Secs 
Primary dealers could be independent or linked to banks, 
but they have acquired a major share of the GOI bond 
market. 
WDM segment was set up at NSE 
FIIs with 100% Debt Schemes were allowed to invest in C-
Sec’s and T-Bills while other FIIs were allowed 30% 
investment in these instruments. 
DMat of G-Secs done through the SGL and Constituents 
SGL accounts. 
2000 Finance Bill The secondary market for corporate did receive a boost 
with the waiver on stamp duty payment on transfer of debt 
securities, as long as they are dematerialized debentures, in 
the Finance Bill 2000. 
High Level Committee on 
Corporate Bonds and 
Securitisation (Chairman: Dr. 
R.H. Patil) 
The recommendations of the group have been taken up for 
implementation. The Union Budget, 2008-09 has abolished 
tax deduction at source (TDS) on corporate bonds.  
The trading platforms are in operation both at the BSE 
and the NSE since 2007.  
The Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives 
Association of India (FIMMDA) set up also in 2007 as 
the trade reporting platform for capturing the over-the-
counter (OTC) trade data. 
Source: Compiled by the Author from relevant websites and livemint.com 
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Although government bond market has grown over the reform period, the 
corporate bond market, however, is much less developed in comparison to the emerging 
East Asian (EEA) economies. Over the reform period the office of the Controller of 
Capital Issues (CCI) was abolished (it formerly administered control over capital 
issues), which meant that companies were free to price their equity issues as per the 
market appetite. As during the pre-reform period, companies wanting to make any 
change in they’re capital structures had to obtain prior approval from the CCI. While 
examining such proposals, the CCI acted as the last checkpoint to ensure that the 
company had obtained al government and mandatory clearances, such and industrial 
licenses, approval from financial institutions, and so on. This led to a slew of primary 
issue of equity and the relative attractiveness of issue of debt yielded way to equities. 
Several relaxations in regulations post 1992 have encouraged Indian corporations to 
raise debt from overseas capital markets leading to further shunning of the domestic 
debt market by creditworthy issuers. Therefore, the corporate debt market in India has 
continued to be again dominated by the Public Sector Undertaking’s (PSU’s). 
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As Table 3.8 suggests, the corporate bond market at 3.9% of GDP is similar to 
the size of markets in countries where corporate finance is not well developed 
(Philippines and Indonesia) or where state-ownership remains dominant (as in PRC or 
Viet Nam). Even in absolute terms India’s corporate bond market is minuscule in 
relation to its economic size. Although Asia’s corporate bond markets are relatively 
smaller than the government bond markets, India is only similar with China, Vietnam 
and to some extent Indonesia; where the corporate bond market is just over one tenth 
of the government’s share. Though the businesses in different countries choose to rely 
on different modes of financing, either equity or bank financing. But India has 
corporate bond market is believed to be miniscule compared to its size, where it just a 
little larger than that Thailand, and on top of that private placements dominates the 
market. 
 
Table 3.8 India and EEA Bond Markets (US$ Billion), March 2008 
 
Source: ABD 2008 
 
It was not until 2007 when the SEBI launched initiatives to ensure more 
comprehensive reporting of the OTC for corporate bonds, under clearing entities such 
as banks, Stock Holding Corporation of India Ltd. (SHCIL) and CCIL. According to 
ADB (2008) by late 2008 the volumes were at 140 transactions amounting to about 
US$80 million per day. But as corporate bond markets worldwide are typically illiquid 
theoretically speaking a more liquid market is supposed to eventually contribute to 
lower costs of capital for issuers. India’s corporate turnover ratio was at 70% in 2007, 
which was high compared to other EEA corporate bond markets. The subscribers to 
corporate bonds are mainly mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds. 
Table 3.9 suggests that comparing Government and Corporate bonds is changing with 
reducing spreads, and corporate bonds being less volatile. 
 
Table 3.9 Recent Performance of Government and Corporate Bonds 
During the first half of 2009-10: the spread between the 10-year gilt and the 10-year corporate 
bond was 175 basis points 
 Government Bonds (G-Secs) Corporate Bonds 
Interest Rate: 9 7 
Volatility: 8.25-8.75 6.75-7.51 
Source: www.business-standard.com October 16, 2009 
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Corporate bond issuances also went through innovations, where even floating 
rate instruments, zero coupon bonds, convertible bonds, callable (put-able) bonds and 
step-redemption bonds were issued. Examples included step bonds issued by the 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. (ICICI, in 1998) paid 
progressively higher rates of interest as the maturity approached while the IDBI’s step 
bond was issued with a feature to pay out the redemption amount in installments after 
an initial holding period. The dominance and the preference for private placement in 
total issuances are because of the lengthy issuance procedure for public issues, which 
include information disclosure requirements. Another reason corporations avoid public 
issue is because the costs which are considerably higher than those for a private 
placement, apart from being able to raise much larger amount through placement in 
comparison with a public issue. Also, a corporate can expect to raise debt from the 
market at finer rates than the prime-lending rate of banks and financial institutions 
only with a AAA- rated paper. This limits the number of entities that would find it 
profitable to enter the market directly. In India private placement is when corporate 
security is sold to a small number of investors (usually mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and pension funds), companies prefer this method as it has to comply with 
fewer requirements although the placement has to be registered with the regulator. 
In actual fact, the ADB (2008) states that although corporate bonds can be 
issued publicly, most issues in the corporate bond market are not really bonds but 
private placements, and the interesting fact is that neither do the corporations 
themselves make the issues.  
• Public issues are bonds offered to a wide range of investors and which 
conform to the regulatory standards required of public issues of bonds. They require a 
prospectus approved by SEBI, and have to be open at a fixed price for a month with 
public subscription to allow investors (particularly retail investors). 
•  On the contrary private placements can be made to a maximum of 50 
“Qualified Institutional Buyers” (professional investors) as mentioned above, requiring 
much less documentation. The small number of investors makes it relatively easy to 
renegotiate terms. Typically, for example, a change in interest rates will lead to a 
renegotiation of the coupon on a placement during the currency of the issue.  
This makes private placements very flexible. The Table 3.10 depicts the 
private placements in terms of value and number. 
 
Figure 3.9 Private Placement Issues 
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Public issues have become rare due to the costs and the excessive disclosure 
requirements with:  
• Prospectuses for bond issues reported to be several hundred pages long. 
As against international practice, disclosure requirements are identical, irrespective of 
whether the company is already listed or not. 
• There is also no provision for shelf registration whereby a program of 
tranches can be covered by a single prospectus 
• The issue process is also reportedly slow, taking several months, which, 
with high marketing and other costs, makes public issues very expensive. The slow 
process also makes issues risky, as the price is fixed throughout the offer period.  
In contrast, documentation for private placements is minimal, although 
requirements have been increased in recent years. Placements can be issued quickly 
with book building and pricing usually completed within a day. 
The government’s committee report (Patil report) has recommended the SEBI 
to allow new listing agreements with stock exchanges. However they still need to be 
put into place, but the key features include (i) companies publicly-listed on an Indian 
exchange would be required to make only minimal additional disclosures for a public 
issue or a private placement; and (ii) unlisted companies would be required to make 
more substantial disclosures, though less than those required for an equity issue. But 
another aspect of the Indian private placement issues are generally quite small to 
international standards, and issuance in 2006–07 totaled US$35 billion with over 1,678 
issues (averaging about US$20 million) (ADB, 2008, p. 16). This also forces some 
corporate issuers to make several separate placements, sometimes even within the 
same day, and more often so to the same investor (as there are only few available) also 
under similar terms. As a result the result these so called “bonds” are in fact disguised 
syndicated loans, considering the fact that the largest investors for private placements 
are banks. 
Private sector, banks, and public companies in effect issue corporate bonds in 
India. Public sector entities accounted for the largest share of issues with 42% of the 
value, averaging US$107 million for only 8% of the number of issues. This leaves the 
private financial companies, largely banks raising money for lending purposes 
accounting for another 35% in terms of value and 39% of the volume. So this leaves 
private, nonfinancial corporate issuers with only 23% of value and 53% of the volume, 
indicating an average value of only US$10 million. The government sector PSU’s again 
dominate the corporate bond market too, leaving the private sector and nonfinancial 
issuers (usually major participants in other corporate bond markets elsewhere) with 
only a small proportion in terms of value. Corporate demand is limited for genuine 
bond finance (as opposed to loans disguised as bonds). Traditionally companies have 
borrowed from banks to meet financing needs. But that trend has not changed, as bank 
credit continues to dominate corporate funding, accounting for 90% of financial assets, 
with state-owned banks representing 70%—a declining but still dominant share as can 
be observed in Graph 3-7 below.  
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Figure 3.10 Deposits, Investments, and Advances by Bank Type 2007 - 2008 
 
Source: ADB 2008  
 
The main source of finance for smaller companies is from former “development 
bank” (now termed the "other public sector bank") which have emerged from state-
owned development banks but are now private and profit-oriented, these include the 
ICICI and IDBI. They finance themselves through debt issues, as they are barred 
issuing deposits. These development banks are active in the private placement market, 
as they are wholesale borrowers lending to smaller companies. Sometimes these banks 
can absorb an entire issue of a private placement. The decision as to whether to issue a 
bond or take a loan is determined through tact, for example as RBI prohibits banks 
from lending at rates below their published rates, but as prohibition does not apply to 
private placements, the bank would present the loan as a bond; loans are not subject to 
stamp duties, whereas bonds are making loans desirable for tax sensitive borrowers. 
Thus the public issues market has continued to be dominated by financial 
institutions, including the ICICI and IDBI, which both together accounted for the 
entire debt offerings in 1998–99 and all but one issue in 1999–20001. Apart from 
dominating the public issues market these financial institutions have raised 
significantly larger amounts through the private placement route themselves. The 
secondary market for non-sovereign debt, especially corporate paper has been 
tormented with inefficiencies including extremely poor liquidity. The biggest investors 
in this segment of the market, namely Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), 
General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC) and Unit Trust of India (UTI) prefer to 
hold the instruments to maturity, indirectly limiting the supply of paper in the market. 
The distribution of corporate bonds issued by rating indicates that the number of sub-
investment grade issues are minimal and the proportion below and the market is 
dominated by the largest corporations who are likely to achieve an AAA. While others 
are excluded from the bond market and obliged to rely on bank finance, where even 
bond ratings with AA is small. But SEBI’s has been keen on relaxing its rules to 
increase the proportion of lower-rated bonds. 
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Table 3.10 Distribution of Corporate Bonds by Issue 
 
Source: ADB 2008 
 
Wholesale trading in the corporate bond market is entirely OTC, with the NSE 
and the BSE offering order-driven, bond-trading platforms that are used for post-trade 
reporting but rarely for trading. The exchange-trading platforms are mainly used by a 
small number of retail participants, but some major banks have acted as the unofficial 
market makers slowly eliminating the role of brokers especially as they have 
withdrawn from the government bond markets. SEBI is interested in introducing 
mandatory, centralized clearing and settlement for corporate bonds to make expand to 
a wider range of investors, but the market suffers a huge settlement infrastructure 
deficiency. The RBI has been the regulatory authority for corporate bond repos (as it is 
considered a money market instrument), and has been considering permitting them. 
But in effect the Collateralized Borrowing and Lending Obligation (CBLOs) have been 
on the rise taking over the role of repos, but only limited to government bonds. 
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Where repo is the generic term for repurchase agreements, the repo market is 
where two participants agree that one will sell securities to another and make a 
commitment to repurchase equivalent securities on a future specified date, or on call, 
at a specified price. This sort of borrowing or lending stock for cash allows the stock 
serving as collateral. In India the government bond repo market is open to primary 
dealers and banks, which can repo their non-SLR holdings. Repo-eligible securities are 
government bonds, Treasury bills and state government bonds. Repos are almost 
exclusively between the market and the RBI and there are few third-party repos. Repo 
terms can range for over few months, but they are mostly short-dated, for example 
even a few years ago 3/4th of them were for overnight and almost 1/4th for 2–3 days. The 
RBI, similar to other central banks uses repo as their principal tool in open market 
operations to control short-term interest rates. However, market repo rates are 
determined between private institution, although the central operations are not part of 
the repo market they only provides a benchmark. 
Daily rates are announced and set a band between the repo and reverse- repo 
rates, where the call money market operates. The volume of repos has grown sharply 
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in recent years though less fast than the volume of CBLOs. The heaviest borrowers (of 
cash) in the market are foreign banks (46% in July 2008), public sector banks (33%) 
and primary dealers (18%) as Figure 3.11 below depicts. These are financial 
instruments typically used by securities dealers and other leveraged traders to fund 
the purchase and holding of securities and other assets. Repo’s have been part of the 
wider securities financing mechanism (along with securities lending and borrowing), as 
they are safer in terms of being used as collateral and obtain cash, lenders are willing 
to lend more. Cheapness and the ability to borrow more, apart from lower credit risk 
are the key attractions of repo for borrowers. 
 
Figure 3.11 Recent Repo and CBLO Volumes in India 
 
Cited in: ADB 2008  
 
What has been unique to India, is that it developed the CBLO to supplement 
and bilateral repo market, but in the eventually it is possibly supplant the repo market. 
The CBLO offers significant advantages over repos: in that the instrument are 
tradable, allowing a borrower to reverse the position and repay the loan before its term 
expires, CBLOs are considered secure because of the involvement of the CCIL as 
guarantor of each transaction. This allows low failures and participants with lower 
credit ratings can mainly use it. CBLOs are offered similarly to repos, with 3/4th being 
overnight, but they could also be for a year. As of 2008 there were more than 160 
lender and mutual funds were the largest lenders around 3/4th of the market followed 
by insurance companies representing 11%. On the borrowing side, they were mostly 
banks with almost half of being lent to public sector banks, with private sector banks 
and foreign banks borrowing another third of the entire volume. The CCIL, the 
clearing agency in fact now operates a market for CBLOs, which is a form of tripartite 
repo (approved by the RBI) that allows market participants to create borrowing 
facilities by placing collateral securities (government bonds and treasury bills) at the 
CCIL. CBLOs are innovative and unique to India, for refinancing short-term funds, 
and the main requirements on participants (for CBLOs) are that they have a 
constituent subsidiary general ledger (SGL) account for stock and an account with a 
recognized settlement bank. 
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 Demand by households for varied financial assets has risen, not only with 
investments in bank deposits but also in institutionally managed funds, although it is 
still comparably low compared to other countries. Although private sector mutual 
funds have expanded markedly, the assets of the insurance sector are still dominated 
by the state-owned life Insurance Company of India (that exists for over 50 years now), 
which invests 80% of its assets in public sector liabilities (OECD, 2007, p. 156) as can 
be observed below in Figure 3.12. LIC also dominates the Insurance sector although it 
faces competition from private sector insurers but in terms of investment it represents 
98% of the market. Although LIC is only required to hold 25% of its assets in 
government bonds, in reality it still maintains about 75% of its assets in government 
bonds. Private sector insurers are similarly conservative. Regulations also restrict 
companies, as they are not allowed to raise debt or go public in their first decade of 
operation, putting the onus on shareholders to fund costlier growth. Foreign ownership 
in the life insurance sector is capped at 26%. The LIC went through reform in 1981 
through decentralization by spreading its network deeper into the country, which made 
its operation much more effective 
  
Figure 3.12 Institutional Investors: an International Comparison of Funds under 
Management (Life Insurance, Pension and Mutual Funds, % of GDP 2005) 
 
Source: OECD 2007  
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Table 3.11 Legislation and Important Developments in the Insurance and 
Pension Market 
Year and 
Legislations 
Development and Details 
Insurance 
1999, IRD Act 
Insurance Regulator: Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority 
Pension 
2003, PFRDA Bill 
Pension Regulator: Interim pension fund regulator: PFRDA 
Bill 2005 still awaits approval of Parliament 
Liberalization of 
Insurance to Private 
Sector 
2000 
But State-run LIC still the largest 65% (total premium 
income of Rs1.57 trillion in March 2009) (livemint.com, 
December 1, 2009) 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com 
 
 The largest pension scheme in the country the Employees Provident Fund 
Organization (EPF) has not been successful administrative, and matching benefits to 
contributions apart from raising volume. The government also owns this organization 
where 5% of the labor force in the economy makes compulsory contributions, and it is 
subject to no outside regulation. It is its own fund manager and has a cumbersome 
system of governance with a board of governors that has 45 members and is chaired by 
the Minister of Labor. Private sector pensions are often managed by the publicly owned Life 
Insurance Company of India, which is regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Development 
Authority. Another reserve funds for employee severance payments are only regulated, to a certain 
extent, by the tax authorities. Even after the passage of the new Act, regulation of long-term saving 
schemes has not been effective.  
 Pension systems have been dispersed, and there even exists scheme for civil 
servants, New Pension Scheme (NPS) that offers the possibility of generating a 
significant amount of funds for management. This scheme is not restricted the 
government employees and is actually open on a voluntary basis. Original plans to 
allow participants to choose between four different funds have faced parliamentary 
opposition. Most pension funds are still controlled by legislation, not allowing 
investment in financial assets other than government bonds although the government 
is considering for example NPS funds to be invested in the stock market, government 
debt and corporate bonds. Once the Pension Act is passed, the Authority may allow a 
much greater mix of assets in four major funds in the country. Allowing greater 
investment diversity for both life insurance funds and government pension funds 
(including the EPF), similar to other Asian countries would be required in the long run, 
also allowing private companies to diversify their sources of finance. Insurance and 
Pension funds are also more crucial in providing funds for longer gestation periods. 
 Pension funds tend to hold a larger percent of government bonds than required. 
The pension fund sector is mainly controlled by various state-run provident schemes. 
Although the new pension system is to be based on individual accounts, it is still not 
clear as to when this will be in place. The current structure of investors includes many 
with heavy state involvement. In addition competition is limited for example in the 
low-premium life business. These investors may lack the incentive (and the skills) to 
engage in more active investment strategies. For example, since January 2004, newly 
recruited employees of the Central and 19 state governments contributed about Rs 40 
billion to the new scheme being managed by subsidiaries of State Bank of India, Life 
Insurance Corp. of India Ltd. and UTI Asset Management Co. But this figure could rise 
to US$300 billion by 2020 with if reforms are put in place, with a more active regulator 
and more competition. Apart from this, foreign firm are also not allowed to operate in 
the pension sector and private Indian players hardly have any presence. 
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 Where Mutual Funds have come to mean a professionally managed type of 
collective investment scheme that pools money from many investors and invests it in 
stocks, bonds, short-term money market instruments, and other securities. Worldwide 
pension funds were accompanied by mutual funds in taking over a market share in the 
financial system development over the last 40 years. Mutual funds were essentially a 
post-World War II phenomenon, where it rose in the US up to 17% in terms of the 
intermediation in 2003 (measured based on total assets) (Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007, 
p. 68). Its significant growth was the penetration of mutual funds among households, 
which again even reached to half the household population in the US. According to 
Greenbaum and Thakor (2007) these investment vehicles had in fact grown to about 
60% of the size of commercial banks and larger than pension funds, insurance 
companies, and savings institutions from their inception. Domestic mutual funds have 
played a key role in resource mobilization and it has been an example of how the 
private sector have eroded the government PSU and improved market performance.  
The market share of the public sector fund manager (Unit Trust of India) has 
been progressively eroded from two-thirds prior to reforms to 6% by 2006. This public 
sector fund manager had to be completely restructured in 2002, for the second time, 
due to failure of its investment portfolio to meet the assured returns that it had 
promised to investors. According to the regulator, SEBI (2009) mutual funds have 
played an important role in mobilizing the household savings for deployment in capital 
markets. In India Mutual funds are categorized into three: private sector mutual funds, 
UTI mutual Fund and other public sector mutual funds. The gross mobilization of 
resources by all mutual funds during 2008-09 stood at Rs.5.42 Trillion compared to 
Rs.4.46 trillion a year earlier with an annual increase of 21.6 (SEBI, 2009, p. 59). The 
mutual funds were one of the major investors in the debt segment of the Indian 
securities market. During 2008-09, the combined net investments by the mutual funds 
in debt and equity were Rs.887.87 Billion with net investments in the equity market at 
Rs.69.84 billion in 2008-09. Investor accounts increased by 9.8% in 2008-09 over the 
previous year, with the total number of investors in mutual funds expected to be less 
than 47.6 million (figure not exact due to possible error of double counting). Of these 
about 46.1 million were individual investor accounts which account for 96.8 %of the 
total number of investor accounts and contributed Rs.1.55 trillion which is 37.0 % of 
the total net assets. Table 3-12 depicts the scheme wise resource mobilization and 
assents managed by Mutual Funds. The private sector mutual funds also manage 
80.5% of the net assets as against 19.5% assets managed by public sector mutual funds.  
The mutual fund market however has also developed rapidly in India and is 
now almost exclusively private. Specialist “gilt funds” (which have access to the RBI 
liquidity facility) have been set up to invest exclusively in government securities. 
However, the nature of the Indian mutual fund industry’s customer base is largely 
corporate that use mutual funds for short-term treasury management (it means that 
the bond funds are treated as money-market funds and must invest mostly in short-
term bonds and bills). The mutual Fund Industry in India is of the size of Rs7.2 trillion 
(around US$156 Billion) capital market regulator, the SEBI has been regulating the 
sector (www.livemint.com accessed on August 27th 2009). In fact Indian asset 
management companies (AMCs of which there are 36) are making plans to start their 
own distribution business instead of selling funds through third-party distributors. 
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Table 3.12 Scheme-wise Resource Mobilization and Assets under Management 
by Mutual Funds as of March 31, 2009 
Schemes No. of 
Schemes 
Gross Funds 
Mobilised (Rs. 
Bil) 
Repurcha-ses 
Redemption 
(Rs. Bil) 
Net Inflow/ 
Outflow of 
Funds (Rs. 
Bil) 
Cumulative 
Assets under 
Management as 
on March 31, 
2009 (Rs.  Bil) 
Per cent 
Varia-tion 
over 
March 31, 
2008 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Income / Debt 
Oriented 
Schemes of which  
599  
(593)  
 
53,833.67 
(43,172.63)  
54,155.28 
(42,133.96)  
-321.61  
(1,038.67) 
2,943.49 
(3,129.97)  
-5.96 
(61.68)  
i) Liquid / Money 
Market  
56  
 
41,879.77  41,915.76  -35.99  90,594  1.33 
ii) Gilt  34 
 
146.96  110.90  36.06  64.13 126.37 
A
  
iii) Debt 509 11,806.94 12,128.62 -321.68 1,973.43  -10.61 
Growth / Equity 
Oriented 
Schemes of which  
340 (313)  
 
328.05 
(1,262.86)  
287.81 
(793.53)  
 
40.24 
(469.33) 
1,082.44 
(1,727.42)  
-37.34 
(39.76)  
 
i) Equity Linked 
Saving Scheme 
47  33.24  3.56  29.69  124.28  -22.42  
B 
ii) Others  293  294.81  284.25  10.55  958.16  –38.86  
C Balanced 
Schemes 
35  
(37)  
26.95 
(114.88) 
26.34 
(57.20) 
61  
(57.68) 
106.29 
(162.83) 
-34.72 
(78.74) 
Exchange Traded 
Fund of which 
17  
(13)  
57.19 
(93.39)  
67.18 
(121.06)  
-9.98  
(-27.67)  
13.96  
(3,130)  
-55.4  
(-) 
i) Gold ET  5  2.71  1.87  0.84  7.36  52.38  
D 
ii) Other ETFs  12 54.48  65.31  – 10.83  6.60  –75.07  
E Funds of Funds 
Investing 
Overseas  
10  17.67  9.89  7.78  26.81  (-)  
TOTAL 
(A+B+C+D+E)  
1,001  
(956) 
54,263.53 
(44,643.76) 
54,546.50 
(43,105.75) 
-282.96 
(1,538.02) 
4,173.00 
(5,051.52)  
 -17.39 
(54.82) 
Note: Figures in parentheses relate to 2007-08. 
Source: SEBI Annual Report 2008-09 
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Since 1992-93, when FIIs were allowed entry into Indian financial markets, 
foreign institutional investment and participation in the markets have significantly 
increased. With a boom in the stock markets investments by FIIs into India were quite 
high in last few years, particularly since 2003-04. In terms of percentage the gross 
purchases of debt and equity by FIIs declined by 35.2% to Rs.6.145 trillion in 2008-09 
(SEBI, 2009, p. 63). Table 3-13 shows the FII and Mutual Fund investments. Last year 
saw the highest net outflow for any financial year so far, as FII inflow into India had 
surged continuously since 2003-04. However, last year (2008-09) saw the highest FII 
outflow ever since the post-reform period most likely attributable to the global 
financial meltdown and the home country bias of FIIs in the crisis.  
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Table 3.13 Investments by Mutual Funds and Foreign Institutional Investors (Rs. 
Billion) 
Year/ 
Month 
Net Investment by Mutual Funds Net Investment by Flls 
 Equity Debt Total Equity Debt Total 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
2006-07  90.62  525.43  616.07  252.36  56.05  308.41  
2007-08  163.06  737.90  900.95  534.04  127.75  661.79  
2008-09  69.84  818.03  887.87  -477.06  18.95  -458.11  
Apr-08  -1.12  164.38  163.27  10.75  -17.02  -6.27  
May-08  0.64  59.19  59.82  -50.12  -1.63  -51.74  
Jun-08  31.79  32.64  64.43  -100.96  -9.99  -110.95  
Jul-08  14.12  57.89  72.01  -18.37  36.19  17.82  
Aug-08  -36.9  74.64  70.95  -12.12  12.58  0.46  
Sep-08  22.92  64.17  87.09  -82.78  32.04  -50.74  
Oct-08  14.32  -260.82  -246.50  -153.47  -18.58  -172.05  
Nov-08  -3.73  -35.99  -39.71  -25.98  42.15  16.17  
Dec-08  3.41  136.50  139.91  17.50  6.27  23.77  
Jan-09  -8.64  184.22  175.57  -42.45  8.02  -34.43  
Feb-09  -14.96  166.43  151.47  -24.37  -6.88  -31.24  
Mar-09  14.76  174.78  189.54  5.30  -64.20  -58.90  
Source: SEBI Annual Report 2008-09 
 
Although during 2008-09 there was an outflow from the equity segment 
amounting to Rs.477 million, the debt segment, however, witnessed a positive net 
inflow of Rs.18.95 million. Foreign fund managers wishing to invest in Indian debt 
securities need to first apply to SEBI and gain a FII certificate. Certificates are valid 
for 3 years and are renewable. FIIs in turn register individual sub-accounts for each 
investor for which they act. SEBI has introduced a number of reforms to smooth access 
for foreign investors: 
• FII status is not open to individuals, hedge funds, corporates, or to fund 
managers;  
• FIIs can now undertake short-selling and stock borrowing/lending on 
par with domestic investors;  
• Registration has been simplified; and  
• FII status has been opened to non-resident Indians (NRIs). 
There are currently 1,483 FIIs operating 4,474 sub-accounts as of September 
2008 (ADB, 2008, p. 36). The number of FIIs have increased significantly over the 
years following the reforms from 685 at end 2005, though the bulk of these are active 
in equities and derivatives rather than bond markets. FIIs are also limited by SEBI in 
the amount they can invest and their investments are subject to monthly reporting.  
 In terms of quantitative limits, in January 2008 FIIs were subject to changes in 
the method of assessment with the methodology to include investments in bond mutual 
funds. As the total invested amount exceeded the aggregate limit, FIIs were restricted 
from further investment until their aggregate holdings were reduced to conform to the 
aggregate limit. Although foreign investor access remains controlled, FIIs are 
increasingly important holders of domestic bonds and have become major players in 
equities.  Percentage ownership is limited to 24% for most companies, 20% for public-
sector banks. At the end of March 2008, foreign investors owned 15% of the shares of 
the companies in the BSE 500 (the main blue chip index). For comparison a recent 
survey has estimated that FII holdings of Indian equities were approximately 10 times 
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the holdings of domestic mutual funds and indeed exceeded the combined holdings of 
domestic financial institutions, including mutual funds and insurance companies, 
retail and high-net worth investors. Generally FIIs are permitted to invest in 
derivatives (including theoretically in bond-related derivatives—though these do not 
currently exist). SEBI has periodically imposed limits on FII derivative activities when 
it appeared that derivative use risked compromising other policy objectives such as 
limits on foreign ownership. 
 Historically FIIs had not been attracted to Indian debt markets until recently 
where rapid economic growth has become a hallmark for the Indian economy and 
improvement of India’s sovereign rating have led to FIIs to increasingly invest in 
Indian debt markets, that include both government and corporate. On the contrary the 
market regulator is trying to contain and regulate FIIs, possibly with a view to reduce 
foreign exchange and volatility risks (in terms of any sudden outflows), where this 
happened last year. Currently there is an aggregate cap of US$5 billion of government 
debt and US$3 billion of corporate debt. The aggregate caps have been raised over 
time—twice during 2008 (from US$2.6 billion for government bonds and US$2 billion 
for corporate bonds. Individual FII/sub-accounts are allocated limits within the 
aggregate total permitted. Individual limits are allocated on a first come first serve 
basis up to a maximum currently at US$200 million. FIIs are required to fulfill their 
allocations within 15 days of the application being approved. Corporate bond holdings 
exceeded the permitted aggregate total in January 2008; this was particularly due to 
an unexpected change in the calculation methodology). At end June 2008, FII domestic 
debt holdings totaled US$3.87 billion, up from US$2.29 billon at the start of the year 
(the total permitted investment is US$8 billion) (2008, p. 37). As the Figure 3.13 below 
shows however, although there was a large outflow last year, the cumulative amount 
still remained high.  
 
Figure 3.13 Trends in Foreign Institutional Investment 
 
Source: SEBI Annual Report 2008-09 
 
In fact according to reported trends in periodical, the last 18 months, have has 
swings in foreign capital flows and were becoming a concern. All foreign investors 
argue against being taxed for them, as that would hurt investor confidence and the 
country’s reputation. The existing mechanisms of intervening in this market are 
through sterilizing inflows by issuing special bonds, where RBI in the past used 
market intervention bonds to absorb excess liquidity generated by large foreign capital 
inflows. Foreign investors had by the end of last year (livemint.com, Nov 23 2009 
accessed the same day) invested more than US$15 billion of local equities in 2009, after 
selling US$13 billion in 2008, helping send Indian stocks up about 75% and lifting the 
rupee to its highest in more than a year. Where capital inflows are part of a globally 
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where international institutional investors chase faster growing emerging markets, 
especially under the sluggish recovery and low interest rates in developed economies.  
Although it is not the purview of this work, but raised inflows could be seen in 
creating asset price bubbles and drive currencies to uncompetitive levels as the RBI 
already faces excess liquidity in the market and has recently been struggling with 
controlling inflation. Other emerging economies have faced similar situations by 
imposing controls, where Brazil and Taiwan have already imposed controls while 
Russia is considering doing the same. But India in general has a larger task of 
improving intermediation to capture the growing domestic savings (as the rates are 
really high now), and in the short run be improving conditions in order to encourage 
more domestic participation in its equity markets to counter the impact of foreign 
investment flows. Indian institutional investors are still week, and lack the capacity to 
counter rapid fund flows as the funds themselves still considerably small. Apart from 
that regulations are stringent where government pension funds banned from investing 
in equities, and private pension funds can only invest 5% of their assets in equities. 
 
Another inlet the GOI has used to allow Foreign Investment has been the 
NBFCs which have become an integral part of India’s financial system. The 
government has specifically listed certain categories of NBFCs that are eligible to 
receive foreign investments, and NBFCs have emerged as lenders to both companies 
and individuals. When it comes to lending, NBFCs are generally regarded to be 
complementary to banks in India only certain categories of NBFCs that are eligible to 
receive foreign investments.  As India’s foreign exchange laws regulate and govern 
foreign investment in certain categories of financial service companies and the 
categories of activities they can carry out, these are referred to as FDI NBFCs.  
FDI NBFCs, by definition are not necessarily the same as NBFCs defined under 
the RBI Act. FDI under the automatic route (that is, without prior approval of the 
government) is permitted in 18 identified financial service/sector activities (including 
merchant banking, underwriting, portfolio management services, investment advisory 
services, financial consultancy, leasing and finance, stock broking, asset management 
and venture capital). FDI NBFCs are also subject to the prescribed minimum 
capitalization norms, where minimum capitalization in a “fund-based” NBFC for FDI 
of up to 51%, US$0.5 million has to be brought in upfront. For FDI above 51% and up 
to 75%, US$5 million is the minimum capitalization to be brought in upfront and for 
FDI above 75%, the minimum capitalization required is US$50 million, of which 
US$7.5 million is to be brought in upfront and the balance within 24 months. 
Irrespective of the level of shareholding in a “non-fund-based” FDI NBFC, the 
minimum capitalization requirement is US$0.5 million. 
Systemically important NBFCs are required to comply with cash adequacy 
ratios, single borrower limits, single investment exposure limits, and so on, which are 
not applicable to NBFCs that are not accepting public deposits. Recently, Sebi included 
systemically important NBFCs and certain other types of NBFCs not accepting public 
deposits as “qualified institutional buyer” for the purposes of the Securitization and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 
(Sarfesi Act). These amendments are to enable NBFCs to subscribe to security receipts 
issued by securitization and reconstruction companies and will be entitled to 
protections accorded to qualified institutional buyers under the Sarfesi Act. The 
multiplicity of regulations, directions and certain overlapping categorizations has often 
led to confusion in the NBFCs domain (livemint.com, Jul 20 2008 Accessed the same 
day). As NBCs are emerging as a very important segment of the Indian financial 
system, there is a need to categorize and simplify the regulatory system. Although this 
section will not get into the depth of the external sector or monetary policy, as the 
scope is to only profile the financial system in order to understand the case for 
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intermediation. The Table 3.14 below outlines the legislations and developments in the 
foreign investment, exchange market and external sector. 
 
Table 3.14 Legislation and Important Developments in the Foreign Exchange 
Foreign Investment and External Sector 
Year and Legislations Development and Details 
Monetary policy  
1934 Reserve Bank of 
India Act, 1934 
RBI, originally privately owned, nationalized since 1949. Regulates 
FIIs and also oversees the Foreign Exchange Market 
1991 FIPB and FIPC Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) set up, with a Council set 
up later in 1996: Foreign Investment Promotion Council (FIPC) 
Foreign Exchange 
2000 
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to replace the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
2003 FIPB transferred to 
DEA, MoF 
FIPB is a special agency in India. In 2004 an Investment Commission 
was also set up 
2003 Working Group on 
Interest Rate Futures 
(Chairman: Shri V.K. 
Sharma) 
The Group was constituted to review the experience gained with 
interest rate futures since its introduction in India with particular 
reference to product design issues, and these were incorporated in the 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) for Money, Foreign Exchange 
and Government Securities Markets 
1999 Setting up of the 
Foreign Investment 
Implementation Authority 
(FIIA) 
FIIA to facilitate FDI approvals, assisted by Fast Track Committee 
(FTC), that have been established in 30 Ministries/Departments of GoI 
for monitoring and resolution of difficulties for sector specific projects. 
2007 Internal Working 
Group on Introduction of 
Currency Futures in India 
(Chairman: Salim 
Gangadharan) 
That was a part of the efforts in the Introduction of Interest Rate 
Futures, and was further discussed in TAC on Money, Foreign 
Exchange and Government Securities Market  
2008 RBI-SEBI Standing 
Technical Committee 
Committee set up to advise on operational aspects in regard to trading 
of currency futures on exchanges. 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com 
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Securitization was generally small in EEA markets and in including India at 
the beginning of this decade accounting for less than 0.2% of GDP in 2001. But by 2006 
a number of the region’s economies, especially Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Singapore have expanded securitization levels considerably levels reaching up to 4.0% 
of GDP. Although India was very early in securitization among Asian markets, where 
transactions even took place even in the early 1990s. But the growth for this sector 
only accelerated from 2000, taking volumes up to Rs 580 billion (US$12.5 billion) in 
fiscal 2007/08 roughly 1% of GDP. However, the securitization market is believed to 
have not yet taken off, as volumes tend to be low and asset types limited. With the 
market being subject to excessive regulatory, legal, and tax uncertainties, volumes 
appear to be mainly influenced by tax or regulatory arbitrage considerations rather 
than by underlying financial factors.  
As the nature of the securitized assets suggests, originators have mainly been 
banks and nonbank financial institutions, by far including the former development 
banks that have been privatized and which have become major players in the consumer 
lending market, and housing finance companies. The CRA estimates that the top five 
originators of securitized assets account for about 80% of issuance. There has also been 
some securitization of corporate loans with substantial credit enhancement, included 
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single loan securitizations. The preference for asset-backed securities (ABS) is similar 
to the patterns observed in other parts of Asia including Korea and the Philippines. 
Although mortgage-backed securities (MBS), that are more prevalent in Malaysia and 
Singapore, have not been so popular in India. As insurers are subject to restrictive 
investment mandates, securitized assets are structured to obtain high ratings and 
enhancements include direct recourse to the originator (often structured as put 
options), originator or third-party guarantees, over-collateralization (by providing cash 
collateral and reserves). 
The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of 
Security Interest Act, which was intended to clarify the status of securitization, has 
been enacted, but is regarded as having had little effect. After much delay, the RBI 
implemented the Basel II standardized norms in March 2009 and is moving to internal 
ratings in credit and advanced measurement approach (AMA) norms for operational 
risks in banks. RBI regulations, which were already noted to be stricter than Basel II— 
have encouraged more direct assignments (cash flow transfers without SPVs). 
Developing the securitization can be pushed for by providing incentive to securitize and 
by setting up standard assets to securitize, as financial institutions will securitize only 
if they have the need to reduce the size of the balance sheets or if they are under 
competitive pressure. Securitization enables financial institutions to realize profits on 
their current assets by selling them, but this will require a supply of assets that 
typically can be securitized at the start of the market. These are the standard assets 
such as mortgages, auto loans, and credit card receivables, as well as infrastructure 
projects where future cash flows can be securitized. 
India’s banks have not felt pressure on their balance sheets so far—though 
credit demand suggests they may. Other entities such as auto finance companies have 
been active but they are small relative to the bank market. In considering which assets 
to securitize: (i) India is still developing its credit card market; (ii) auto loans are being 
securitized but the residential mortgage market remains too small for securitization on 
any scale; and (iii) India’s infrastructure demands are huge—but the main expenditure 
is in the future. As a result, there has so far been limited incentive for securitization. 
But this may change as credit demand and infrastructure expenditure increase. The 
use of securitization to finance infrastructure development and remit the cash flows 
could diversify the investor base for infrastructure debt. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 India and EEA Securitization (% of GDP 2007) 
 
Source: ADB 2008  
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While in Korea, Philippines, and Malaysia, securitization was done through 
policies designed to recapitalize the banking sector. But in India auto loans were the 
mainstay of the securitization market in the 1990s. Since 2000, residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) have also contributed to market growth, although RMBS 
activity has been dormant over the last 2 years. But the focus on ABS has claimed the 
biggest share of the market where in FY2007 accounted for 63%, followed by CDO and 
Collateralized Loan obligations (CLO’s) at 32%. While in 2007/08, CDO/CLO issues 
representing 54 % together with ABS (45% of the total) accounted for 99% of 
securitization volumes (ADB, 2008, p. 30). Credit card securitization has still not taken 
off mainly to credit card market, while showing rapid growth still remains small, but 
also partly because of stamp duty costs. There have also been limited future flow 
securitizations, such as toll receipts, and some infrastructure financing like for 
national highways. Demand for infrastructure financing in India is only now being now 
recognized as crucial, and it is expected that securitization of receivables from such 
projects should expand rapidly in the future. 
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 The Savings Rate in India is edging towards 40% of GDP (livemint.com 18 Jan 
2010 accessed the same day) increasing rapidly from humble beginnings prior to the 
reform period rate at a little over 10%, and this is justified according to the theoretical 
view that under repression saving rates are inhibited. The looming issue is although 
India now has about US$400 billion in domestic savings, very little is currently being 
funneled through the financial markets (even through banks) to fund, for example the 
country's huge requirements to build infrastructure. Closer examination of the trends 
in savings from the RBI Macro-economic Data (2009) reveals just how much of the 
savings and investment is actually fueling India's economic growth. Where Indian 
households save 28% of their disposable income, unfortunately only half of these are 
even invested as savings in bank deposits and other financial assets (refer to Table 
3.15). Of the other half, 30 % is invested in housing, and put the remainder that 
amounted to US$24 billion in 2007-2008 is put into machinery and equipment for the 
44 million tiny household enterprises that make up the economy's unorganized sector. 
In 2005, Indian households also bought more than US$10 billion worth of gold, which 
obviously is another form of non-financial savings; now making India the world's 
largest gold consumer. 
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Table 3.15 Rates of Gross Domestic Saving and Investment (% of GDP at current 
market prices) 
 
Source: RBI 2009 
 
India's economy would grow faster if the financial system could attract more of 
the nation's savings and channel them into larger-scale, more productive enterprises, 
and to provide for funding to projects that larger investment and with longer gestation 
periods. The RBI has also been undertaking efforts to continue reforms in order to 
divert US$7 Billion a year to GDP (which is just half of the household savings used to 
purchase gold or machinery in sub-scale household enterprises) through the financial 
system to invest more productively. In this regard the next generation of financial 
reforms is already being mentioned in policy circles, but something seriously needs to 
be done to channel this growing reserve of savings to make its way into productive 
investments. With the recent global financial meltdown again dampening Indian 
appetite for financial liberalization, especially the country and its regulator were found 
on the right side where in fact active regulation of the financial sector and restrictions 
on foreign investors safeguarded the economy from one of the worst global downturns. 
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Table 3.16 Major Developments in the Financial Sub-Sectors after during the 
Reform Period 
Sphere / Sector Pre-1991 System Reforming through New System 
Financial 
 
State controlled, Bank 
based, Credit Based 
System 
Financial 
liberalization – to 
improve 
intermediation 
Capital-Market system: 
expanding and diversified 
markets that provide 
better intermediation: 
with more instruments: 
equity, bonds, insurance 
and pension, 
securitization 
Banking Public Sector Banks 
dominate the financial 
space, and lend 
primarily to 
government in a 
repressed economy 
determined by law 
Financial 
liberalization 
PSB’s many privatized, 
competition emerges with 
private and foreign banks, 
intermediation more 
open, although 
government remains 
primary 
Bonds Absent as prior to 
1992, money was 
collected and lent 
according to Plan 
Through expanding 
debt market 
Primarily financing 
primarily government 
securities (G-secs) issued 
by the RBI. Strictly 
monitored by the RBI, 
Corporate Market weak 
Equity Markets Centrally controlled, 
and industries strictly 
monitored using 
licensing (License Raj) 
Investment in debt 
markets raised also 
through mutual funds 
New stock exchanges 
established, and 
industries freed up to 
raise their own capital 
through equity 
Pension and Insurance  Markets not well 
developed 
 Insurance opened up to 
private sector operators, 
but still dominated by 
public sector owned 
corporations 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com 
 
Even though the ability of firms to raise funds externally through the issuance 
of bonds is becoming a reality in India, which is also crucial for economic development, 
government borrowing as seen in the sections above could be "crowding out" private 
borrowers. It is expected that further reforms will undoubtedly occur in the near future 
such as permitting banks to enter the insurance and securities market, partly, or fully 
privatizing the PSBs and the further reduction of the CRR and SLR. However, the 
gradualist approach to financial reform advocates the need for developing and 
strengthening the supervisory systems before the implementation of such reforms 
(Arun & Turner, 2002, p. 441). Analyzing the financial markets through the theoretical 
framework at the beginning of this session, it is pretty evident that India’s financial 
market has although been developing capital markets; moving away from a credit 
based bank system. Looking at the world data on the composition of financial markets, 
it becomes a little simpler to understand in which direction India’s financial markets 
are evolving. As they are slowly moving to international standards, the process of 
reform and intermediation through liberalization has been gradual yet steady. This 
can be understood keeping in mind the size and political economy of the country. But 
international trends suggest that as countries move from middle income to high-
income status the relative size of the bank assets, equity market capitalization debt 
securities (especially international placements) grow rapidly.  
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With the investment needs in Indian infrastructure over the current 5-year 
plan (until 2012) is estimated at a soaring US$475 billion (Rs18.7 trillion), only then 
with the economy grow faster, and in fact contribute to the overall economic 
development goals! But other estimates also suggest that at the existing levels of 
investment, the country will miss the target by a staggering US$162 billion. Although 
tax collections are buoyant in India, the public sector is already being stretched beyond 
capacity. The government prioritizes social spending on populist concerns, as it has 
done with rural job guarantees. Although the PSP and foreign investors will in the long 
run contribute to the shortfall in spending in infrastructure projects, there is a growing 
awareness that ultimately, domestic capital has to take the lead. As this section 
outlined, with functioning corporate bond market deficiency and the overindulgence of 
government sector in the Bond market and PSU’s in the corporate bond market and 
debt market, productivity in this sector is only expected to grow more gradually. Where 
developing domestic capital markets is not an easy, widespread stock ownership can be 
problematic unless the legal system protects the interests of minority shareholders. 
With regards to Infrastructure companies a more promising way to change the political 
calculus is to try to ensure that the stock in private infrastructure companies is held at 
least in part by many small domestic investors (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003, p. 357). Efforts to 
deepen and broaden local capital markets by developing pension funds and other 
schemes may be extremely important in broadening support for private infrastructure. 
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 Financial systems that efficiently provide intermediation have been able to 
develop a range of instruments and institutions that are crucial in providing financing 
and funding public and private initiatives, depending on the countries’ needs and stage 
of development. Financial systems however have been crucial for economic 
development; their primary role as providing intermediation in the political economy 
has received less attention. As the initial thrust towards economic reform and 
liberalization came from the BOP financial crisis, India has been especially sensitive to 
financial repression and financial sector development. Developed countries having an 
extremely large share in holding bank assets, equity market capitalization and both 
international and domestic debt securities, which suggests that developing countries 
have a long way to go in developing their financial markets. Although India over the 
last 20 years has moved away from a bank-based system in developing its equity 
markets (with a surge in market capitalization), it still has a long way to go in 
developing its security markets (especially corporate bond market), domestic 
institutional investors (mainly pension and insurance markets). It is clear however 
that India is moving away from a state-centered, public finance approach, (through 
financial liberalization and intermediation) based on banks, to a more, credit-based 
financial system based on capital markets (and eventually securities market). This 
especially allows for intermediating more large and long term funding that is typical of 
financing public goods. Typical Highway projects in India run into millions and 
sometimes billions of dollars, with gestation periods and time taken for projects to 
attain financial closure extending as long as 30 years; this therefore requires more 
stable financial markets.  
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In India the public sector has been the main provider of basic infrastructure in 
India. However, public financing as mentioned in earlier chapters has already limited 
and further decreased by the deficit reduction provisions of the FRBM Act 2003, and it 
will not alone be able to generate the needed levels of investments (US$475 billion) to 
improve infrastructure facilities. According to the 11th Five Year Plan, the targeted 
average GDP growth rate of 9% during FY2007–FY2012 requires an increase in 
private investment for infrastructure from the historical average of 6.5% per year to 
nearly 12.0% per year.  Accordingly, the strategy of the Government for bridging the 
infrastructure deficit includes (i) revising policies and regulations across sectors for 
enhancing PSP in infrastructure development including through PPPs; (ii) enabling 
arrangements for bridging the enormous deficit in infrastructure financing especially 
for long-term funds through all possible sources; and (iii) strengthening the capacity at 
all levels for promoting PPPs for infrastructure development.  
 
Figure 4.1 India Infrastructure Investment (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: Broker research gross capital formation in energy, airports, seaports, roads and telecom has been 
used as a proxy for infrastructure spending. 
(http://www.idfcprojectequity.com/investments/india_infrastructure_opportunity.htm) 
 
The Government expects the shares of public and private investment through 
PSP including PPP in total infrastructure investment during the 11th FYP to be 70% 
and 30% respectively, compared to 83% and 17% respectively during the 10th FYP. 
Financing from multilateral and bilateral institutions during the 11th FYP are 
expected at around US$40 billion to supplement resources raised in domestic and 
international markets (ADB, 2007, p. 2). While the Government has pursued reforms 
for establishing a framework conducive for infrastructure development and broadening 
the range of financing modalities, significant scaling up of infrastructure investments 
still faces formidable challenges in the real and financial sectors. While PPP is 
emerging as the preferred mode for infrastructure development, capacity constraints 
will have to be addressed for transforming the potential for PPPs into a stream of 
bankable subprojects. This risk is being dealt by intensive support from ADB and other 
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development partners for mainstreaming PPPs. In addition, upfront identification of 
potential subprojects for the first PFR of the Facility has been made.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Infrastructure Available in India 
Source: ADB 2007 
 
 
The adverse impact of drop in the momentum of mainstreaming PPPs have 
been mitigated at the macro level through positive incentives that are provided by the 
Government for enhancing the bankability of infrastructure sub-projects. In addition, 
state governments are proactively reducing constraints to infrastructure development 
for promoting economic growth. Infrastructure reforms in broadly consist of the 
Government recognizes its important and expanded role in the changing economic and 
technological context for catalyzing PSP and PPPs in infrastructure development 
through 
(i)  Developing legal and regulatory frameworks and arrangements,  
(ii)  Planning and coordination,  
(iii) Reforming institutions and developing partnerships among 
complementary institutions, and  
(iv)  Ensuring quality of infrastructure.  
In pursuit of these, policy actions have been taken across sectors to encourage 
PSP, both through direct PSP and PPPs. These reforms are designed to reduce risks by 
enhancing the enabling environment, provide stability to long-term cash flows and 
assist in project appraisal to facilitate financing. Table 4.2 below summarizes the major 
infrastructure sector reforms (Appendix 2).  
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Table 4.2 Major Infrastructure Reforms in India 
 
Source: ADB 2007  
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 The most commonly understood definition of infrastructure has come to mean 
anything that is beneath (infra) the building (structure), and technically that now 
includes services or facilities that are on the surface (roads and railways) or 
underground (piped water and sewerage). Electric power, transport and 
telecommunications are often included as well, even though they their facilities are 
sometimes built well above the ground, but they still provide a supporting function to 
human productivity. In this regard the two most crucial aspects of infrastructure is 
network nature of these industries in distributing products or services over geographic 
space, and the monopoly nature of infrastructure industries in that they are usually 
provided by government and also termed as public utilities. The infrastructure service 
networks that are built are by and large capital extensive and the investments 
required are durable and immobile (implying that the network benefits and investment 
cannot be shifted to another geographical location).  
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Table 4.3 The Nature of Infrastructure Networks and the Role of the 
Government 
The Nature of Infrastructure Networks and the Role of the Government 
1. Monopoly, Network, and Economies of Scale Characteristic 
• The government has been a driving force and the main actor that has been involved in 
developing infrastructure services, and this is by and large the tendency as these 
infrastructure networks have the characteristics of a so-called natural monopoly, which 
are a combination of durable and immobile investments and strong economies of scale 
or traffic density (Ibanez-Gomez 2006).  
• This concern over monopoly eventually has lead government to either to provide 
infrastructure services itself or to regulate the prices and quality of service of private 
infrastructure companies. 
• Networks also imply that they essentially provide economies of scale, so that developing 
the infrastructure facility and services are provided by a single entity (by itself or 
contracted out), and costs could be reduced particularly when local network has a 
relatively low density of traffic. The durability and immobility of the investments 
increase the risk for new entrants to provide services where the incumbent is already 
operating; deriving the monopoly nature of infrastructure services.  
• Economies of scale also require large sale investment and long term funding that 
sometimes private sector cannot have access to (depending on the market). Thus might 
require government support in funding, regulation and  
2) Rights of Way, and Eminent domain, Capture Issues 
• But government ownership and involvement in the provision of infrastructure services 
that often pre-dates and enhances concerns about monopoly, is the difficulty of 
assembling the right of way required to set up an infrastructure network. Where 
facilities from railroads, highways, and power, water, and telephone lines all require 
long, linear, and contiguous rights-of-way that would be difficult to assemble without 
the government’s power to expropriate private property through the process of eminent 
domain.  
• Without the eminent domain, private landowners along the network alignment could 
easily bargain for high prices for key or missing links. In this regard, even if the 
government does not provide the infrastructure services directly it necessarily has to 
exercise its power of eminent domain on behalf of infrastructure companies, or allows 
the companies to place their pipes or lines in local streets or other publicly owned rights 
of way.  
• Governments on one hand are imperative in guaranteeing rights of way, but on the other 
hand they will always remain hesitant in delegating this eminent domain powers to 
private companies or to grant companies unrestricted access to local streets, for the 
simple fear these privileges will be abused under a monopoly environment (Capture). 
Moreover, the reluctance of the government to expropriate property and provide rights 
of way is understandable considering the fact that it can contribute intensify 
monopolization, by making it harder for a new company to enter the business and 
challenge the incumbent. 
3) Services of General Interest, Universal and equitable access, Basic levels guaranteed by 
legislations  
• Another important justification for government involvement is that some types of 
infrastructure generate benefits beyond those that accrue to its immediate users or 
subscribers. For example, clean drinking water and sanitary waste disposal protect the 
general public from the spread of disease and the contamination of the environment. 
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Similarly, a lamp outside a private residence or business reduces the risk of accidents 
and crime for neighboring properties and passersby.  
• If important benefits of infrastructure services accrue to nonsubscribers, then it may be 
difficult to persuade subscribers to pay voluntarily for the level of service that is socially 
desirable. Nonuser benefits have stimulated governments to promote infrastructure 
provision in a variety of ways. Most city governments contract directly with electricity 
companies for street lighting, for example, and compel all households and businesses to 
subscribe to piped water and sewerage services. 
• Some of these services are also supposed to be provided by the state for its citizens to 
promote quality of life and basic standards of existence. This is also crucial as the state 
is responsible for providing public utilities in exchange for the tax that users pay. But as 
economies and their functions get more diversified a more user based approach 
infrastructure provision has also been emerging. 
• Economic development and equity considerations are two additional and related motives 
for government intervention, and they also often enhance monopoly concerns. 
Infrastructure is viewed as an important to local economic development, and 
governments are often concerned about the infrastructure endowments of lagging or 
underdeveloped regions of their countries. Similarly, ensuring universal access to a 
basic level of infrastructure services is often thought to be important to the protection of 
equal opportunity for individual citizens, much as universal access to basic education 
and basic health care is. Infrastructure may not be deemed as essential or providing 
equal opportunity as education or health, but often considered critical for equitable 
development. 
4. Larger Concerns that are not only profit oriented, Regulation and setting up 
standards 
• Government involvement in infrastructure is also very crucial in reducing safety and 
environmental problems. Railroads, highways, and power lines present safety hazards to 
both users and nonusers, for example, while power plants, locomotives, and motor 
vehicles pollute the environment.  
• To the extent that these risks fall on nonusers, the government often feels justified in 
regulating the harms on the public’s behalf. And even if the safety and health risks fall 
on users, government intervention may be warranted if users are not well enough 
informed to judge the hazards that they are being ex- posed to.  
• In most countries, the regulators in charge of safety and environ- mental concerns are 
separate from those responsible for controlling monopoly. The separation is designed to 
avoid any potential conflict of interest between setting tariffs and setting health and 
safety standards. 
Source: Gomez-Ibanez 2004 
 
 As natural monopoly is the most important form of barrier to entry in 
infrastructure, another characteristic of natural monopoly are the large economies of 
scale in terms of providing the durable and immobile investments in establishing the 
barrier to entry. Economies of scale occur when average or unit costs of a firm fall as 
volume of producing a service product decreases, and this can enable one firm (as 
opposed to two or more in serving the entire market. This automatically has a larger 
firm bias, as the larger firms always have a cost advantage over a smaller one; so the 
larger firms has a natural tendency to win competitive biddings and provide services. 
This nature of firms, raises the need for a regulator that has to first of all protect itself 
from being captured (agency capture). As economies of scale mean that only one firm 
will serve the market at any given time, but they don’t prevent “hit and run” 
competition from a challenger to the incumbent. If investments are short-lived or 
mobile, both the incumbent and the challenger have the option of exiting the market 
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and taking their investments with them, but as the investments are durable and 
immobile, bringing competition is difficult and exit of both firms from the market 
without losing its investments is natural. However both durable and immobile 
investments, and economies of scale, have become the defining characteristic of 
infrastructure monopolies.  
 According to Gomez-Ibanez (2003) there are four main groups or categories in 
which infrastructure can be provided. Where it can range from state provision through 
public enterprise provision on one extreme; and to direct private contracts between 
infrastructure companies and customers is the category in which the market plays the 
largest role and politics the smallest (in other words minimal regulation too). With 
private politics is defined in terms of policy as however the polity is involved as the 
legislature and the courts enact and enforce the laws that govern private commercial 
contracts. But within that general legal framework, infrastructure suppliers and their 
customers negotiate voluntary agreements about the prices to be paid and the 
quantities and qualities of services to be provided. Apart from these four main groups 
there are many variants and hybrids along the continuum, but most can be assigned to 
one of those outlined in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.2 The Range of Solution to a Monopoly and the Options for 
Infrastructure Provision 
 
Source: Gomez-Ibanez 2004 
 
 The next alternative is concession contracts, which has gained exceeding 
popular in different parts of the world since nineteenth century and it was rediscovered 
and improved in the late twentieth century. Under this scheme the government awards 
a private firm a concession or franchise to provide a specific infrastructure service for a 
limited period of time, typically ten or twenty years. The services the concessionaire 
must provide and the maximum tariffs it can charge are specified in the concession 
contract. The contract is usually awarded competitively, often to the bidder proposing 
the lowest tariff for a specified level of service. The government monitors the 
concessionaire’s performance to make sure it is in compliance with the contract, but 
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neither it nor the concessionaire is supposed to unilaterally change the contract after it 
is awarded. 
 Concession contracts increase the role of politics as in effect the government 
represents consumers in deciding what combination of price and service quality would 
be best. The contracts between the private suppliers and governments are substituted 
for contracts between the suppliers and individual customers. Market forces still play a 
major role, because the concessionaire signs the contract voluntarily and the contract is 
not supposed to be changed subsequently without the knowledge of both parties. If the 
contract is awarded competitively, consumers have some assurance that the 
concessionaire’s expected profits will not be excessive relative to those of firms in 
competitive markets. 
 The third alternative is discretionary regulation, which had been used 
extensively in the United States and Britain and has been applied selectively or done 
as a hybrid in many developing countries. The discretionary approach involves creating 
a government regulatory agency with the power to unilaterally establish the tariffs and 
service standards for the infrastructure firms to abide by. The legislation establishing 
the regulatory agency usually sets out the principles the agency must consider when 
making its decisions and the powers of the agency. And the agency’s decisions can 
usually be appealed to the courts or some other tribunal on the grounds that it has not 
followed its statutory orders. The discretionary approach increases the role of politics 
further by abandoning the effort to describe all the commitments or making any direct 
contract between the government and the infrastructure company. The market is still 
importantly involved, especially as firms depend entirely or in part on private capital 
markets to finance their investments. If the regulatory agency’s decisions are too harsh, 
the company will not be able to raise capital to replace worn-out facilities or to 
accommodate growth in demand. But to the extent that the assets are durable and 
provide adequate capacity, the consequences of harsh decisions may not be apparent 
for many years. 
 The final option is to give the responsibility for providing the infrastructure 
services to a public or nonprofit enterprise. Private firms might still be involved as 
contractors to the public agency, but the services contracted out will still be less than 
the period for a concession, and will also not be encompassing. And markets are still 
influential, but only minimal as they become restricted to the public agency’s revenues 
determined by the prices consumers are willing to pay for its services while the 
agency’s costs are affected by the prices it has to pay in the labor, equipment, materials, 
and other input markets. The main difference is that the enterprise responsible for the 
service is not owned and controlled by private investors, so that it may have less 
incentive to take advantage of its monopoly position by charging prices above costs. 
This form of infrastructure provision is usually present in developing countries, and it 
surely did exist for India especially before the pre-reform period.  
 With the shift from private contracts to concession contracts or discretionary 
regulation, however, the focus shifts from whether the market is fair to whether the 
government is fair (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003, p. 35). And as one moves from concession 
contracts to discretionary regulation, the difficulty of demonstrating fairness increases. 
The concession contract has a very important advantage in that it can be awarded 
through an open and competitive bidding process, which the public is likely to accept as 
fair. Critics though may object that the government should have set a different 
minimum service standard or maximum tariff when it drafted the concession contract, 
but if the contract is then awarded competitively it is harder to argue that the firm is 
making unreasonably high profits. As a result, the task of demonstrating fairness and 
maintaining public acceptance becomes much harder in discretionary regulation than 
it is with concessions. 
 Even with discretionary contracts the design of the regulatory agency also 
matters, as measures that insulate regulatory agencies by making them more 
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independent protect them from political influence allow the regulator to make decisions 
that are unpopular in the short run, including decisions that are not in the public 
interest but are more efficient or equitable in the long run. Finally, the broader 
institutional environment of the regulatory agency is probably influential as well. 
Legal systems and other institutions that protect private property may also help 
protect utility investors from abuse by regulatory agencies. Political systems with 
checks and balances (as in India) may make it harder to change regulatory regimes. As 
regulations are made under different circumstances and in different legal setting in 
each country it is still too difficult to say which is more effective among regulatory 
strategies. The institutional environments that seem helpful to private contracts or 
concession contracts seem to help discretionary regulation as well. 
 Concession contracts proved very popular, however, in the wave of 
infrastructure privatizations that swept the developing countries beginning by the end 
of the 1980s. Concession contracts were becoming the norm for the private-toll 
expressways, railways, electric power–generating stations, and water and sewage 
treatment plants that many countries established during that time. Concession 
contracts however are not too prevalent say with privatized telephone and electricity 
distribution companies, probably because those services seemed so complex that 
governments had little faith that they could specify the needed service standards or 
investment programs in advance. Or also the level of monopoly is comparatively lower, 
considering the amount of innovation and competition that telecom can garner. 
Concession contracts were appealing in developing countries precisely because they 
promised greater commitment from the private sector. The fear of regulatory capture 
and opportunism was often strong, particularly among foreign investors who were 
often being courted for their money and expertise. 
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 What is popular with economics is when companies are horizontally separated 
they can serve different markets or regions, but vertically integrated in that they 
provided all the key array of functions needed to serve their regions. But governments 
began to vertically separate, or unbundle, their infrastructure companies in the 1980s 
at the same time concessions were getting popular. In most cases, the restructuring 
was part of the process of privatizing a government-owned utility. A well-known 
example being the case of Britain’s privatization of its national railway in 1994, where 
it sold the railroad off as approximately seventy different companies. 
Vertical unbundling was an outgrowth of the criticism of regulation in the 
United States in the 1970s and 1980s, and the motive was to reduce the need for 
regulation by introducing competition wherever technically possible (2003, p. 247). 
Unbundling is directly linked to regulation, whether or where unbundling proves to be 
worthwhile will depend importantly on our ability to solve the special regulatory issues 
it raises. At its core, unbundling involves a trade-off between the benefits from more 
competition and PSP and the costs from reduced coordination. How favorable that 
trade-off will be depends on how critical coordination is and how skillfully the regulator 
can promote it. 
 
99 
Figure 4.3 Unbundling Activities Increases the Options for Competition and 
Private Sector Development 
 
Source: World Bank, 1994 
 If only parts of these industries are natural monopolies, then vertical 
unbundling can focus regulation on the parts that need it and allow market forces to 
govern the rest. But while unbundling reduces the range of activities that have to be 
regulated, it comes at the cost of making coordination between the different segments 
of the industry more difficult. After separation, by contrast, the coordination must be 
arranged largely through contractual arrangements between separate firms. The firms 
may have common interests in the success of the passenger service, but this could also 
get complicated as firms could also have conflicting interests regarding who should 
bear what costs and risks. The regulator here is crucial, as it becomes a third party to 
already complicated contractual relationships. One paradox of vertical unbundling is 
that the effort to substitute competition for regulation may actually increase the 
complexity, cost and importance of the regulator’s task. That task seems easier in that 
the regulator can focus his attention on the fraction of the industry’s activities that are 
monopolistic. But once vertically unbundled the regulator must now supervise complex 
relationships between the monopolistic and the competitive segments of the industry, 
and these relationships are critical to the ultimate quality and cost of service for the 
consumers.  
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 The state of infrastructure in India has been a source of concern for local and 
foreign investors interested in tapping its potential as a business destination. 
Perceptions about Indian infrastructure are reflected in infrastructure rating 
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comparisons drawn with Brazil and China, which indicate that India has some way to 
go on infrastructure development before it can match countries at similar stages in 
development. The PRC spends seven times as much as India on infrastructure in 
absolute terms, spending US$150 billion in FY2003 on electricity, roads, airports, ports, 
and telecommunications, compared with US$21 billion India spent (Basistha, 2007, p. 
33). In terms of percentage, China has been spending 10% of GDP on infrastructure, 
while it India it has been hovering at 5%. According to the CoI, as India aims to expand 
its economy at the rate of 8–9% in the coming years, infrastructure spending will have 
to reach around 9% of GDP. India had also established nodal agencies such as NHAI 
and Airports Authority of India has taken the lead in partnering with financial 
institutions to promote PPP. 
 
Table 4.4 Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) Infrastructure Development Ratings 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Monitor 
Cited in: KPMG 2006 
 
The Indian government has released two fiscal packages so far (December 7 and 
January 3) with an infrastructure focus with an announced funding is expected to 
support a PPP program of US$20 billion in the highway sector and port and power 
projects. In the December 7 announcement, India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd. 
(a government-owned special-purpose enterprise) was authorized to raise US$2.1 
billion by March 2009 to support financing of around 60 highway projects through PPP. 
On January 3, IIFCL was authorized to raise an additional US$6.25 billion in tax-free 
bonds for refinancing bank loans to infrastructure projects. Non-bank finance 
companies dedicated to infrastructure financing have also been allowed to raise funds 
from multilateral or regional institutions and are to be provided with additional 
liquidity of up to US$5.15 billion. For a fast-growing economy like India, a sustained 
growth rate of about 8–9% is feasible and necessary to maintain global competitiveness. 
The size of expected spending in the various sectors is provided below in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Infrastructure in India: A vast land of construction opportunity 
Projected spending from FY07-FY12 in selected infrastructure segments:  
Infrastructure Sector Projected Spending  
Electricity US$167 billion 
Road and highways US$92 billion  
Railways US$65 billion 
Ports US$22 billion  
Airports US$8 billion 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008  
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Table 4.6 Infrastructure Regulatory Agencies and Regulators in India 
Industry 
Sector 
Year 
Privatized 
Legislation Regulator 
Telecom 1997 
(amended in 
2000) 
Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India Act, 
1997 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 
Airports 1995 (to be 
replaced in 
2009 
Airports Authority of 
India Act, 1995 
State owned Airport Authority of India 
(AAI, 1995), was replaced by the Airport 
Economic Regulatory Authority to be 
formed 
Electricity 1998 The Electricity Act, 
2003 (with amendment 
in 2007) 
Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission 
Petroleum 
and Natural 
Gas 
2006 The Petroleum & 
Natural Gas Regulatory 
Board Act, 2006 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory 
Board (PNGRB) 
Highways 1988 National Highways 
Authority of India 
(NHAI) Act, 1988 
NHAI was only operationalized in 1995 
Water  1997 Constituted under the 
Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986 
Central Ground Water Authority: that 
only regulates and controls, the 
development and management of ground 
water in the country. (New regulator to 
be proposed) 
Railroads None None (Although PPP’s 
to be implemented on 
Dedicated Freight 
Corridor and City 
Metro Systems and 
Rail Modernization) 
Indian Railways Regulatory Authority 
(proposed) with an Indian Railways 
Corporation (proposed under Rakesh 
Mohan Committee Report) 
Ports 1997 (to be 
replaced in 
2009) 
Major Ports Trust Act, 
1963 was amended by 
Port Laws 
(Amendment) Act 1997 
Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP, 
1997) to be replaced Major Ports 
Regulatory Authority (2009) 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites including Planning 
Commission, TRAI, AAI and livemint.com accessed on 25th May 2010  
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 The infrastructure finance market in India is largely characterized with 
inadequate flow of long-term funds despite a growing market and diversified 
instruments in the financial sector as the last section explained. The availability of 
funds from the domestic market is typically range only for 10 years or less with a 2–3 
year re-set clause, in effect making them short term financing. This typically leads to 
front-loading of tariffs during the initial years of the project cycle, which in the end 
could adversely affects affordability of the services for the low-income end-users. But 
this could also make private sector weary of entering the market in case there are 
price-cap regulations as in the case of National Highways. Since user tariffs are 
required to provide for debt repayments, return on equity, and depreciation costs, tariff 
affordability depends on debt amortization through smaller repayments over a longer 
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period of time. In the absence of long-term fixed rate financing, stability of cash- flows 
are difficult to achieve as the table below suggests.  
 
Table 4.7 Financing Sources for Infrastructure Projects 
 
Source: ADB 2007  
 
With the absence of long-term debt market in terms of corporate debt market, 
asymmetric information on infrastructure projects, and inherent risks in financing 
infrastructure projects further impedes infrastructure investment. Another anomaly 
that occurred when development finance institutions (DFIs) were converted into 
commercial banks cut the long-term funds that had been a major source of long-term 
finance, during the pre-reform period. In general, although studies and reports have 
been calling for more reforms in the market to support commercial banks raise funds in 
the market (that is Infrastructure based mutual funds), in general they still have 
limited experience in infrastructure financing. As the scope of financial intermediation 
was already covered in the last section, just the details of one Government SPV is 
worth mentioning here:  
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Table 4.8 Facts on India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd. 
IIFCL was established on 5 January 2006 under the Companies Act, 1956 as a Government-owned 
SPV specifically in the context of the magnitude of infrastructure investments required and very 
limited supply of long-term resources and the need to catalyze financing for PPP projects. 
• Central to Government’s PPP development strategy, IIFCL’s establishment has been extensively 
deliberated within the Government and with experts such as the Patil Committee and 
international and domestic financial institutions. Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
World Bank have extended support to ensure IIFCL’s autonomy and commercial orientation.  
• IIFCL has a lean capital and operating structure with paid-in capital of US$76.3 million and 
authorized capital of US$225.3 million. IIFCL is expected to raise  
(i) Rupee debt of 10-year maturity and beyond,  
(ii) Debt from bilateral or multilateral institutions, and  
(iii) Foreign currency market borrowings. 
• IIFCL’s market borrowings are government-guarantee to encourage funds resident in long-term 
financiers such as insurance and pension funds to invest in infrastructure. IIFCL’s operating 
paradigm, the Scheme for Financing Viable Infrastructure Projects through IIFCL (or the 
Scheme) was approved by the CoI chaired by the prime minister.  
• Pursuant to its Scheme, IIFCL will provide long-term debt financing at commercial rates for 
stand-alone non-recourse infrastructure projects or projects that are units of larger corporate 
entities. While IIFCL can fund both public and private sector projects, it prioritizes PPP projects 
selected through transparent and competitive bidding and assessed for commercial viability. 
IIFCL is expected to catalyze and promote PPPs by leveraging market-based project 
development skills and providing much needed long-term debt for financing infrastructure 
projects. This includes: 
(i) Extending support to infrastructure projects in partnership with institutions like IL&FS, 
IDFC, and National Highway Authority of India;  
(ii) Considering PPP projects at the state and municipal levels for example, roads, urban 
development, ports, tourism related infrastructure;  
(iii) Providing financial instruments for enhancing investments in infrastructure, for example 
guarantees, debt, and equity; and  
(iv) Establishing market benchmarks.   
• Accordingly, the Government has also designated IIFCL as the debt manager of a US$3 billion 
debt fund of the US$5 billion India Infrastructure Financing Initiative. IIFCL, in partnership 
with Blackstone Group, CitiGroup, and Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC) 
are investors in the US$2 billion equity fund of the India Infrastructure Financing Initiative. 
Further, IIFCL and 3i Group plc. have entered into a strategic partnership for equity and long-
term debt financing for projects in power, port, airport, and road sectors.   
• IIFCL is also expected to be the lead agency in using India’s foreign exchange reserves to 
finance infrastructure projects. Under this arrangement, IIFCL has been given in principle 
approval for setting up two offshore SPVs which will borrow funds from RBI and lend to Indian 
companies implementing infrastructure projects, or to co-finance their external commercial 
borrowings for such projects solely for incurring expenditure outside India 
Source: ADB 2007  
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Table 4.9 Interesting Facts about the Road, Highway and Transport Sector in 
India 
• India has an extensive road network of 3.3 million kilometers (km), 2nd largest in the world, 
carrying 61% of the country’s total freight and 85% of total passenger traffic. The growth in 
road traffic has been at the expense of railway traffic.  
• Of the 45,000 km of National Highway only 7% of were four-lane, 58% two lane, and 35% 
single lane. 
• The 2000 to 2006 period saw India undertake a series of large size infrastructure 
development programs. These included the beginning of the ambitious National Highway 
Development Program (NHDP) in 2000 to strengthen the country’s road network. In 2004 
the government started its National Railways Development Scheme (NRDS) to improve the 
country’s railway network. (to be discussed later). 
• Until the late 1990s the National Highways suffered from poor funding, inefficient 
institutional framework for development and maintenance 
• The Indian Government, via the NHDP, is planning more than 200 projects in NHDP Phase 
III and V to be bid out, representing around 13,000km of roads. The average project size is 
expected to US$150 million-US$200 million. Larger projects are likely to reach the US$700 
million- US$800 million range. About 53 projects with aggregate length of 3000km and an 
estimated cost of around US$8 billion are already at the pre-qualification stage.  
• The procurement process favors players with good experience and sound financial strength. 
Apart from the National plans, there are more than 10 states are also actively planning the 
development of their (state) highways. While the average size of these projects is smaller 
than the NHDP projects, most will still be substantial, in the US$100 million- US$125 
million range. All told, more than 4,500km of state highways are likely to be awarded by the 
end of 2010. 
• Projected annual growth over the 11th FYP is 12–15% for passenger and 15–18% for cargo 
traffic. World Bank estimates indicate that over the next 10 years, there will be a need to 
widen 15,000 km of national highways from two to four lanes, and a further 16,500 km 
requires upgrading from intermediate to two lanes.  
• Estimates suggest that about 25,000 km of state highways need widening. An estimated 
US$50 billion–US$60 billion investment is required over the next 5 years to improve road 
infrastructure. The cumulative funding shortfall from defined road user charges over the next 
10 years is estimated at US$25.66 billion, or 39% of total requirement 
Source: Bordia 2006, Basistha 2007, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008 
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 There was a rapid increase in use of roads for traffic and freight over the last 
five decades, where in 1950-51, road sector accounted for 13.8% of freight and 15.4%  of 
passenger traffic (Singh D. , 2006, p. 6). Recently the roads carry 70 % of all freight and 
85 % of passenger traffic, highlighting the fact the roads has become the preferred 
mode of transport. Moreover, the National Highways / Expressways although only 
accounting for about 66,590 km (2% of all roads) and carry 40% of the road traffic 
(Committee on Infrastructure, 2006). With India boasting the second largest network 
of roads, most of them are two-lane with high traffic, low service and slow speeds Table 
4.10. In terms of investment during the 5 year period till 2012, Rs.225,000 crore1 
                                                   
1 (IndE) ten million 
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(US$50 billion) is to be spent on highway improvements, and Rs. 70,000 crore or 
US$15.6 billion) on rural roads, through the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana 
(PMGSY) to connect villages.  
 
Table 4.10 Indian and Highway Road Sector 
Indian Highways and Road Sector Length (km) Percentage 
National Highways 66,590 1.98 
Expressways 200 0.01 
State Highways 1,31,899 4.00 
Major District Roads 4,67,763 14.00 
Rural Road 26,50,000 80.00 
Source: NHAI 2006 
 
The management and financing of roads and highways is now being revisited 
and it has become yet a new issue for governments. Although until recently different 
countries had adopted different approaches towards developing and financing roads, 
more than often it was a variation of the traditional approach. Theoretically put, the 
traditional approach has treated roads much like a public good where it was being 
financed from general government revenue. This was characterized by hardly any 
relation between the costs of road provision and the taxes or charges paid by road users 
(though fuel is often heavily taxed for general revenue purpose), and there was no 
attempt at direct road pricing. The more recent approach being the commercial 
approach, governments are now more often dealing with roads as a business sector. 
Roads are now being treated as a capital asset, commercial accounting is applied and 
users are charged, either directly or indirectly, for their use of the roads. Road 
transport remains a source of general revenue, but taxes are designed to minimize 
distortions to transport patterns or choices. In some countries, road finance is being 
separated from general government expenditures and road users are increasingly 
involved in decision-making.  
 The traditional approach has largely persisted in India, not until recently 
national and in some states fuel cesses2 have been introduced, tolls are increasingly 
applied and substantial private sector financing is also becoming a trend especially in 
the highway sector. According to the World Bank (2004) study India is categorized to 
be in early in a transitional stage between the traditional and commercial approaches. 
But the study also notes that the present structure of financing contributes to the 
under-funding of road maintenance, a distorted vehicle fleet, unreasonable incentives 
for traffic allocation between road and rail, and substantial economic losses. But this 
trend was not restricted only to India, and the developments were also a part of a 
global awareness and standards arising from the experience that with government-run 
monopolies were once justified by the low production costs associated with large-scale 
operations and by the need to protect consumers from voracious private monopolies. 
But over time there was growing recognition that private initiative disciplined in part 
by regulatory forces and competitive market forces often has the upper hand in 
efficiently delivering infrastructure (Mody, 1996, p. xiii). By analyzing the way the 
Road sector was treated till the late 1980s directly under a National Planning 
Commission 5-year plans shows particular trends. 
                                                   
2 Cess is the word used for Transportation Fuel tax (a uniform tax on petrol and 
diesel) 
106 
 To get a picture of how the Roads and highways were developed in under the 
20-Year Road Plans in India over the period 1941- 2001 refer to Table 4.11. As it can be 
observed that the National and State Highway Sector suffered the most in terms of 
expansion and development. Most of the expansion and development went into the 
district and rural road division, and this section will explain as to why this was so. 
Since Independence the Indian economy was based on Fabian Socialism, it was 
centrally planned with economy five year plans to guide policy, further it was 
financially repressed, controlled markets, import restrictions, and the state had much 
control over policy and implementation. 
 
Table 4.11 Progress of Road Network (Thousand Km) 
Targets and Achievements under 20-Year Road Plans (in Km)  
 
Source: Lall and Rastogi 2007  
 
 Most of the Infrastructure developed during the 1950s and early 60s focused on 
expanding large multi-purpose and irrigation schemes. Building National 
Infrastructure was missing even during the second five year plan (1956-1961), as the 
strategic approach was to develop heavy and basic industries as part o an import 
substitution plan. Most of the 1950s and 60s was infrastructure development was 
characterized as being developed to complement the industrial development, more 
often in remote green field sites. It was not until the Indira Gandhi era, that 
substantial resources were allocated to roads, especially to rural roads. During the late 
1960s and the 70s the rural road sector was given priority under the rationalization as 
part of transport sector development, but as it was a populist regime, and the political 
imperatives into channel funds rural India to build vote banks among the poor who 
could not benefit from village electrification ((Lall & Rastogi, 2007, p. 13). 
 The bulk of funds to rural roads came from The Minimum Needs Program as 
part of poverty alleviation program. During the mid 70s the, at the beginning of the 5th 
Five Year Plan (1974 – 1979) there was a proposal to link all villages with a population 
of 1500 and 50% of villages with a population of between 1000 and 1500 by all-weather 
roads, but unfortunately the implementation of these plans was poor and wasteful. 
Often these earthen tracks and gravel roads were hardly all-weather roads. In reality, 
the quality of the physical network of rural roads that were built was hardly 
comparable with the resources that were allocated to the effort during the 1970s and 
1980s. Refer to Figure 4.4 that illustrates the 10-year data wise breakup on the 
development of different types of roads. 
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Figure 4.4 Progress of Road Network (Thousand Km) 
 
Source: Basic Road Statistics, Road Development Plan Vision: 2021 
 During the Indira Gandhi era, infrastructure development was heavily 
politicized, this contrasted to the previous Nehru era where it was a part of economic 
strategic thinking. The Indira Gandhi era also saw an expansion of physical 
infrastructure for ground water irrigation and electricity supply that was needed to 
power the irrigation pumps continued during this period in spite of many State 
Electricity Board’s financial deterioration and chronic power shortages. The political 
imperatives and the mostly inefficient and distortionary trends in providing electricity, 
roads, and irrigation services were passed on to Rajiv Gandhi’s term. Although in the 
Rajiv’s term there was a growing pressure to undo these previous distortionary effects, 
but fiscal constraints were more severe and the intellectual debate about the direction 
of administrative and organizational reform to improve efficiency in infrastructure was 
being ushered. Much of this research work was being done by committee’s set up by the 
government, lending and multilateral institutions, which is finally said to have sped up 
the reform initiatives of the post-1991 BOP crisis period. 
 The next era of Decentralized Politics in the 90s financing constraint became 
the most severe in decades and it also started receiving exceptional coverage, due to 
the further intensification of shortages in the infrastructure sector and a growing body 
of knowledge of the benefits of infrastructure development on economic development 
and growth. As the nature of political power became more complex and diversified, this 
was complemented with a need for consensus building in policy making, demanding 
relevant empirical research. The India Infrastructure Report (NCAER , 2006), under 
the chairmanship of Rakesh Mohan, was a pioneering work with many 
recommendations being incorporated into the several budgets of the Eighth Plan (1992 
– 1997). Until the 1980s the shortage of physical infrastructure particularly in the 
context of sustaining a GDP growth rate of 5% was not properly acknowledged.  
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Table 4.12 Chronology of Legislations and Regulatory Arrangements Related to 
the Indian Highway Sector Development 
1851 Indian Tolls Act 
1894 The Land Acquisition Act  
1940 Dispute Settlement Act 
1956 The National Highway Law (allowing for Land Acquisition and Tolls among others) 
and National Highway Act of 1965,  
1957 The Department of War Transport was re-named as Ministry of Transport & 
Communications and the Department of Transport was placed under it. 
1958 In 1957, the chief -engineers (road and bridges development) of the Central and the state 
governments met in Bombay 20-year, and subsequently presented the Road 
Development Plan (1961-81) in 1958, is popularly known as the Bombay Plan. 
1966 In the President's order of 25 January 1966, the Ministry of Transport was re-named as 
the Department of Transport, Shipping and Tourism in the Ministry of Transport and 
Aviation. 
1967 The Ministry of Transport and Aviation was bifurcated into the Ministry of Transport & 
Shipping and the Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation w.e.f. 13 March, 1967. 
1978 National Transport Policy Committee, set up in 1978 under the chairmanship of B. D. 
Pandey, submitted its report in May 1980. It recommended 37 roads with a 12,955 km 
length for inclusion in the National highway network. Out of these, only 11 roads, 
aggregating 3,595 km length, were completed over a span of one-and-a-half decades. 
1981 Another Road Development Plan (1981-2001), known as the Lucknow Plan of the 
Indian Road Congress, has made a case for 66,000 km of National Highways by 2001 
A.D 
1985 The Ministry of Transport & Shipping became the Department of Surface Transport 
under the Ministry of Transport with effect from 25 September 1985. 
1986 The Department of Surface Transport under the Ministry of Transport was re-named as 
the Ministry of Surface Transport with effect from 22 October 1986.   
1988 NHAI Act and the Motor Vehicles Act 
1987  Establishment of the National Highway Authority of India 
1991 Asian Development Bank-aided study in February 1990 on Development of Long-Term 
Plan for Expressways in India. The study was completed in 1991 and it recommended 
development of 10,020 km of expressways by 2015 at an estimated cost of Rs 580 
Billion. 
2000 Central Road Fund Act  
The Ministry of Surface Transport was bifurcated into two Ministries viz., Ministry of 
Shipping and Ministry of Road Transport & Highways with effect from 17 November 
2000. 
2004 Highway development overseen by the Committee on Infrastructure under the 
chairmanship of the Prime Minister. 
The Ministry of Road  Transport  &  Highways  and  Ministry of  Shipping were 
merged   on 2nd  September, 2004 into a single Ministry of  Shipping,   Road Transport 
& Highways, with two Departments  – Department of Shipping and Department of Road 
Transport & Highways. 
2009 Plans to develop an Expressway Corridors and create Expressway Authority 
2009 The CoI, under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, replaced by Cabinet Committee 
on Infrastructure on July 6, 2009 
2009 B.K. Chaturvedi Committee on National Highways Development Programme 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites including MoRTH, TCIL and livemint.com 
 
 By the 1980s it was already observed that the volume of the increased traffic 
was being borne increasingly by the national highways, in spite of its small share of 
the overall road network in the country. It was not until 1971, that there was a 
realization to increase the National Highways by 8,000 from an existing 24,000 km, 
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while the length of overall road network was 915,000 km Table 4.5. But it was not until 
the post -1991 period that the case of transportation infrastructure became a good 
example of effective targeting of public spending especially during the Ninth Plan 
(1997 – 2002). In 1993 a Task Force on Infrastructure of government and industry 
representatives was constituted under the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission Jaswant Singh, with the aim of attracting investment to specific projects 
of national and regional importance, and ensure their execution and timely completion. 
The Task Force dealt with the developing and determining innovative methods of 
financing the Six lane expressway of 7,000 km of North-South and East-West corridor 
project, and the Four-laning of National Highways project.  
 The Ninth Plan was crucial when it came to the management of the 
infrastructure deficit under fiscal constraints, it sought to do this through 
organizational, management, structural, or in some cases, legislative reforms where 
were designed to improve operational efficiency, cost recovery and financial viability in 
key infrastructure sectors, and attract private capital into them (GOI 1993). The Ninth 
Plan had also recognized the unbalanced modal use in the transport sector, with a 
disproportionate reliance on congested national highways vis-a-vis rail. This awareness 
not only increased the operational efficiency of the Indian Railways, but it also led to 
targeted spending on the national highway network under the NHDP with Golden 
Quadrilateral (GQ, Phase I) and the related North-South and East-West Corridors 
(Phase II) under the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002 – 2007). To summarize the 
developments during the post-1991 period it is important to note the growing pressures 
of “neo-populist” coalition politics and the binding fiscal constraints that has forced a 
reduction in government spending on infrastructure on the one hand but there is 
marked improvement in the targeting of that spending, sustaining the path of gradual 
structural reforms to improve the sector’s efficiency and induce private investment on 
the other.  To top it all off there has emerged a strategic focus to infrastructure policy, 
with a growing emphasis on empirical policy oriented research in the sector (Lall & 
Rastogi, 2007, p. 19). 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Projected Investment in the Road & Highways Sector in the Eleventh 
Plan 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008 
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Table 4.13 Road Infrastructure Detailed Projections (US$ Million) 
 
Source: (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008)  
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 The Union Government through Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and 
Highways (formerly Ministry of Surface Transport) was responsible for the 
maintenance and development of the highways until the National Highways was 
constituted. The NHAI was constituted by the Parliament with the enactment of NHAI 
Act in 1988, which was subsequently put into operation in February 1995. NHAI 
charter requires it to act on business principles, and the first project was only taken up 
only in 1998.  The NHAI is evolving in its role and it is being strengthened to make it 
multidisciplinary body by establishing a dedicated setup for Public Private Partnership 
by creating separate cells for:  
Project Appraisal    -- Monitoring  
Planning    -- Quality Assurance  
Standardization and R&D  -- Contract Management  
Legal and Arbitration   -- Road Safety. 
 Later in June 1995, the GoI further reformed the legal framework that would 
pave the way for PSP in development of National Highways, with the amendment of 
National Highway Act, 1956 in June 1995. This Act finally enabled the private 
investors to levy toll and allowed participation of the private sector in construction, 
maintenance, and operation of National Highways. Since then the Government has 
been involved in other institutional reforms and in augmenting fiscal incentives to 
involve the private sector in road development.  The main enactments according to 
Singh and Kaladindi (2006) included: 
• The Road sector being accorded the status of an industry via Section 18 (1)(12) of the 
Infrastructure Act  
• Establishment of Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC) that would function as 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to meet the long-term financial needs of the infrastructure 
sector 
• Foreign equity participation of 100%, subject to a ceiling approximately US$300 million) 
• Highways projects involving widening of existing highways are exempted from environmental 
and forest clearances. 
• Guidelines for development of road projects through BOT to simplify the procedures 
concerning initial feasibility studies, acquisition of land, relocation and resettlement of affected 
establishments, environmental clearances, and equity participation in the highway sector.  
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• PPP project promoters are allowed to raise external commercial borrowings up to 30% of the 
project cost.  
• Separate Model concession agreements for projects costing of less/more than approximately 
US$20 million that are to ensure uniformity in the various agreements for PPP road projects. 
 
 But it was not until the later in 1998 when the Task Force that announced 
construction of North–South and East–West (NSEW) corridor also recommended the 
need for connecting the four metro cities of Delhi– Mumbai–Chennai–Kolkata–Delhi, 
termed as GQ. This was a significant to the political economy as not only was the 
traffic volume highest between these four metropolises it would also connect the four 
corners of India. In 1999 the NHAI was given charge with implementing the ambitious 
NHDP, with the first two phases GQ and NSEW, in January. This Program was 
estimated to cost US$13.2 billion (in 1999 prices), and NHAI was expected to involve 
the private sectors in certain stretches of the National Highways drawing US$1 Billion 
(in 1999 prices) in private investments. Although the NHAI initially sought to allow 
PSP through the conventional BOT -Toll scheme, where private investments were to be 
recovered through tolling the road users, it had to introduce the BOT – Annuity PPP 
model. This was due to the poor response by the private sector in entering BOT – Toll 
Concession model, as the private investors’ were not ready to assume the traffic 
revenue risk.  
 Although the since the late 1990s of the PSP regime, the Government had 
introduced new policies by offering fiscal incentives to overcome poor PSP, private 
investors remained skeptical due to the high upfront capital investment, 
overestimation of the traffic and public dislike for tolls as in high risks of revenue 
collection have been amongst the factors. The inaccuracies in accounting historical 
traffic data by the concerned public authorities and time span constraints during the 
project proposal process have been perceived to be key concerns of the private investors 
to BOT road projects in India. In general the perception of road users in India as in 
other developing countries that roads are a public good, and high taxes levied on users 
to fund road projects through the traditional public procurements process have made 
them unaccustomed to pay toll for using road. This causes users to avoid using the 
tolled roads by diverting onto the existing and alternate inefficient un-tolled road. The 
estimation of the users’ willingness to pay during the economic appraisal period has 
been also been a challenging exercise in developing countries where there are no or 
limited toll networks and the income and income inequalities are undergoing transition 
(other words the elasticity of transport demand)(World Bank, 2001.) . 
Overarching Policy framework of the NHDP has been to increase the viability of 
projects through private sector financing efficiency in executing the different phases of 
the NHDP. The NHDP is now being closely watched by the political machinery, it fact 
Prime Minister’s COI constituted in 2004 is managing policies and monitors the key 
developments in the national highway sector. The Planning Commission’s Five Year 
plans also integrate the NHDP plans in order to ensure time-bound creation of world 
class infrastructure, and to maximize the role of PPPs. The CoI with its report on 
Restructuring of NHAI (2008) is seeking institutional strengthening and greater 
autonomy of the NHAI with the view to increase its expertise in financing and contract 
management especially investing of about US$55 Billion over the next eight years. 
Since the Union cabinet has approved these recommendations of the report, hopefully 
this will usher in a new chapter of NHAI management. The NHAI has a mandate of 
undertaking seven phases of the NHDP, the plan of each phase is in Figure 4.6 (also 
refer to map in appendix for further details) and as of recently the status updates are 
summarized in Table 4.14. 
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Figure 4.6 NHDP: Implementation of the Seven Phases 
 
 
Table 4.14 NHDP and NHAI Project Latest Status 
 
Source: NHAI 2009  
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 Infrastructure services, (services that essentially have elements of natural 
monopoly) were generally provided by the state in most developing countries, to ensure 
equitable access to and distribution of public assets. Apart from all the essential 
characteristics of public goods, the role of the public sector is crucial in setting 
minimum quality standards and maximum access charges, to ensure benefits over cost 
to the public. These considerations compels the public sector to 'unbundle' 
infrastructure services either vertically or horizontally to spread risks, promote 
allocative efficiency in financing, service expansion and open up discretionary 
regulation (or enter into private or concessionary contracts) with private developers. 
India being a gradual reformer, in unbundling infrastructure services it has unbundled 
several of the sectors, especially power, highways, telecom, ports and airports by 
establishing independent authorities and allowing private participation, with a 
planned investment of $475 Billion during the 11th Plan (2007-2012) of which 30% is 
to be private investments. The National Highways was eventually vertically unbundled, 
and an independent authority (National Highway Authority of India) was established 
to implement the Development Plan in 7 phases (NHDP) to develop over 45,000 km of 
national highways and expressways by entering into concession contracts (BOT - toll, 
BOT - Annuity, or EPC). Developing and financing the National Highways before the 
reform period (pre-1991) was done the traditional way, and investment in national and 
state highways suffered in the light of popular politics which encouraged development 
of district and village roads especially to connect small villages. It was only the era of 
decentralized politics that led to a more concerted national highway development 
program and investment, which almost halved the investment in all roads and 
highways during the 11th Five Year Plan (around US$ 45 Billion of US$ 92 Billion). 
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The NHAI over the last ten years has been overseeing and financing the the 
different phases of the NHDP with government ear marked assured funding through 
oil cess, World Bank/ADB loans, road tolls (or other user charges), market borrowings, 
budgetary support and viability gap funding through SPVs. For the financial 
arrangements made for the Phase I and II of the NHDP refer to Table 5.1. These two 
phases had excessively relied on borrowing and the assured funding through cess, and 
the type of contracts were mainly Construction Contracts and initially Annuity projects 
gaining prominence, but over time the number of toll projects increased rapidly. The 
Private sector and the use of other financial instruments like bonds were negligible. 
 
Table 5.1 The Funding of the NHDP Phase I and II  
 
 
Private contractors are involved in this scheme mainly through EPC contracts, 
annuity (BOT) contracts and BOT (Toll) concession agreements, each corresponding to 
a varying degree of financial obligations in the future for NHAI. The estimated total 
cost of all the seven phases and special road program can be seen Table 5-2.  The Phase 
III, V and VI will be developed exclusively on BOT (toll) model. Economically less 
viable projects usually were funded by EPC or Annuity contracts, as the private sector 
did not want to assume financial risk and traffic risk. While the PSP took financial and 
all other risks in BOT Toll projects, with the public sector only assuming the political 
risk. 
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Table 5.2: NHDP Phases with Length and Estimated Cost 
NHDP PHASES Length (km) Estimated 
Cost in 
US$ Billion 
Phase I: Balance Work (GQ and Others) 1,738 2.15 
Phase II: Balance Work (NS-EW Corridor and 
Others) 
6,736 10.65 
Phase III: four-laning on BOT- Toll 12,109 19.26 
Phase IV: 2- laning with paved shoulders on BOT 
– Toll/ Annuity  
20,000 6.80 
Phase V: six-laning on DBFO, Toll 6,500 10.04 
Phase VI: Expressways on DBFO, Toll 1,000 4.07 
Phase VII: Ring Roads, Bypasses and so on, on 
BOT- Toll/ Annuity 
- 4.07 
Special Accelerated Road Development 
Programme in North East (SARDP-NE) 
7,639 2.96 
Total 55,722 60.00 
Source: NHDP 2006  
 
Like in many other countries India also eventually introduced a tax on fuel to 
directly finance the projects in the road and highway sector. This assured funding, the 
Central Road Fund was set up in 1998-99 to meet the challenges of accelerated funding 
requirement for all categories of roads in the country. This was legislated by the Union 
Budget that levied an additional excise duty and additional custom duty of Rs 1 per 
liter of petrol. Subsequently, in the Union Budget for the year 1999-2000, an additional 
duty of Rs 1 per liter on high-speed diesel (HSD) was also levied. Later in 2003-04 
budget speech the then Finance Minister announced an additional levy of cess of 50 
paise per liter each on petrol and HSD. The revenue that was generated from the cess 
would be used to finance all categories of roads. This fund was given a statutory status 
by Central Road Fund Act enacted in December 2000. Finally it was decided to levy 
and additional cess of 50 paise per litre on petrol and diesel for the year 2005-06 which 
was to be exclusively used for National Highways. The total cess levied on Petrol and 
HSD reached Rs 2, refer to Figure 5.1 to see the percentage wise breakup of the of the 
fuel surcharge. 
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Figure 5.1 The Allocation of Cess Revenue as % on Every Two Rupees Charged 
for a Liter of High Speed Diesel and Petrol 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from MoRTH Data for Roads and National Highways 2009  
 
The actual figures that went to different sub-sectors of the Highway/Road  for 
the year 2007-08 as can be seen in Table 5.3, reveals that almost half the funding 
collected from the cess went into the National Highways. This maybe justifiable 
considering that the use of the National Highways is respectively higher than all other 
roads, but it does raise issues as to ways to measure proportionality, and it does raise 
the issue if levying the rural citizen for the NHDP is legitimate. Although according to 
the World Bank Study on, Highways in India (2004), the cess is still classified as 
relatively medium at about 10 - 30 US cents per liter, like many other developing 
countries, it does raise concerns as how long the government intends to impose this tax, 
and the future use of funds even as there will be increased private sector participation, 
rising toll incomes, and hopefully other financial instruments available for long term 
financing (that is bonds). 
 
Table 5.3 CRF for 2007-2008 and 2009 - 2010 
 Type of Roads 2007-2008 in 
Rupees 
2009 – 2010 in 
Rupees 
1 National Highways 65.41 Billion 85.78 Billion 
2 Rural Roads 38.25 Billion 48.43 Billion 
3 Railways 7.25 Billion 9.58 Billion 
4 Grant to State Governments and UTs for State roads 15.65 Billion 20.70 Billion 
5 Grant to States & UTs for Roads of Inter-State 
Connectivity and Economic Importance 
1.74 Billion 2.30 Billion 
  Total 128.30 Billion 166.80 Billion  
Source: http://india.gov.in/sectors/transport/national_highway.php?pg=2 and (Government of India, 2010, 
p. 968) 
 
The CoI report on Financing Highways in India uses data that assumes a 
commitment of cess until the year 2030-31, and other assumptions:  
• estimates based on 2004-05 data on tolls, loan and interest repayments,  
• scheduled quarterly completion of highways in terms of length,  
• toll incomes do not include under BOT (Toll) project 
• toll considered at Rs.5 million per km in Phase-I, at Rs.1.8 million per km in 
Phase-II with 5% p.a. growth on a/c of traffic,  
• Maintenance considered at Rs.1 million per km on annualized basis  
 Based on these estimates cess funds would soar, even compared to toll incomes, 
as can be observed in Figure 5.2. Although it can be seen in the graph that the private 
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sector investments would contribute considerably at the initial stages of the project 
development, most of the expense of the NHAI would be funded using the cess. When 
this cess inflow is plot against the outflows of annuity repayments, repayment on 
borrowings and annualize interest, it can be seen that the cess funds would 
significantly contribute to these repayments. As the total outflows peak around 
2010/11 that would mark the stage where public spending in the projects, although 
that would still be at the initial financing stage of many of the projects, Although these 
estimates do not assume an increasing a more efficient and developed user-charge 
regime in place by then, which is already showing signs of success. Other factors will 
also traffic growth higher than estimates, which would contribute to a higher net toll 
surplus.  
 
Figure 5.2 Combined Cash Flow Statement for NHDP Phase I to VII Assuming 
Commitment of Cess up to 2029-30: Inflows 
!Source: Author’s Calculations from COI Data for National Highways 2006  
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Figure 5.3 Combined Cash Flow Statement for NHDP Phase 1 to VII Assuming 
Commitment of Cess up to 2029-30: Outflows 
 !Source: Author’s Calculations from COI Data for National Highways 2006  
 
The loans and borrowing from multilateral development banks and JBIC has 
been considerable towards the Phase 1 and 2 as can be seen in Table 5.4. JBIC projects 
are all complete as they were used to fund the initial NHDP projects, but World Bank 
and ADB funded projects are still underway. But the repayment of these projects will 
start around 2020 and peak around 2029, and interest rate payments will be a 
significant part of the repayment till then. 
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Table 5.4 World Bank, ADB, JBIC Funded Projects 
Awarded Completed Category 
No. of 
Contracts 
Length in 
Km 
Awarded Cost 
(Rs. Billion) No. of 
Contracts 
Length in 
Km 
World Bank Funded Projects 
GQ 18 983 55.37 9 526 
Others 0   0 ?  
NHDP Phase I 18 983 55.37 9 526 
NHDP Phase II 12 482 32.08 0 ?  
Sub-Total (A) 30 1,465 87.45 9 526 
ADB Funded Projects 
GQ 12 718 23.76 9 567 
Others 1 48 0.58 1 48 
NHDP Phase I 13 766 24.34 10 615 
NHDP Phase II 31 1,636 75.65 2 157 
Sub-Total (B) 44 2,402 99.99 12 615 
JBIC Funded Projects 
GQ 5 111 3.33  5 111 
Others 2 39 3.00  2 39 
NHDP Phase I 7 150 6.33 7 150 
NHDP Phase II 0   0 ?  
Sub-Total (C) 7 150 6.33  7 150 
?      ?  
Grand (A+B+C) 81 4,017 193.77  28 1,448 
Status as on May 31, 2008  
Source NHDP 2008 website 
 
  In terms of the trend in type of contracts used in NHAI, the trend in the 
late 1990s was the direct public financing of projects through EPC/CC, especially 
during the first two phases of the financing. There was a concerted effort to improve 
and focus on PSP, although the BOT Toll projects were not initially viable due to 
reasons mentioned earlier on in the paper, BOT annuity initially increased, eventually 
giving way to more PPP Toll projects. The public sector has also borrowed from the 
debt capital markets; it has largely borrowed mostly from the banks and financial 
institutions. As the equity market is still not ready and developed enough to accept the 
risks of these projects, and bond markets are not well developed, alternative long term 
financing options could aid public sectors financing options. 
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The rate of fee for the section of national highway, permanent bridge, bypass or 
tunnel constructed through public funded project or private investment project shall be 
identical. This however is guarantee’s equity by allowing for no fee levied for two 
wheelers, tractors and animal drawn vehicles if there is alternative or service road. 
The rate of the fee for use of a section of NH of four or more lanes shall be, for the base 
year 2007-08, the product for the length of such section multiplied by the following 
rates: 
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Table 5.5 National Highway Pricing According to Type of Vehicle 
Type of Vehicle 
(Gross vehicle weight, and number of passengers) 
Base Rate of Fee Per Km 
(in Rs.) 
Car, Jeep, Van or Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) (not exceeding 7,500kg 
and 12 passengers) 0.65 
Light Commercial Vehicle (LCV), Light Goods Vehicle (LGV) or Mini 
Bus (7,500 – 12,000 kg and 12 - 32 passengers excluding driver) 1.05 
Bus or Truck (12,000 – 20,000 kg and carries more than 32 passengers 
excluding driver) 2.20 
Heavy Construction Machinery (HCM or Earth Moving Equipment 
(EME) or Multi Axle Vehicle (MAV – three to six axles) (20,000 to 
60,000 kg) 
3.45 
Oversized Vehicles (seven or more axles) (over 60,000 kg) 4.20 
Source: MoSRTH 2008 
 
The rate of fee for use of a section of NH, having only two lanes but where there 
is an average investment for up gradation has exceeded Rupees one crore (ten million) 
per kilometer, shall be 60%. The rate of fee for use of permanent bridge, bypass, or 
tunnel constructed with the cost exceeding rupees hundred million shall be for the base 
2007-08 as follows: 
 
Table 5.6 Base Rate of Fee for National Highway Construction 
Source: MoSRTH 2008 
 
Provided that while computing fee for the section of national highway on which 
a permanent bridge, bypass or tunnel costing Rs 500 million or more is situated, the 
length of such permanent bridge, bypass or tunnel shall be excluded from the length of 
such section of national highway and fee shall be levied at the rates specified for such 
permanent bridge, bypass and tunnel:  
Provided further that where the cost of such permanent bridge, bypass or 
tunnel, as the case may be, is less than Rs 500 million, and the said permanent bridge, 
bypass or tunnel, form part of the section of national highway, then instead of above 
rate of fee, the rate of fee specified under sub-rule (2) of rule 4 shall be applicable for 
the such permanent bridge, bypass or tunnel. 
The explanation of the sub rule:  
a) The cost for private investment project, shall be the cost as assessed by the executing 
authority prior to invitation of bids from the concessionaire;  
Base Rate of Fee (Rs. per Vehicle / (Per) Trip) 
Cost of permanent bridge, 
bypass or tunnel (in Rs. 
million) 
Car, jeep, 
van or LMV 
LCV, LGV, 
Minibus 
Truck or 
Bus 
HCM, 
EME, 
MAV 
Oversized 
Vehicle 
100 – 150 5.00 7.50 15.00 22.00 30.00 
For every additional Rs. 50 
million or part thereof, 
exceeding 150 million up to 
Rs. 1 billion 
1.00 1.50 3.00 4.50 6.00 
For every additional Rs. 50 
million or  part thereof, 
exceeding Rs. 1 billion up to 
Rs. 2 billion 
0.75 1.15 2.25 3.40 4.50 
For every additional Rs. 50 
million or  part thereof, 
exceeding Rs 2 billion 
0.50 0.75 1.50 2.25 3 
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b) The cost for public funded project shall be the cost as assessed by the executing authority 
six months prior to the completion thereof  
1 Annual revision of rate of fee: the rates specified under rule 4 shall be increased without 
compounding by 3% each year with effect from the 1st day of April 2008 and such 
increased rate shall be deemed to be the base rate for the subsequent years.  
2 the applicable base rates shall be revised annually with effect from April 1st each year to 
reflect the increase in wholesale price index between the week ending on January 6, 
2007 (that is 208.7) and the week ending on or immediately after January of the year in 
which such revision is undertaken (Swaroop, 1994) but such revision shall be restricted 
to 40% of the increase in wholesale price index.  
3 the formula for determining the applicable rate of fee shall be as follows: 
Equation 1 The Formula for Calculating Toll Rate for Indian Highways 
Applicable rate of fee = base rate + base rate * {WPI  A – WPI  B / WPI  B} * 0.4 
Explanation for the purpose of this sub-rule –  
1 applicable rate of fee shall be the rate payable by the user; 
2 base rate shall be the rate specified in rule 4 read with sub-rule (1) of rule 5; 
3 WPI A means the wholesale price index of the week ending on or subsequent to 1st 
January immediately preceding the date of revision under these rules; and  
4 WPI B means the wholesale price index of the week ending on 6th January, 2007. 
4 and the annual revision of rate of fee under this rule shall be effective from the 1st of April 
every year.  
Discounts: 
Table 5.7 Pricing – Discounts for Using the National Highways 
Amount Payable Maximum number of one way 
journeys allowed 
Period of validity 
One and half times of the fee of 
one way journey 
Two Twenty four hours from the time 
of Payment 
Two-third of amount of the fee 
payable for fifty single journeys 
Fifty One month from date of payment 
Source: MoSRTH, 2008 
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 With the government’s policy of increasing PPP’s in the National Highway 
sector since the mid 1990s, a cess fund that is growing incrementally every year, 
however, it is still not clear as to what kind of financing system the government is 
aiming at eventually creating. It is not certain as to whether the NHAI is supposed to 
pursue full cost recovery in the National Highway sector. Although reforming and 
unbundling the sector is creating efficiencies in increasing viability of projects, and 
regulating and fostering PSP, there are still uncertainties in fiscal and distributional 
considerations in assessing the desirable level of cost recovery. There is not clear-cut 
target in reducing borrowings in highway finance, and how to increase a cost recovery 
regime. Like other infrastructure sectors the fixed costs are high with large initial 
investments required in setting up the highway system. But once the system is in place 
output can be increased at declining average costs until the capacity limit becomes 
binding. Although apart from telecommunication full cost recovery is too difficult to 
achieve, a good management policy should be able to cover all of its operating expenses 
and debt service and to contribute substantially to its investment program out of its 
own resources (Swaroop, 1994, p. 1909).  
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Table 5.8 Contracts Under Different PPP Schemes 
 
 
No. of Contracts Length (km) Cost 
Rs. Billion          US 
$ Million 
BOT Toll 
Awarded 42 2,357 145.66 3.167 
Completed 7 420   22.47 0.488 
BOT DBFO 
Awarded 2 148  11.52 0.250 
Completed - - - - 
BOT Annuity  
Awarded 20 1,150  76.95 1.673 
Completed 8 476  23.54 0.512 
Source: NHAI 2006 
 
 This raises the issue of tariff structure, and whether the NHAI is willing to 
raise tariffs to cover cost of investment and inflation as in India, the World Bank Study 
(2004) observes that the user charges current expenditures only because the highway 
network is being grossly under-maintained, poorly operated and with little attention to 
road safety. The study also notes that the user charges are economically inefficient (as 
it does not impose a higher congestion, on slow trucks), inequitable (as they charge 
buses more heavily), and promoting uneconomic distribution of traffic (as road freight 
is undercharged). User charges over time although needs to balance distributional 
equity, it also needs to include not only interest payments but also depreciation costs, 
as this would eventually generate a cash surplus over the sum required to meet the 
debt repayment installments.  
 Due to strict regulations the toll charges are being monitored by the NHAI, but 
there are many costs that are sill not being accounted for including: full road 
maintenance cost, system administration, environmental and other externality costs, 
congestion costs, capital investment costs, fuel tax, annual vehicle licenses, 
weight/distance charges, and road safety charges. Although the earmarking of 
funds for maintenance is crucial and is being carried out by the NHAI, the World Bank 
recommended that the three times the current level of expenditure was required for 
full maintenance of the network. Another crucial issue is that private provision would 
necessitate an appropriate rate of return, in other words a user charges that reflect 
cost would be essential. 
 The current trend in Toll collections current trends has been higher than 
estimated, in spite of complaints from the private sector that there has been default, 
due to corruption, lack of cooperation from state governments, and so on. With new 
stretches being of the National Highway being completed rapidly the NHAI has 
witnessed increase in toll collections the new toll plazas as well as from existing 
highways. For the 2008-09 fiscal the NHAI expects to exceed its toll revenue target of 
Rs 16 billion by another Rs 1 billion or more. During the last fiscal year 2007-08, with 
better results in toll collection, the NHAI had increased the target for 2008-09 to Rs16 
billion from its estimate Rs14 billion. As for 2007-08 fiscal the revenue was already 
Rs14.15 billion. As per a data, only 6,212 km of the total national highway network of 
66,000 km is currently tolled.  (The Mint April 1, 2009, accessed online) 
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In spite of the many issues in financing the Highway development and its 
maintenance, the trend with higher toll collection has been a favorable development. If 
this trend continues, with more demand and data, could boos the governments 
endeavor to increase PSP through BOT toll. This would also mean that the NHAI BOT 
Annuity commitments especially from 2015 would need to be revised. As the COI 
estimate (2006) represented in the Figure 5.4 suggests that annuity repayment 
especially for phase IV, which is still being implemented, would constitute over half the 
payments. Using the Annuity mode of funding the projects is unjustifiable, unless the 
projects are unviable (that is unable to traffic risk or it is a political economy project). 
Issues such as these, demand the government to not only reconsider the risk sharing in 
projects, and not only assume risk on annuity projects, but reconsider opening up other 
financial instruments and alternatives for funding such long term projects. 
 
Figure 5.4 Cash Flow Statement for BOT – Annuity (Phase wise – with Total 
Commitments)  
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from COI Data for National Highways 2006 
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Although it is impossible to account for all the developments in the financial sector in this 
paper, the crucial trends in the financial sector and macroeconomic developments that will have an 
influence on infrastructure spending in the national highways will be mentioned here. The financial 
sector is still dominated by the public sector banks while lending is also dominated towards the 
Public Sector Units or State Owned Enterprises. The bond market still not fully developed with no 
secondary bond markets, NHAI uses bonds minimally. Capital Markets are growing fast, with 
companies market capitalization growing quickly. Debt market is still largely used for financing 
government spending, which do cause imbalances in the financial system. Although there have are 
policy discussions towards looking at many infrastructure investment from a point that it requires 
long-term financing, and how this could be done for example, with domestic institutional investment 
(that is pension and insurance) fund reforms, securitizing toll or annuity receivables, and foreign 
exchange reserves (Haldea & Mohanty, 2003, p. 5). On the Fiscal side, the macro-economic 
condition has seen a large improvement with rising domestic savings rate and growing investment 
levels, and the government is actively trying to reduce its fiscal deficit with the FRBM. With regards 
to monetary policies have always been managed by the Reserve Bank, which is busy taming 
unsteady inflation rates, and aiming at full currency convertibility by 2011. 
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Figure 5.5 Organization of Highway Development and Ownership in India: 
Decision Making Process of NHAI in Bidding and Awarding Concession 
Contracts  
 
Source: created by the author based on the interview with Senior Transport Engineer, South Asia 
Division, (September 2009) World Bank, New Delhi Office 
 
As the Figure 5.5 outlines the decision-making flow chart in the NHAI 
determines on which mode to construct highways, as per conversations with World 
Bank Senior Transport engineer, the process is carried out in a very crude method that 
has often been very time consuming.  It starts of with identifying a group of allotted 
projects that are jointly decided by COI and NHAI (by which time the government also 
makes its own assessment on traffic and liabilities). These allotted projects are then 
handed over to the NHAI by the Ministry of Roads, Transport and Highways (MoRTH), 
and MoRTH remains the owner of the assets and is responsible for land acquisitions 
(Table 5.9 displays the clearances required and the Agencies responsible). The 
projects are put to test by issuing tenders for competitive bidding, and by default they 
opened to tender on a BOT –Toll mode. If however there are no bids, it is now entirely 
up to the NHAI and the COI, to re-assess the project and send it out for a rebid, this is 
only usually only up to a second time. As it is not such a scientific method, it raises 
issues as to the future of project development and role of the government in identifying 
and making stretches more marketable.  So if the BOT – Toll does not garner enough 
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interest from developers (who are risk averse to commercial or traffic risks) the BOT – 
Annuity method is chosen, with a concession whereby the government pays the 
developer a fixed annuity each year for the concession period. The last option is the 
EPC contracts, where it is used only when the developers show no interest, or the 
government is interested owning the assets and can contract out separate tolling and 
Operation and management (O&M) Contracts. 
But the real issue seems to about asset ownership, where concessionaire is not 
passed on the asset but only allowed to manage it, and in most case concessionaire’s 
rely on bank based debt, and the issue is if the asset is passed on it will allow 
concessionaire’s to securitize assets, to fund further investment. In fact even the NHAI 
is only the agent of the ministry that manage the highway assets and the 'right of way', 
under this circumstance the concessionaire only has the right to toll (and no control on 
the asset), and is also unable to securitize tolls. Even in worst cases the concessionaire 
business fails he cannot sell the asset or securitize the asset, making some projects 
(especially the ones with less commercial viability more risky. Another issue with the 
debt/equity ratios is the way firms artificially created, jack up project costs to get cover 
up for the equity part of their investment. So for example, if only 70% debt financing is 
allowed, and 30% equity, firms can escalate the cost to ensure they obtain debt 
financing for the entire project. National highways projects are constructed on debt 
finance (PPIAF), as without any differentiation of state or national highway, that too 
debt financing mostly from domestic public sector banks.3 
 
Table 5.9  Major Clearances Required for Roads and Highways 
Source: Investment Promotion and Infrastructure Development Cell, GOI 
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 Between 1984 to 2000 only developed about 1000 km of construction was taken 
up through 60 contracts of an average length of 17 km And these contracts were to 
take 8 – 12 years to complete and were characterized by cost overruns, poor contract 
management and institutional weakness. These projects were being carried out 
through to four multilateral loans, tow each from the World Bank and ADB 
These could also be due to the organizational structure of how project were to be 
carried out:  
• While the overall responsibility for highways was with the Central Government (Ministry of 
Surface Transport),  
• The Public Works Departments (PWD) of the State Government on agency basis carried out 
actual execution of works.  
                                                   
3 Based on interview with Senior World Bank Transport Engineer, New Delhi 
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The broad framework of implementation was:  
• Detailed project reports: prepared by consultants but extensively examined and reviewed 
first by State PWD and thereafter Ministry of Shipping and Transport (MoST) 
• Award of Contract: The PWD invited tenders and after their evaluation submitted the 
recommendations to the MoST.  
• Once approved by the MoST contracts were awarded by the PWD.  
• Both PWD and MoST followed the prescribed internal procedures of their respective 
governments that involved cross-referencing with other departments and ministries.  
• All financial and technical decision had to get approvals through technical section, policy 
sections of the PWD and the finally the Finance Department of the State Government 
• Supervision: prior to 1984 the supervision of the project was generally the responsibility of 
the State PWD, later it was supervised by the consultant and the PWD 
• Variations and Financial Decisions during the Execution of the Project: These were 
examined by the PWD and sent to the MoST for approval and again followed the prescribed 
internal procedures of approvals.  
The duality of responsibilities between the Central Government (MoST) and the 
State Government (PWD caused long delays at every stage of project implementation of 
contract awards, revision of cost estimates, approving design changes, decision on 
variations and on time extensions. (ADB 2007, World Bank 2004) 
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As it is expected that all the sub-projects in NHDP Phase-III to Phase-VII will 
be ensued on PPP BOT mode, apart from the Phase II that had seen an increase in 
PPP. The government’s efforts to increase and improve private sector participation and 
reduce the risks, financial, legal impediments to PSP are now more visible. Although 
during the early stages of NHDP, experts and policymakers in India have prescribed 
Annuity-based BOT model to finance highway projects so as to limit the effect of price 
elasticity of traffic demand, and also due to poor interest from the private sector. 
Annuity-based BOT model is still considered a traffic risk-neutral PPP model, where 
the granting authority will pay the concessionaire a fixed semi-annual annuity, 
regardless of the traffic using the facilities. This amount will compensate for the 
expenses incurred by the concessionaire in construction, operation and maintenance of 
the facilities, thereby the concessionaire does not bear the traffic revenue risk.  But 
eventually the PSP saw a growth in BOT annuity from the earliest traditional EPC 
(Engineering, procurement, construction) or CC (Construction Contract) Civil Work 
contracts, but with new reforms BOT tolls is now gaining much more popularity, 
especially when traffic risks are less uncertain. 
 The general trend in India has been a rapid increase in private investment in 
infrastructure since 2003 (2008)Harris 2008). Its PPP program has grown rapidly over 
the last five to six years; between 2002–06 more than 150 PPP deals were closed, 
compared with 66 in the previous seven years.  This growth has mainly been in the 
transport and urban infrastructure sectors, with road projects accounting for a large 
share of the increase, particularly in the number of projects. The Harris and Tadimalla 
study (2008) of 104 PPP projects (accounting 73% of the total PPP project value in 
India) and their financing between 1995-2007 was composed of: 68% senior debt, 25% 
equity, 3% subordinated debt (mostly transport projects), 4% government grants 
(viability gap funding provided during construction). Of the senior debt 70% was from 
commercial banks, four-fifths of this by public sector banks, 23% from institutional 
investors (5 % from the International Finance Corporation), and bond markets were 
used sparingly. On the Equity side 80% came directly from the project developers the 
next largest being the public sector. 
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 In recent years the role of senior debt even with the private firms has grown 
while the share of equity has declined, leading to rising debt-equity ratios. One 
explanation for this trend is that commercial banks have become more comfortable 
with PPPs, particularly in the road sector, and are therefore willing to have senior debt 
make up a larger share of project financing.  
 The trends in PPP financing highlight several issues with implications for 
financing the large-scale PPP program envisaged by India’s government. PPPs have 
relied heavily on commercial banks for their debt financing, and it is unclear how this 
dependence and relationship will emerge. Long-term financing exposes the banks to 
the risk of asset-liability mismatch, as the main source of funds for Indian banks is 
savings deposits and term deposits, with a maturity period ranging between less than 
six months to five years. Initially developers were comfortable with shorter reset 
periods, as this had been a period of declining or low rates. But as interest rates began 
to increase more recently, concerns arose about the impact on PPPs, because the 
concession contracts have no provisions for passing on higher interest charges. 
Continued increases in rates as well as a tightening of credit could have adverse effects 
on many projects. Interest rate volatility has been a serious cause for concern for the 
private sector as there is also a reduced liquidity. With the banks typically lend to 
infrastructure projects at close to the so-called prime lending rate or the benchmark-
lending rate but these rates increased from 12.25-12.75% to 13.25-14% over the past 
five months alone (The Mint, September 8th 2004). With the increasing need for PPP’s 
there is a growing need to broaden the sources of financing through policy reforms to 
capital markets and concession frameworks (Harris & Tadimalla, 2008, p. 1). 
 As also mentioned earlier, an active bond market can increase the flow of long-
term funds and reduce reliance on banks, also for the private sector. The Indian 
corporate bond market, though one of the largest in Asia is still at an early stage of 
development, and its growth is hampered by institutional, legal, and regulatory 
constraints and this has made bonds a more expensive way of financing debt. These 
issues were raised, as well as recommendations were highlighted by the Patil 
Committee (2005), established by the government to look into improving terms for 
infrastructure finance. Following the suggestions of the committee, the government 
has set up reporting and trading platforms for corporate bonds. Many other important 
recommendations still await implementation. But implementing bond market reforms 
is a difficult challenge in the best of times, and in the light of the current global 
financial crisis the government would have to explore other innovative ways to ensure 
adequate flows of (private) financing to infrastructure PPPs.  
 On the equity side, participation by foreign players, particularly strategic 
investors, has been low even though PPP projects are now allowed to have 100% 
foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment accounted for only 11 percent 
($322 million) of the total investment in the Harris and Tadimalla study (2008). The 
port sector had the largest share with 51 % of this foreign investment, followed by 
airports with 32 % and roads with only 16 %. It was found that the reason why few 
pure equity providers were willing to invest directly in special-purpose vehicles was 
because many concession agreements put restrictions on the sale of developers’ equity. 
More liberal norms is considered essential now to encouraging pure equity providers 
allowing them to participate at the time of bidding or to enter later with a majority 
stake.  
 Looking at it from an international perspective private activity in transport 
infrastructure in developing countries reaching peak levels in 2005-07, both in terms of 
new projects and investment commitments. With investment remaining concentrated 
in a few countries. The top five countries by number of projects (India, China, Nigeria, 
Mexico, and Indonesia) accounted for 67% of new projects implemented in 2005–07 
while the five countries with the highest investment commitments (China, India, 
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Mexico, Turkey, and Hungary) accounted for 62% of transport investment in that 
period (http://www.ppiaf.org/content/view/440/216/).4 
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Table 5.10 Total Number and Investment (US$ Million) in Projects by Type and 
Primary Sector 
Source: Calculations by Author from Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, World Bank, 
http://ppi.worldbank.org/exploreCountry.aspx?countryId=152 accessed February 2nd 2010 
 
India has been very active in promoting PPP’s as the previous section suggests. 
PPP’s in number are especially high in the Transport, especially with Road sector 
(That includes the roads and Highways). In fact for the last 18 years, the Roads has 
had 143 PPP’s with US$ 14 Billion, although the contracts are of small value each, 
they still commend a growing share in the number of PPP’s. The Appendix also has a 
list of the details of all the projects under PPP, from the PPIAF. As the table below 
shows, the number of PPP’s especially in the transport sector was growing annually in 
amount and number, except in 2008, reason being the Financial Crisis. As the list of 
projects suggest, most of the PPP’s went to the National Highway section, and some to 
State Highways, as some project do not have a clear distinction, as to whether they 
were state highway or national highway projects, making it difficult to have an 
absolute number. But in general they were mostly in the National Highway Domain, 
                                                   
4 Transport investment also includes investment in state highways, district/rural 
roads, but National Highways remains the highest in composition. 
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Greenfield projects, and BOT-Tolls concessions for over 20 years. To cater to 
investment needs of the road sector, the investments in the sector are projected to grow 
by around 24 percent over the next 5 years (KPMG, 2006, p. 21). The state and the 
central governments have planned investments in the road sector to the tune of almost 
USD 50 billion by 2011. The share of private participants is expected at USD 4 billion 
by way of equity alone for NHAI BOT projects under the National Highway 
Development Program from Phase III to Phase VII. 
 
Table 5.11 Total Number and Investment (US$ Million) of Projects by Primary 
Sector 
 
 
The World Bank, has been deeply involved, especially in initially providing 
large loans especially during the construction of GQ, but now is involved in providing 
loans to two-laning National Highways other than the NHDP, and is recently involved 
in knowledge management through advisory and analytical support. Where the 
challenges is now slowly moving towards the technology in tolling (Microwave, infrared, 
GPS technologies being used), and there are already manual and automatic tolling 
stations (300), the World Bank is assisting the NHAI in bring all facilities under a 
single platform, to also make it on a real-time approach, where the data could be used 
in building a database and information systems could be used for studies and further 
development.  
130 
Table 5.12  Road and Highway Sector Specific Enablers and Considerations 
Source: KMPG 2006  
 
The new Minister for MoRTH Mr Kamal Nath has been very proactive in 
looking at the future scope and the fast tracking of National Highway Development. In 
fact he went on a world tour to the US, Middle East, Singapore, Hong Kong, and more 
recently even to Tokyo, to assess the appetite for foreign institutional investors to 
invest in a possible expansion of Highway Bonds. There are also Mega PPP's apart 
from the 7 phases being proposed (each at $2 Billion  – being amenable to BOT - toll) 
being proposed, and made on a large consortium's to be build highways along the 
mineral belt between Mumbai to Kolkata and Gujarat to Punjab. Interesting facts were 
that the BOT Annuity was the IDFC's Idea so as to deferring responsibility, but this 
requires long term planning, assessing contingent liabilities. In fact the World Bank is 
already doing its own transport research Study in the region (South Asia) to capture 
27/7 real time data (although India is the real focus with 15 states being selected/out of 
18 primary group of states). These studies provide the raw data for the government 
and also provide policy direction to the government. As the role of data is becoming 
important there is also data that is being collected to the specific type of vehicles and 
time data. Where even Operation and Maintenance contacts now require data, so as to 
use road information data up gradation and maintenance needs. The data is also being 
used extensively for road safety/accident data, which the O&M operators collect as part 
of the contract (and NHAI can monitor) making the data more reliable. 
There are great opportunities in the securitization of future Toll receipts. As 
this was already assessed in Chapter 3 on financial intermediation, and has been 
practiced extensively in China at the provincial level, although it is doubted that this 
model could be used widely elsewhere. But the government there builds a toll road 
Sector Specific Enablers  Sector Specific Considerations 
Policy / Institutional / Regulatory Issues 
• Project for road development and maintenance 
failed to evoke interest from large reputed 
foreign and international firms (as size is small 
lesser than 100 km) 
• No uniform tolling policy • Disparity in 
tolling rates between private-funded 
projects and public-funded projects leading to 
user resistance 
Project-level issues 
• 100 percent FDI allowed  
• Capital Grant of 40percent of capital cost by 
NHAI to enhance project viability. NHAI also 
permitted to participate into equity of BOT 
projects 
•Institution of Central Road Fund for assured 
funding of road development projects. 
• Provision of encumbrance free site for work 
by Government 
• BOT guidelines for private sector 
participation put in place 
• Toll / shadow toll / annuity based concessions 
to private participants 
• New model concession agreement (MCA) 
finalized. The new agreement includes design, 
build, finance, operate and transport activities 
instead of build, operate and transfer. This 
implies that government, instead of owning the 
asset after the concession period, would 
continue to buy ‘road services’ from the 
concessionaire 
• Partial traffic risk mitigation introduced 
• Concession period linked to 6-laning of 
projects 
• Toll rates indexed to 40 percent of WPI 
• Sector has been declared an industry to allow 
commercial borrowing 
• Acquisition of land is an impediment that 
delays project implementation 
• Traffic figures of government are on the 
higher side, leading to independent traffic 
projections by entrepreneur and project 
lender(s) causing delay in financial closure 
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(usually several of them) and, after the road is complete and most construction and 
traffic risks have disappeared, it sets up the road(s) as a public limited company.  The 
company is then listed on the stock exchange and the government sells shares in the 
toll road corporation.  The share holders earn dividends on their shares – with 
profitability depending primarily on the growth of traffic, inflation and approved toll 
increases – and the provincial government invests the money paid by share holders 
into constructing new toll roads (Brixi & Irwin, 2004, p. 9). 
 
Table 5.13 Important Developments in the National Highway Sector Over the 
Recent Months 
• By the end of last year the MoRTH is ambitiously planning on developing 35,000 
km of national highways in the next five years. 
• The B.K. Chaturvedi Committee on National Highways Development Project has 
failed to address the crucial issue of granting autonomy to National Highways 
Authority of India in its report. In order to minimize interference from influence 
from the Ministry 
• For road developers, the bidding process for highway projects has been simplified. 
A developer is now no longer required to go through the RfQ process for each and 
every project. Once accepted as being qualified for the bidding process of a 
particular project, the developer can bid for other projects as well without having 
to go through the RfQ process again, provided it is within a span of one year. 
• The technical threshold capacity criteria for bidding have also been relaxed. The 
threshold level is now equivalent to the project cost. Similarly, significant 
changes have been carried out in disbursement of Viability Gap Funding, the exit 
clause, the termination of contract clause, and the interest of conflict clause, to 
make highway development projects more attractive to highway developers. 
• According to the Chaturvedi Committee report, the NHAI would need 
approximately Rs 1.90 Trillion as borrowings till 2030-31.  
• The ministry is scouting investment of $70 billion for road construction in the 
next 3-4 years, out of which about $45 billion is expected to come from the private 
sector, including $10 billion from foreign investors (Business Line: Delhi July 17, 
2009) 
• India has sought $2.96 billion loan from World Bank for two-laning of over 17,000 
for development of non-NHDP National Highway sections in various states to 
two-lane standards 
• Despite some concerns over implementation of the National Highway projects, 
the World Bank has also agreed to look at funding of viability gap, he said. 
• There are 163 arbitration cases relating to Rs85.09 billion worth of highway 
projects under NHDP. 
• The land acquisition remains the single largest impediment in building of roads 
and pointed out that out of 218 projects completed under NHDP, 146 projects 
were completed behind schedule. 
• State governments have been requested to set up dedicated 192 Special Land 
Acquisition Units to speed up land acquisition exclusively for NHDP projects, he 
said, adding chief secretaries have been requested to head the monitoring 
committee in their states to accelerate land acquisition. 
• The minister has set an ambitious target of building 7,000 km of highways 
annually, or 20 km a day, requiring an investment of about Rs 1 trillion  
• The road show in Singapore, jointly organized by ICICI Bank and JM Financial 
Institutional Securities Private Ltd, completes the Asia tranche of the events. A 
similar road show was organized in Mumbai last week. The sector’s investment 
requirements till 2012 are pegged at $12 billion. This is the first time that the 
ministry has planned to organize such road shows. 
• B K Chaturvedi committee, set up by the prime minister to work on measures to 
fast track award and financing of highway projects. The committee, in its first 
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report, has also pitched for delegation of more power to the road, transport and 
highways ministry on issues related to the MCA, RFQ and RFP (request for 
quotation, request for proposal). (Economic Times 2009, 0656 hrs IST) 
• Senior officials said considering the need to pump more funds to take up the 
highway development projects, the committee has recommended for sovereign 
guarantee. In this case, government guarantees that an obligation will be 
satisfied if the primary obligator defaults. This means, in case the NHAI fails to 
pay up, Centre will compensate for that. 
• To build 1,000 km of expressways at an estimated cost of Rs 166.80 Billion 
proposed by the Union Road Transport and Highways Minister Kamal Nath 
today said the government was considering setting up an authority for 
expressways on the pattern of the NHAI in order to give impetus to 
infrastructure development in the country. (economictimes.com July 15, 2009) 
• The government plans to build 1,000 km of expressways at an estimated cost of 
Rs 166 billion, which is likely to be completed by December 2015. 
• “The government is considering an expressway authority. The new authority will 
identify routes, technology and schemes for the expressways,” Nath said at the 
National Highways Development Conclave organised here by the Confederation 
of Indian Industry (CII). 
• There are plans and on making toll collection a tangible asset, so that banks can 
offer loan to concessionaires. 
• Also, the trend of lower realizations per km is likely to continue due to another 
reason. NHAI is bidding out the dense stretches to private developers on a BOT 
basis, wherein the toll revenues will accrue to the developer during the 
concession period. In absolute terms, however, the NHAI’s annual toll revenues 
have gone up to Rs 17.03.13 billion in 2008-09 against Rs 14.15 billion in 2007-08. 
There are other factors also that stop NHAI from collecting tolls on several 
sections. 
• The authority had 11,037.2 km of completed stretch as on March 31, out of which 
3,417.34 km were “partially completed” and “not fully completed that make it 
eligible for tolling”. This 3,417 km comprise a mix of public and private funded  
• Even out of the remaining tollable stretches of 7619.86 km, NHAI could not toll 
about 1,168 km in 2008-09 due to various factors. After full physical completion 
of a project, some paperwork is required to start tolling – like issuance of a public 
notice, gazette notification and approved commercial operations date (for BoT). 
“This also leads to a time lag,” said an official, adding that about 364 km were 
added for tolling in April 2009. 
• The objective is to build specialized tolling companies like those in Europe and 
the US, which bring in the best technology and practices. The business of tolling 
companies overseas translated traffic to value. Besides, the governments 
concerned got the best returns in the process. 
• RFC proposal: There are plans to establish Road Finance Corporation 
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites and livemint.com, financialexpress.com, 
economictimes.com 
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 The first two phases of National Highway Financing saw the introduction 
of BOT (Toll and Annuities) PPP's in financing the National Highways, although more 
than two thirds of the funding came through the recently established Central Road 
Fund (from fuel tax on petrol and diesel - cess) and borrowings from Multilateral 
Financial Institutions, and less than 10% from private finance. Looking at the 
government's plan in financing the NHDP over the 30 years till 2030-31 suggests that 
while outflows will peak 2009-10, inflows were expected to peak in 2008-2009 
(according to the plan in 2006), and annuity repayment is expected to be highest 
between 2015-16 and 2027-2028 (above Rs 40 Billion annually); but the situation is 
changing fast. Even with the government's conservative estimates, the Central Road 
Fund (fuel tax - cess) is expected to soar over the next 20 years, while toll revenues are 
too modest (as they are already exceeding estimates), and even though the government 
is committed to constructing more stretches on BOT – Toll, this has not been converted 
into policy by providing the private sector with adequate incentives (to promote 
competitive bidding and raising services levels). More quality studies would be 
required to understand traffic demand, to ensure that there is no over-investment in 
creating assets (requires more vehicle ownership studies, travel trip analysis through 
Origin-Destination surveys, and so on). With PSP in general on the increase (in spite of 
many projects receiving no bids under BOT tolls), the number of concession contracts 
in highways is already the highest in India, with 143 contracts at a value of US$ 14 
Billion for Highways and Roads over the last 18 years (as of February 2010- breakup 
between highway and road not available). With a general equation for pricing tolls, on 
a fixed rate based on wholesale price index (WPI) the highway network is expected to 
be cross subsidized (temporal and spatial). Several issues however remain at large: 1) 
double taxing of beneficiaries (tolls and fuel tax), 2) decrease in CRF over time, 3) more 
periodic reviews in toll rates, 4) the danger of regulator (NHAI) capture by agents that 
are being regulated (private developers, construction worker labor unions), 5) future 
concerns in network development using pool that will lead to debt (as with the case of 
Japan), 6) the evolving framework in manage highway assets and profitability (that is 
horizontal unbundling), 7) and to slowly move towards an highway expansion plan 
based on cost-recovery on a more accurate user-charge system. 
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Japan now has one of the worlds’ most highly developed multimodal transport 
system, which would not have been possible if it had not been successful in building an 
extensive highway network in such quite a short duration.  The two remarkable 
aspects about this network is that the scale and layout of the network were determined 
not only in accordance with the forecast of traffic volume, but also in accordance with 
equal opportunity. The other is that the public corporation responsible for the highway 
network development relied extensively on a debt financing strategy, relying on toll 
revenue collection, with the aim of accelerating the nation's highway development 
within limited funding capacity of the national government. With a motive of equal 
access, to enable as many people as possible to enjoy the service of high-speed 
transport, a pool system of revenues and costs (plus a uniform toll rate system) was 
adopted for all intercity expressway routes. The costs of each route were to be covered 
by tolls paid by its users, cross-subsidization from other routes, and public funds. But 
over the years the costs that came with building such a system was high, and this has 
created large level of debt obligations in the highway public corporations. Japan in 
other words is on the other side of the spectrum of its highway development program, 
where it is now undergoing rapid transition and possible privatization of its highways.  
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Japan in spite of its image as a country with well managed compartmentalized 
transport infrastructure services, did not have a road system adequate for auto traffic 
even until the end of World War II. At the 1952 Census, less than 6%  of national 
highways and prefectural roads in Japan were paved, and bicycles accounted for 87%  
of the vehicles registered, other slow vehicles (horse and ox-carts and handcarts) 
accounted for 7% , and mechanically propelled vehicles for only 6%  (Black & Rimmer, 
1982, p. 3) Only after the war was there a rapid transformation, and road construction 
was taken seriously and developed on a large scale. But by the 1970s, an extensive 
expressway system was under construction and urban traffic flow was orderly, with 
shiny white paint marking vehicle lanes, turn pockets, medians and pedestrian 
crossings, and computers controlling signals at intersections. This has placed Japanese 
transport engineering and planning into global standards. But the credit goes to the 
state that facilitates corporate accumulation, promotes the destructuring and 
restructuring of economic activities and copes with its disruptive consequences.  
According to the study by Black and Rimmer (1982) there were three early 
phases of highway development in Japan during the post-war period. During the first 
phase, it was subordinated to the political and economic influence of the United States 
after the Pacific War, Japan’s highway planning practice reflected heavy borrowing of 
American ideas and techniques. Resistance to the renewal of the Security Pact in 1960 
marked a more independent Japanese state looking inward at rapid economic 
development, during which time transport engineering and planning were being 
revived to meet local conditions before being widely applied within the country. The 
third phase during the 1970s where Japan started incorporating transport planning 
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and engineering feasibility studies as an integral part of aid especially to Southeast 
Asia, its major recipient (p. 30)  
 
As part of Japan's reconstruction, a memorandum from the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in 1948 outlined the initial five-year road 
plan (which replaced the German autobahn-style highway planning in vogue during 
the early 1940s). This was to be administered and implemented by the Road Bureau, 
Ministry of Construction. However, when Japan's post-war recovery faltered in 1949, 
and with the fears of communist penetration in Southeast Asia with the dawn of the 
Cold War, led to a change in American foreign policy. Under the United Nations' 
Korean War effort in 1950, the Japanese economy recovered, especially in the 
transport sector with strategic road building and the establishment of the Police 
Reserve Force (later Self-Defense Force) also stimulated demand for Japanese-made 
motor vehicles. After the Korean Wars the United States, sought to foster Japan's 
economic reconstruction and stabilization by facilitating export-oriented industrial 
growth, including the upgrading of highways to support the domestic motor-vehicle 
industry. 
 In 1952 Law Concerning Special Measures for Highway Construction (SMHC 
Law) was enacted, which provided loan funds from a Trust Fund Bureau of the 
Ministry of Finance to construct roads and approved the collection of tolls from users to 
repay the loan.  This also gave rise to a new road administration with the Road Law 
(as amended in 1952) and later to the enactment of "Law for Temporary Measures 
Concerning the Source of Funds for the Improvement of Roads 1953", which prescribed 
that the government establish a five-year road improvement program to start the 
following year. Public roads in Japan were then classified into primary national 
highways, secondary national highways, prefectural roads and municipal roads. Out of 
140,657 kilometers of national highways and prefectural roads, only 15% had two or 
more lanes and only 5.4% were paved; 47% of all the bridges were wooden.  In 1953 a 
petrol tax was also introduced (revenues that came out of 54% of the retail price) and 
allocated to accelerate the road construction program. During the first Five-Year Plan 
had strong American influence and specialists led by Dr. Ralph J. Watkins visited 
Japan under government sponsorship in 1956, to consider the economic feasibility of an 
expressway linking Nagoya with Kobe.  
When Watkins wrote in the report in 1956, of the sorry state of roads in Japan, 
to quote: “No other industrial nation has so completely neglected its highway system” 
(Kimura & Maeda, 2005, p. 4). This further triggered a flurry of additional highway 
legislation providing for national expressways, national toll roads, revised funding 
arrangements (government bonds, grants to prefectures) and metropolitan 
expressways. As at that time, even among first-class national roads, only about a 
quarter of them were paved, even the Tokyo with Osaka route on the National 
Highway Route 1, two third of it was paved. The report also stressed the importance of 
roads as social overhead capital that it was imperative for economic growth. Apart 
from that it also introduced the concept of transport demand analysis and methods for 
estimating traffic diversion from existing roads to new roads. Simultaneously, 
economic evaluation methods and road investment criteria were borrowed from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
 These developments, gave American engineers the chance to influence highway 
design and construction in Japan, and this was furthered when the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development started funding highway projects. Although the 
Japanese borrowed modern methods of highway construction and geometric design 
from the US, they had to make considerable changes as settlement patterns in Japan 
were denser and poor roads in Japan necessitated a check to highway capacity. This 
even led to the development of a Highway Capacity Manual that was used as the basis 
for expressway design although "capacity" was "revised" from 2,000 to 2,500 vehicles 
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per hour per lane. Geometric standards were scaled down due to high land-acquisition 
costs, and some innovations, such as trumpet interchanges to facilitate toll collection, 
were introduced (Black & Rimmer, 1982, p. 6). 
In the mean time in April 1956, the Japan Highway Public Corporation Law 
was enforced giving rise to the establishment of Japan Highway Public Corporation 
(Nihon Doro Kodan or JHPC). At the same time, the revised SMHC Law was enforced, 
and the JHPC took over the role of the Government (Ministry of Construction) to 
construct national toll highways and collect tolls.  Earmarked funds for road 
improvement were also introduced in 1954 and were expanded as a major fund raising 
channel for road construction and maintenance at both national and regional levels.  
However, a relatively small portion of the funds has been used for highway 
construction. Planning then began on the Meishin and the Tomei Expressways that 
linked Tokyo and Kobe in October 1957, and these were based on surveys and designs 
made by the JHPC to oversee construction of expressways and toll roads. The IBRD, 
lent to many other JHPC projects since the 1960s (refer to Table 6.1), and all 
repayments were completed by 1990. 
 
Table 6.1 World Bank Loans to Japan Highway Public Corporation and 
Expressways 
Year Date Signed Beneficiary Project 
1960 17-Mar Japan Highway Public 
Corporation 
Amagasaki Ritto section of the Meishin 
Expressway 
1961 29-Nov Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (2nd loan) 
Ichinomiya Ritto and Amagasaki Nishinomiya 
sections of the Meishin Expressway  
1963 27-Sep Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (3rd loan) 
Tokyo Shizuoka section of the Tomei 
Expressway 
1964 22-Apr Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (4th loan) 
Toyokawa Komaki section of the Tomei 
Expressway 
1964 23-Dec Metropolitan Expressway Public 
Corporation 
Haneda Yokohama section of the Metropolitan 
Expressway 
1965 26-May Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (5thloan) 
Shizuoka Toyokawa section of the Tomei 
Expressway 
1965 10-Sep Hanshin Expressway Public 
Corporation 
Kobe line No. 1 
1966 29-Jul Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (6th loan) 
Tokyo Shizuoka section of the Tomei 
Expressway 
Source: URL for this page: http://go.worldbank.org/9J0TYP38K0 (accessed 1st September, 09) 
 
 As the framework and major legislations were all set in place during the 1950s 
the 1960s saw a shift in Japan’s economic policy whereby there was a pronounced shift 
from a dependence on steel, chemicals and shipbuilding to lighter industries, such as 
motor vehicles and electronics. The number of motor vehicles was 130,000 at the end of 
WWII, this figure reached 500,000 by 1951, one million in 1953, and two million by 
1957. The Japanese government, faced with severe budgetary difficulties, had to 
address explosively increasing demand for road traffic after WWII.  The Security 
Treaty in 1960 with the United States also gave an opportunity to gain political 
equality with the West. This necessitated a change in emphasis from national 
expressway planning to urban road planning, as indicated by Table 6.2.  
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Table 6-2: Japan’s Five-Year Road Programs 1954 – 1978 (?Billion 
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National highway planning in Japan was then founded on clear objectives, with 
straightforward economic considerations and some simple analyses. Where the 
priorities was the construction of an expressway network that would develop land, 
industry habitation space in a well-balanced way, eventually leading to an increase in 
productivity and an anticipated increase in automobile traffic demand. These basic 
principles indicated that a network of over 10,000 km to connect the central cities of 
each local region, new industrial areas and "Special Areas for Coordinated Industrial 
Development", and to ensure that all people would be within two hours of the system. 
But the final selection was to be based on traffic demand calculations. The country was 
partitioned into "zones" around 110 major cities; the future number of vehicles in each 
"zone" was estimated, and forecasts of inter-city traffic were calculated from an 
unconstrained gravity model (vehicles were substituted for the population "mass" in 
the numerator, and projected expressway driving time for the "friction factor" in the 
denominator). Results suggested an optimal network of from 5,000 to 6,000 km, but re-
adjustments were made to accommodate areas with heavy traffic and Hokkaido – an 
island with a large area but a small population. 
The National Arterial Expressway Construction Law passed in 1967 provided 
for thirty-two routes covering 7,600 km (refer to Figure 6-1). Within the guidelines of 
this long-term plan, individual road projects were selected both in accordance with 
road construction policies (priority was to be given to districts with heavy traffic 
demands) and with regional development plans. The initial expressways were already 
built during the 1960s: the Meishin Expressway was opened to traffic in July 1963; the 
Tomei Expressway in 1969. Cost efficiency estimates by the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation show that the Meishin Expressway recovered 31% of its construction costs 
in the first year of operation, compared with 38%  for the Tomei Expressway in an 
equivalent period ((Black & Rimmer, 1982, p. 6). Expressways were recognized as the 
key to addressing urban traffic problems. Even in Tokyo, a plan for eight radial routes 
and two ring roads, totaling 71 km, was formulated in 1958 with the intention of 
completing construction in time for the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 (p. 6). 
TABLE I 
Japan's Five-Year Road Programmes 1954-1978  (Billion Yen) 
Designation Date Period Investment Special features 
Ordinary Toll Prefectural Contingency Total 
First May 1954-58  
1954 
Second February 1958-65  
1959 
Third October 1961-65  
1961 
Fourth January 1964-68  
1965 " 
Fifth March 1967-71 
1968 
Sixth March 1969--74 
1971 
Seventh June 1973-77  
1973 
Eighth May 1978-83  
1978 
260 - - - 260 
610 200 190 - 1,000 
1,300 450 350 - "  2,100 
2,200 1,100 800 - 4,100 
3,550 1,800 1,100 150 6,600 
5,200 2,500 2,550 100 10,350 
9,340 4,960 4,700 500 19,500 
13,500 6,800 7,500 700 28,500 
Funding from petrol tax revenues 
Inauguration of construction of 
expressways 
Improvement of relevant road 
network for Tokyo Olympic games 
Improvement of metropolitan 
area road networks 
Further development of express- 
way systems 
Expressways, local arterials and 
by-passes, winter maintenance 
and safety coordination with 
freight movements 
Urban traffic improvements; 
pollution control (noise and air), 
landscaping 
Promotion of environmental 
measures along highways, traffic 
safety and anti-earthquake 
programmes 
Source: Nihon Doro Kodan, 1978. 
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Figure 6.1 Network of National Expressways - 1978 
 
Apart from all these developments the government’s desire to reduce transport 
costs for the private sector and to accommodate traffic demands was consistent with 
aims for national road planning. By transferring a rural design philosophy of 
expressways to the cities, urban road planning failed to recognize the vital 
interrelationship between land use, traffic and transport, and the need to plan for all 
transport modes. To overcome such criticisms, the Japanese were anxious to assimilate 
the methodology of urban land use and transport planning, especially with motor 
vehicles rising from the million mark in the early 1950s to 28,229,000 in 1975. Later, 
data from Fukuoka and Kobe was used for some exploratory work on travel demand 
analysis. However, it was not until 1967, the year in which the production of passenger 
units out-stripped light commercial vehicles for the first time. That gave sufficient 
confidence to conduct the first comprehensive land use and transport study.  
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The initial large-scale person trip survey was undertaken in Hiroshima 
(750,000), and employed four-step aggregate models to forecast traffic and plan rail 
and road facilities. Another study, using different permutations of sub-models, was 
conducted in Tokyo (population 21,310,000) during 1968, with a study area covering a 
50-km radius from the city centre. Both approaches were repeated and contrasted in 
Osaka during 1970. As for the methodology there was no doubt that it was a product of 
1960s Western thinking, but as observed by Black and Rimmer (1982) there were four 
innovations: 
(i) First, a separate traffic generation model for the whole of the study area 
acts as a control against which zonal traffic production and attraction 
estimates are checked.  
(ii) Second, there is an explicit way of handling intra-zonal trip distribution 
and modal-split.  
(iii) Third, modal split is treated consistently as a binary choice problem with 
options for the two "modes" as either public versus private transport 
or road-based transport versus fixed-track (usually rail) transport. 
(There is also a cycle-walk binary choice option.) - - -  
(iv) Fourth, urban goods movements were also included, as demonstrated by 
commodity flow studies in Tokyo (1973), Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe or 
Keihanshin (1975), Chukyo (Nagoya and surrounding areas) (1976) 
and Sendai (1977) - distribution terminals becoming a distinctive 
feature of the economic landscape after the "Distribution Facilities 
Establishment Act, 1966" 
And by 1977, twenty-three urban transport studies had been completed in 
Japan, providing the basis for master plans of urban roads, monorails and new traffic 
circulation systems. The value of such planning methodology was the ability to make 
inferences about national road planning, where it was becoming more important to 
accommodate the amount of extra traffic without introducing undue journey delays. 
Increasingly, it has been recognized that government intervention is necessary to 
control the direction of urban expansion and to manage (and perhaps restrain) the 
demand for travel.  
Where it becomes important to evaluate a policy economically from its, resource 
allocative efficiency and fair distribution of wealth and income, in looking at transport 
infrastructure network improvement, the equity and equality balance is exceedingly 
important. In determining the target scale and layout of the expressway network of 
7,600 km, one important factor was traffic demand and the connection of major cities 
and regional capitals. Another determinant was the coverage rate of area and 
population by expressways, so as to enable people in every region of the country (except 
for remote mountainous areas and isolated islands) to reach the expressway network 
within two hours. This assumes that the latter concept took no account of the level of 
traffic demand directly and the policy objective was to give as many people as possible 
the opportunity to enjoy the convenience of expressways.  
However, the actual plan of the expressway network covered not only built-up 
areas having a high agglomeration and areas with a potential to grow highly 
agglomerated regions, but also included areas with a poor potential for growth as well. 
Therefore, it can be said that the expressway plan is also based on the objective to 
attain equity or equality in the availability of high- speed transport services. In actual 
policy choices, the problem of to whom the costs and benefits belong remains crucial in 
that society may be unwilling to accept policies selected only from the viewpoint of 
efficiency. The concept of equity or equality is not always in agreement with fairness in 
distribution, either. While there are high expectations of expressways in promoting the 
regional development and in improving the income level of inhabitants in the regions 
where they are constructed, low-income levels are not the major reason for these 
regions being included in the network plan. The designs of transport infrastructure 
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networks in Japan, including the railways, expressways, and airports are know to have 
relied more on the concept of equal opportunity than on fair distribution.  
 But until 1972, when only one trunk expressway between Tokyo and Osaka and 
a few other sections were in service, separate accounts for each routes were kept. Thus, 
each route kept its own accounts, and was expected to pay for itself, and tolls were 
collected and applied on a route-by-route basis. However, with the plans to rapidly 
extend the network subsequent years, the Consultative Council on Roads for the 
Minister of Construction in 1972 proposed the creation of the pool system to manage 
the network uniformly.  The toll pooling system accompanied with internal subsidies 
across projects was justified as follows (Kimura & Maeda, 2005, p. 6):   
(i) The expressways are integrated into the nationwide network, and the 
traffic services of the same quality should be offered to the users of all 
roads.   
(ii) Since all the routes are not constructed under the same conditions, it was 
important to address the impact of cost fluctuations of construction due 
to difference in construction periods. 
(iii) If the profitability were assessed separately for each route, it would be 
difficult to construct and accelerate the fund raising required for the 
entire highway network development. 
(iv) With the toll pooling system, the level of toll and the toll collection period 
would be consistent. 
The Council also recommended the adoption of a uniform toll rate system over 
all routes. The government accepted these proposals. It abandoned the individual 
redemption basis of the past and instead introduced the pooling redemption formula. 
Under this plan, the costs of the whole network (including interest accrued over a 30-
year redemption period) was be paid by the toll revenues generated from the entire 
network. In other countries, there are some cases where a regional pool system has 
been introduced for expressways, but a nationwide pool system, like the one in Japan, 
was exceptional at that time.  
During the 1970s while Japan’s internal transport policy was deeply being 
transformed there was also international policy evolving, based on external economic 
assistance by providing transport technology cooperation and technology transfers. 
This was also to reconcile its growing image of penetration and dominating selected 
Third World countries especially in East Asia to secure its “food bases” and "natural 
resources”. Misunderstandings about the nature and scope of Japanese aid in the form 
of reparations, quasi-reparations and financial grants - largely in the form of bilateral 
(yen credit) loans were only culminating in joint ventures and branch factories – 
eventually became the root cause of anti-Japanese feelings by the mid 1970s. To 
counter its declining image, Japan not only boosted its aid further to the Third World 
but began to concentrated more on technological transfers (initially with agriculture 
and industrial development to later energy and human resource) and technological 
cooperation. In pursuing this changed policy emphasis, the Japanese Government 
organized its aid agencies (Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency – OTCA and later 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA) to draw on specialist staff from 
government organizations (for example Ministries of Construction and Transport) and 
co-opted university professors on to its supervising committees. Table 6.2 enlists a 
sample of transport projects (excluding ports and airports) in East Asia which received 
?572 billion between the financial years 1974 and 1977. 
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Table 6.2 Japanese Loan Agreements for Road and Rail Transport in East Asia 
 
Source: Black and Rimmer 1982 
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 Under the JHPC, the national motorways in Japan developed steadily and 
rapidly since 1957, when the JHPC received authorization for the Meishin (Nagoya-
Kobe) Expressway, the first expressway in Japan. Since then the JHPC has been 
engaged in the construction and management of expressways, especially after 1966 
when the National Development Arterial Expressway Construction Law was enacted to 
provide a comprehensive construction plan covering 7,600 km of national expressways.  
The construction proceeded from longitudinal national motorways that would establish 
the backbone network in the Japanese archipelago, and then the other transversal 
national motorways running through very rugged mountain regions that required long-
span bridges and long tunnels were to be developed. While as mentioned earlier, the 
construction of national expressways was carried out following the orders made by the 
Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, generally taking up to 10 to 15 years 
to complete a whole project. 
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TABLE IV 
Japanese Financial and Loan Agreements for Road and Rail Transport in Southeast and East Asia 
1973--77 
Country Project description Amount Agreement date 
( 100,000,000 
yen) 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Jakarta-Merak road reconstruction 
consultancy 
Rembang-Merak road construction 
South Sumatra road reconstruction 
North Sulawesi road reconstruction 
Bus transport improvements 
Electric trains and diesel locomotives 
North Java railway repairs 
Sub-total 
Railway duplication (North ChShoku) 
Crocker Range road construction 
Sabak Bernam bridge 
Sub-total 
Manila highway interchange 
Department of Public Highways depot and 
workshops 
Japan-Philippine Friendship Highway 
Philippine National Railway commuter 
improvements 
Sub-total 
South Highway 
Sathorn Bridge, Bangkok 
Sub-total 
2.4 August 1975 
125.0 Jun. 1973/Sep. 1974/ 
December 1976 
39.0 Aug. 1974/Nov. 1976 
15.0 Mar. 1975/Feb. 1977 
12.0 May 1974/Dec. 1974 
33.0 Dec. 1974/Oct. 1975 
20.0 October 1975 
246.4 
43.0 November 1976 
74.0 March 1977 
6.0 March 1977 
80.0 
10.0 April 1974 
18.0 April 1974 
38,0 March 1976 
19.0 April 1974 
85.0 
57.0 October 1974 
61.0 Oct. 1974/Mar. 1977 
118.0 
Source: Adapted and translated from Sugawara, 1979. 
The Japan Society of  Civil Engineers bolsters the state's aid effort by pro- 
viding a step-by-step account from feasibility study, through engineering 
contracts and specifications, to construction management, as a means of  
demonstrating how individual overseas projects can be procured and more 
effectively implemented (Doboku gakkai kaigai katsudo iinkai, 1976). Pre- 
liminary surveys, feasibility and engineering studies for road and rail under- 
taken by JICA in Southeast and East Asia betwee  1973 and 1976 are listed 
in Table III. These feasibility studies are t  ensure that bilateral agreements 
are worthwhile and yen loans are prudently spent. Table IV lists the trans- 
port projects (excluding ports and airports) in Southeast and East Asia which 
received Y572,400,000,000 in the financial years from April 1974 to  March 
1977. The bulk of  the aid went to Indonesia (43 percent). The remainder 
142 
Figure 6.2 Process of Highway Construction during the JHPC 
 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi, 2006 (made by the author based on several sources from the Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport) 
 
 The final decisions as to which highway would be eventually constructed 
actually rested not with the JHPC, but with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport. The Public Corporation, in this case the JHPC could only construct the 
highway once the ministry had approved it, and this system supposedly prevented the 
problem of overinvestment in highways (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 6). As it can be 
observed in the flow chart, the only point where political intervention could exist in 
highway construction was in the early stages where the master and construction plans 
were being formulated by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. But 
political intervention was minimized as the final decision to construct a highway was 
not only evaluated on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, but it was taken to the Diet. 
The JHPC was a non-profit government corporation it was established for the purpose 
of comprehensive construction and management of expressways and ordinary toll roads 
covering:  
(i) National motorways,  
(ii) Regional motorways including toll tunnels and toll bridges,  
(iii) Car parks, and 
(iv) Service areas. 
 Thus the JHPC, though technically an independent public corporation, it was 
placed neither directly within the government nor completely outside the government.  
Such institutional positioning of the JHPC is said to have worked effectively in keeping 
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the overall consistency with nation-wide development strategies. Due to the public 
nature of its operation, the JHPC also enjoyed some exemptions made by national 
government, with privileges including:  
(i) Exemption from various taxes, including corporation tax  
(ii) Compulsory collection of tolls and other charges related to expressway 
operation  
(iii) Power of compulsory purchase of land and of administrative enforcement 
through the Land Acquisition Law 
(iv) Loans from the government, bond placement to the government funds, 
and government guarantee to bonds 
 Apart from its construction activities the JHPC was effective used as a policy 
instrument for the Keynesian-type countercyclical macroeconomic fiscal policy, where 
highway construction was occasionally used as a part of expansionary fiscal policy.  
The redemption and the cross-subsidization principles facilitated the justification of 
temporary fiscal expansion by revising long-term repayment plans.  This was supposed 
to have worked at least until the mid 1980s, where the expansion of traffic beyond the 
baseline forecast easily absorbed such government intervention (p. 8).  The JHPC also 
performed the role to guarantee against the pooling of various risks.  In addition to 
construction delay risks, highway construction is prone to construction cost risks, 
demand risks, inflation risks, and others.  While under the BOT project design, each 
risk would have to be dealt with separately and there was always a possibility of 
renegotiations among stakeholders, under the JHPC the whole set of highway 
construction activities were managed under flexible time scheme and budget. With the 
JHPC being the central authority in developing highways also enabled a pooling of 
technology and experts for highway construction. The JHPC in alliance with the 
construction companies made substantial efforts by using relatively abundant financial 
resources, to implement and develop one of the most advanced transport systems in the 
world (to be discussed later). 
 The toll pooling system and the temporal and spatial cross-subsidization 
became the essential element of the financing the highway network under the aegis of 
the JHPC.  The distribution of traffic, and therefore the distribution of toll revenues as 
well, were strongly skewed toward trunk lines such as Tomei (Tokyo-Nagoya) and 
Meishin (Nagoya-Kobe). It was these revenues that financed the construction of other 
motorways. The rapid increase in traffic from the 1960s to the 1980s effectively 
supported the construction of expressway network.  If individual-project-based finance 
had been applied, major motorways would have become free to commuters much sooner, 
but at the same time other motorways might not have been constructed. The 
construction of highway network by the JHPC, as mentioned earlier was largely 
consistent with the nation-wide infrastructure and land development policy objectives, 
to minimize the political rent-seeking benefits especially associated with large 
infrastructure projects.  From the latter half of the 1950s to the 1960s, investment was 
concentrated on the main trunk lines.  From the 1970s till early 1980s the five 
longitudinal lines were constructed and since the late 1980s the transversal limb lines.  
 But from the 1980s, there was already pressure in financing expressway 
projects as there was also an aspect of social cross-subsidization. Japan was building 
the Expressway network based on a model to satisfy social demand for the regional 
development and equal opportunity, rather than commercial or economic cross-
subsidization due to external economic effect. While commercial cross-subsidization, 
being a form of spatial cross-subsidization, cost and/or feeder effects give the operator a 
motive to build the expressways to increase profitability. In other words commercial 
and economic cross-subsidization provide rationales for a regional pool system, 
especially in the case of urban networks in which close interdependence exists among 
routes, but a nationwide pool system may still not be justified. 
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  To deal with criticism of cross-subsidization and also as part of the 
efforts to improve the efficiency of administration in general, the government asked the 
Consultative Council on Roads to inquire into the problem of and determine guidelines 
to limit cross-subsidization. As a result the Council (1985) made the following 
recommendations:  
(i) For a route that requires cross-subsidization, the amount of cross-
subsidies it receives should be limited to half of its costs, and the 
remaining half should be covered by toll revenues from that route 
and, if necessary, public subsidies; and  
(ii) For a route that provides cross-subsidization, the amount of cross-
subsidies it supplies should be limited to reproduction costs of that 
route. (Kimura & Maeda, 2005, p. 5) 
This justified the network development benefits, at the same time the former 
recommendation gave grounds for partially socially cross-subsidizing new highways on 
the basis of equity. Equity based on the idea that if others bear part of your costs, you 
should at least bear the equivalent amount yourself. This rationale was sought to be 
more readily acceptable by the general public, at the same time allow for further 
network expansion. In this regard, discretion is really essential as social type of cross-
subsidization would be absolutely necessary especially during the network formation, 
but policy guidance through quantitative restrictions would be a solution. This will 
raise an alarm when sustainability of building a profitable network might be 
jeopardized, although the service being provided is socially equitable. The Council’s 
proposal was an attempt in this direction, to providing a quantitative guideline. The 
implication was that the traffic volume should bear half of the cost of building that 
route, although the constructing the route is could be requisite from standpoint of 
balanced regional development or equal opportunity; but then in case of insufficient 
toll revenue from users of that route, should not be supplemented by cross-
subsidization, but by public subsidies.  
The fourth National Comprehensive Development Plan (NCDP) was established 
in 1987, and the expressway construction plan was to expand the network from a 7600 
km (planned a decade earlier) to 11,520 km and an addition 3,920 km to total about 
14,000 km The new scale and layout of the network was to be determined to meet the 
demands of the time, on a new revised criteria of connecting of all cities having a 
population of 100,000 or more, and the ability to access the nearest interchange (of the 
expressway network) within two hours. The new criteria, in effect also increased the 
scope for equal opportunity and access to the network. As it was already becoming 
obvious, the need to construct expressways and toll road systems rapidly and at service 
levels to match economic development was fulfilling its intended purpose. In spite of a 
legal provision for providing expressways at no charge when the construction cost was 
repaid entirely, it could not be actualized as the pool system was introduced. Thus, the 
possibility for free access to expressway routes that recovered construction cost was 
postponed until the redemption of the entire pool.  
There were two other challenges: there was a marked improvement the quality 
of the general (free-access) roads running parallel to the expressways. The Ministry of 
Construction was directly responsible for these general roads. The increased 
competitiveness of these general roads was expected to place a limit on cross-
subsidization in expressways. Two decades ago, it was already realized that the over 
dependence upon cross-subsidization in the construction and quality of expressways 
was going to add pressure in financing and would become economically contentious. 
Even if the burden per user providing cross-subsidization is relatively small and no 
great inefficiency or unfairness will occur, this would be especially valuable in the 
short run when the network formation is a priority, to enable equal access spatially 
and in terms of cost.  But this kind of social-subsidization in the long run will 
inevitably lead to heavy financial losses result in inefficiency. As Figure 6.3 suggest the 
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expansion of length of expressway in general was in line with the number of vehicles 
using the expressway (in 100 million vehicles), but obviously the graph is does not 
indicate which routes were used more and were profitable. 
 
Figure 6.3 Length of expressways and the number expressway users per year (*) 
 
Source: MLIT (http://www.mlit.go.jp/road/road_e/pdf/chapter05.pdf) 
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 Toll rates were determined under the full-repayment (or redemption) principle, 
within the overall scheme of the toll pooling system. The full-repayment principle 
assumes that the total costs of the construction of highways, including costs of land 
acquisition and interest payments, and highway service costs such as maintenance 
costs including administration costs, must be repaid by toll revenues collected over a 
pre-fixed period. After the repayment of all construction costs is completed, the 
highways are then converted to toll-free roads. The redemption principle is based on 
the ultimate motive that the highways being a part of a social infrastructure which the 
government should be able to provide without collecting user charges, as the 
government does not charge for the use of other infrastructure services.  However in 
Japan, because of the budget constraints in the general account, and the government’s 
intention to quickly create a modern and efficient highway system prompted the 
implementation of the full repayment principle as an alternative approach. Under this 
system the highway network was constructed by money borrowed and debts are repaid 
with the pooled tolls of the highway users. 
 The pooling system of toll revenues becomes the second crucial aspect of the 
Pricing System.  The JHPC tolls revenues from each highway route that is then pooled 
together in order to repay the debts and costs incurred in building the network.  The 
toll rate then cannot be set separately for each route, but instead is set in the context of 
the entire network.  Therefore, the toll level is set by making even the toll revenues 
collected from all the routes for a set of time period, to cover the total cost.  This 
opposed to the conventional toll system where the toll rate was determined 
independently for each route (so that a route’s toll revenue would cover its own costs), 
was designed to cross-subsidize among routes. In operation, when the first motorway 
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the Meishin line was opened in 1963, it was expected that it would take 30 years to 
completely repay the route’s construction costs. But by 1972, when the JHPC that had 
started to pool toll revenues of all national motorways to repaying the network’s debt, 
the Meishin route had to continue its tolling operation throughout. In this way when 
an older line in spite of completely repaying in full its construction costs, it has to 
continue to contribute repaying the debts of newer lines; and this has never allowed 
the Japanese Highway system to become free to use. 
The equation that was used to calculate the highway toll was as follows 
(Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 8): 
 
Equation 2 Pricing Equation for Japanese Highway Toll 
Pij =(pTL+pt )(1+t) 
Where, 
PiJHPCighway toll between lamp i and lamp j 
p : Unit price per km  
TL : Travel length (km)  
pt : Terminal charge  
tc : Consumption tax (5%) 
 
 
This then translates into the following toll rates: 
 
Table 6.3 The Toll Rates as of 2001 
Type of Vehicle/charge Cost 
Terminal charge 150 yen per single use 
Light car and motorcycle:  19.68 yen/km 
Ordinary passenger car:   24.60 yen/km 
Small and medium-sized truck:  29.52 yen/km 
Large-sized truck:   40.59 yen/km 
Special large-sized full trailer:  67.65 yen/km 
Source: Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 7 
 It has been observed that the toll level of the Japanese highway system is much 
higher than in other developed countries.  For example, the unit toll level in Japan is 
24.6 yen per km, while it is 6.4 yen in France, 5.1 yen in Italy and 3.7 yen in Korea (p. 
8).  Where Japan has distinct features that can explain to the higher costs (that would 
reflect higher tolls): 
1. Including the presence of mountainous regions, which would result in higher 
investments in infrastructure in order to build tunnels and bridges. 
2. The possibility of earthquakes also require more expensive anti-earthquake 
infrastructure.   
3. While natural conditions are one part of the explanation in justifying for 
higher toll level in Japan, the possibility that the full repayment principle and 
the pooling system could also be an explanation to the higher tolls.  
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 While mentioned earlier, the government had an initial plan of building 
national motorways of 7600 km in 1966, it was then extended in 1987 to cover 14,000 
km nationwide. Of this additional 6400 km, the JHPC was in charge of constructing 
3920 kilometers of national motorways and another 2300 km of regional motorways 
(Ippan Kokudo jidosha senyo doro), with the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority in 
charge of constructing the remaining 180 km As of the end of March 2001, 6851 km of 
the network was opened, and another 2491 km were included in the construction plan 
(Seibi Keikaku) as they were finishing their environment impact assessment. But by 
then in 2001 and 2002 the policy debates on expressway constructions was already 
intense, especially regarding the financial state of the JHPC and the welfare arising 
from the expansion plan.  
 Although the then financial position of the JHPC appeared healthy, with toll 
revenues at 1.87 trillion yen (in FY 2000) exceeding the sum of operating costs (369 
billion yen) and interest payments (576 billion yen). And as of March 2003, the total 
funds that the JHPC has raised since its establishment was 62.3 trillion yen, of this 
direct government subsidies and government capital funds was only 4.1 trillion yen, 
and the borrowing from the World Bank was 137 billion yen (Kimura & Maeda, 2005, p. 
7). The Japanese government’s decision to finance the JHPC (to construct and operate 
the almost entire expressway system) through toll revenues and the fiscal investment 
scheme through issuing bonds; allowed the government to avoid itself the heavy 
financial burden. In this regard four highway-related agencies borrow construction 
costs from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP, to be discussed later), 
operate toll roads, and repay construction costs by toll revenues.  
 However, the stress on JHPC is hidden with the profitability that varies widely 
among routes. Table 6.4 presents the data from Iwamoto (2002) study, which measures 
the rate of return of each line For the Year 2000, using the information obtained from 
the JHPC annual reports. The rate of return is computed by: 
 
Equation 3 JHPC Rate of Return Calculation 
Operating Surplus (Roll Revenues minus Operating Costs) Rate of return = 
Book Value of Roads 
 
This data can simply reveal whether an expressway line can repay, or recover 
its construction costs. As Table 6.4 indicates that although old lines, which have a high 
opening rate can achieve a very high profitability, however the rates of return to newer 
lines are quite low. Expressway construction obeys the rule of diminishing return; 
where the more recent the construction, less will be the traffic volume (Iwamoto, 2002, 
p. 595). Especially when the rate of return falls short of the interest rate, it is suggests 
that the construction cost will not be repaid. Apart from being able to notice 
underutilization of motorways while observing the traffic on the expressway, there is 
more discontent with the profitability of the new lines it also raises questions to the 
solvency of JHPC, which continued to construct cross-subsidized routes. 
 As the data suggests the older lines: Chuo, Higashi Kanto, Meishin, and Tomei 
lines have already repaid their construction costs and earned 514 billion yen of 
operating surplus in FY 2000. Fairly newer lines: Kinki, Kyushu, Meihan, and Tohoku 
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routes still have a little debt that has not been repaid but they still earned a 368 billion 
yen of operating surplus. The huge cash rich routes with a huge operating surplus, 
enables the JHPC to pay off the interest of 576 billion yen even after they lose 306 
trillion yen to other lines(p. 595).  Neither solvency nor current profit is a good measure 
of judging the business of JHPC. According to Iwamoto (2002) the two main concerns 
for the financial health of JHPC was a potential interest rate hike (as Japan currently 
has a very low rate), and the unsustainability of continuing the pooling principle as the 
cross-subsidization scheme will only increase the share of unprofitable lines. Other 
issues that discouraged the JHPC in continuing building inefficient routes were the 
over optimistic projection of future traffic, and in fact many of the new lines were 
running parallel to old lines which would only lead to traffic diversion, and there would 
be no real increase in the traffic volume. 
 This brought into concern the welfare costs of the construction plan (Seibi 
Keikaku), which was estimated to spend 22.7 trillion yen to add 2491 km to the 
existing network, at that time (2001). Apart from the expanding the national 
motorways of 2341 km, the building regional motorways of 2300 kilometers, where the 
traffic will be much lighter, also raised serious doubts in terms of welfare cost. On top 
of that, the national government finances a large part of construction costs of regional 
motorways with gasoline tax revenues, to help keep the operation of toll roads 
sustainable. This will mean that a substantial part of such subsidies, which do not 
appear on the financial statement of the JHPC, will result in social waste (which 
cannot even analyzed as the JHPC does not disclose adequate date for these 
expressways). 
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Table 6.4 Rates of Return of National Motorways by Line (Fiscal Year 2000) 
 
Source: Iwamoto 2002 
 
 The work done by Mizutani and Uranishi (2006 and 2008), extensively 
documents the Financial Structure of the JHPC, outlining the Revenue and Cost 
structure data. As for the revenue structure, there are three main sources of revenue 
(Refer toTable 6.5):  
i) Service revenue from highway toll charges and highway facility user 
charges such as parking and tenant rents,  
ii) Government subsidies,  
iii) Others (that include revenues contracted-in, and revenues from non-road 
service).  
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Table 6.5 Revenue Structure of JHPC (¥Million) 
 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi 2006 
 
After 2000 the service revenues reached the maximum amount over ¥2 Trillion, 
accounting for 98.9% of total revenues in 2003. 
 
 From the cost side of the current financial statement it gets more complicated 
than the revenue structure, as the accounting system also changed in 1986 (refer to 
Table 6.6).  The costs are categorized into:  
(i) Road Service Costs: general administration costs and maintenance costs 
of already constructed highways 
(ii) Depreciation 
(iii) Non-road Service Costs: the costs of interest payment on bonds and loans, 
and so on 
(iv) Reserves 
(v) Repayment Fund: pooled money for debt repayment 
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Table 6.6 Cost Structure of JHPC (¥Million) 
 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi 2006  
 
The change in accounting rules in 1986 resulted in ‘Depreciation’ being 
accounted for, and replaced by another category, the ‘Repayment Fund’, which refers to 
pooled money for repayment of debts. The significance of the cost structure is that road 
service costs more recently only 17 - 18% of the total costs since the 1980s; suggesting 
that most of JHPC’s costs are capital costs. In macro perspective the financial 
structure appears healthy in spite of the huge amount debts accrued, in hindsight the 
argument is that it could have been avoided if JHPC had stop new construction.   
 To simplify it further according to Miyagawa (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 8) 
summarizes the highway business as follows:  
 
Figure 6.4 Highway Financing and Repayment   
 
 
The construction  
Costs of highways 
+ 
The management  
Costs of the JHPC 
Highway bonds 
+ 
Loans from banks 
+ 
Government investment 
 
While debt: 
Principal 
+ 
Interest 
 
 
 
Toll revenues 
+ 
Government subsidies  
and social capital fund 
 
Infrastructure with monopoly characteristics, the 
government provides infrastructure services using 
public funds (through taxes, directed funding), 
borrowing from banks to fund deficits. (Most 
Developing countries based on agriculture) 
The public sector withdraws from infrastructure 
provision, but remains in the market, through 
entering hybrid contracts using discretionary 
regulation (e.g. price-cap regulations, concessions); 
mostly in fast growing, industrializing countries 
with economic liberalization. 
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So in this way if the JHPC constructs more highways than its repaying ability 
using toll revenues and government subsidies, then its debts will accumulate and 
balloon, as the JHPC has to depend on highway bonds and loans.  This in fact, is the 
cause of the accumulated debts of the JHPC reached that reached to a whopping 2,070 
billion yen by the end of 2003. This (debt) in turn became the trigger for the eventual 
privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation.  
 By this time Japan are so-called “highways” or “expressways,” mostly 
national motorways in Japan, reached 7,197 km as of April 1, 2003, which constitutes 
only 0.6% in the total road length of 1,187,638 km as of 2004 (refer to Table 6.7). By 
this time the roads in Japan were classified into four categories: 
(i) National motorways,  
(ii) National roads, 
(iii) Prefectural roads, 
(iv) Municipal roads 
However, highways carries 6% of total transport (kilometers times number of 
cars) and 24% of total domestic cargo transport.  Although expressway network in 
terms of length is still low for Japan compared to other major western countries, the 
trunk routes of the network have been roughly completed, expressways have also 
reached new levels of technological advancements (to be discussed later).  
 
Table 6.7 Comparison of Road Length Amongst Selected Developed Countries 
 
Source: Mizutani & Uranishi, 2008 
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 Something unique in Japan’s financing of public initiatives including the 
National Highways, was the FILP (Zaisei Toyushi) system that was enacted through 
the Trust Fund Law in 1951. This was a unique financing program was established to 
provide interest-bearing funds for targeted policy areas as a part of fiscal policy 
administration in combination with tax revenues. This was a practice that was traced 
back since the Meiji era where the government would gather funds through deposits 
invested in public bonds (till 1897), apart from using tax proceeds to undertake public 
economic activities (Kaneko & Metoki, 2008, p. 236). And since 1910 these funds were 
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invested in special-purpose banks to support new areas of fiscal activity, as the 
government was involved in new developmental activities. The FILP system as it was 
used in coordination with the budget to achieve policy objectives it was also was 
referred to as the second budget.  
 For the year 1953 budget, already consisted of three parts (entrance, mid, and 
exit). The entrance side of the FILP was central government’s special accounts that 
had a financial surplus a large share taken by the postal savings and public pension 
funds. The Trust Fund Bureau allocated the money among the exit side to a variety of 
special accounts and special public institutions (mentioned below). Fundamentally the 
FILP system served as a financial intermediary between savings pooled from ordinary 
citizens into public institutions, which could then be used to implement fiscal policy. 
Over time the FILP also sourced: 
i) Primarily from postal savings and pension reserves that were required by 
law to be deposited in the Trust Fund Bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance.  
ii) In addition, it also included:  
- The reserves and surpluses of government special account 
- Premiums of the postal life insurance 
 In turn the FILP funds were allocated as investments or loans to various 
government special accounts, including: 
i) Government-affiliated financial institutions,  
ii) Local governments, 
iii) Public corporations and other public institutions. These agencies are 
called FILP Agencies and can be roughly classified into two groups:  
(a) Financial institutions, In the case of financial institutions, they 
lend the allocated FILP funds to the private sector to realize 
certain policy objectives such as fostering advanced technologies, 
supporting small businesses and preventing environmental 
pollutions. Such as the former:  
- Japan Development Bank (current Development Bank of 
Japan)  
(b) Public corporations that carry out construction of such social 
infrastructures as toll-roads and airports based on the 
government policy. Such as the former: 
- Japan Highway Corporation (current three regional 
expressway companies).  
 
 These funds played a strategic role in the rapid economic growth, especially in 
the 1950s by providing the required investment to basic and export industries such as 
electric power, iron, steel and shipbuilding through government-affiliated financial 
institutions (p. 237) like the Japan Development Bank and Japan Economic Research 
Institute. As in the 1950s long-term funding was scarce, due to the rapid increase in 
lending by private financial institutions and the absence of capital markets. During the 
early 1950s, the FILP supplied 28.3%  of total corporate funding, and for the four basic 
industries mentioned above  (electric power, shipping, coal and iron and steel), the 
percentage was slightly higher at 37.2% . The FILP system provided the long-term, 
fixed and low-interest financing from interest-bearing funds (postal savings, pension 
reserves and so on), which private financial institutions could not provide. 
 Among the other funding the postal savings funds have been really crucial in 
the FILP. Studies (p. 237) suggest that the share of postal savings within the FILP 
system ranged from more than 25% in 1955, up to 40% in 1975 and 1980, and dipped 
back to 31.0% in fiscal 1995 and 27.3% in fiscal 1997. Since 1875, when the postal 
savings system was put in place until March 2003, it managed to hold up to a 250 
trillion yen at the end of fiscal 2000, mostly in the form of 10-year time deposits. The 
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postal savings system, which was administered by a government ministry, benefitted 
from the postal system of around 24,000 post offices located nationwide, was crucial in 
channeling the savings of ordinary citizens. Even recent statistics that break down 
household financial assets, suggest that postal savings accounted for about 20% of all 
the household financial assets. The trend was that it shrunk during the bubble, where 
even in fiscal 1980, the ratio was at 16.7%, it rose again as people’s confidence in the 
private financial institutions diminished due to their problems of non-performing loans 
(NPL). 
 As outlined above the core of the FILP funds managed by the Trust Fund 
Bureau, included postal savings, pension reserves and surpluses in other special 
accounts, which was then invested in Japanese government bonds, or loaned them to 
the FILP agencies. Also, ever since the inception of the FILP the interest rate on the 
Trust Fund Bureau’s deposits were determined by law. As at that time the interest 
rate system in the financial markets were also strictly regulated, maintained in such 
an order from deposit rates of banks and postal savings, government bond interest 
rates, lending rates of the FILP agencies to long-term prime rate. In other words the 
circumstances were created where the FILP could provide long-term loans at below 
market lending rates.  
 But things had to change after the oil crises, when the Japanese economy was 
moving towards depression and the government increased spending in order to 
revitalize the economy. This started a chain of events that would affect the financial 
market. As the funding for stimulus spending could not come from tax revenues, 
because it was already decreasing, forced the government to establish a bond market so 
that it could issue huge amounts of bonds in the market. Since the early 1980s, the 
amount of off shore money transactions also increased requiring arbitration between 
and offshore and inland financial assets. This and in the late 1980s when reduced 
corporate demands for credit and the interest rates started falling as the yen was 
getting stronger, hastened the eventual liberalization of interest rates. When in 
January 1987 the long-term prime rate went even below the deposit rate of the Trust 
Fund Bureau, the law determining deposit rates of the Trust Fund Bureau had to be 
revised a month later. The new legislation allowed the cabinet to determine the rates 
based on the market rates, especially the Japanese government bond interest rates. 
The deposit rates of the Trust Fund Bureau became inevitably linked to the Japanese 
government bond interest rates so as to ensure the sound management of postal 
savings and pension reserves (Kaneko & Metoki, 2008, p. 239). 
 Since then as the financial market continued to be liberalized, the discrepancy 
between the Trust Fund lending rate and the long-term prime rate reduced, but that in 
effect led to another contention. This was the competition between the private banks 
and the FILP agencies in the market; with similar interest rates it obviously was 
becoming more difficult for the FILP to provide preferential financing. But before long 
the FILP’s relevance was restored when the economic slowdown following the collapse 
of the bubble economy, allowed the FILP in providing additional funds to cope with 
reluctance of private financial institutions’ to lend money to businesses. 
 But the biggest twist came when in 1996 Mr. Hashimoto (Prime Minister, 
1996–1998) wanted to also delink the FILP with the postal savings and pension 
reserves, as part of his government-wide reform undertaking through establishing the 
Administrative Reform Council. Among the reform measures deliberated by the council, 
the working group of the Fund Management Council of the Ministry of Finance 
through financial experts sought to reform the FILP. The report of the working group 
was included in the final report of the Administrative Reform Council in December 
1997, which also proposed a postal service re-organization. A law was then stipulated 
that the FILP system was to be reformed based on the market principles no longer 
linking it to the postal savings and the pension reserves. The far fletched reform also 
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suggested that the postal service organization would be transformed from a 
government ministry to a state-run public corporation. 
 The fundamentally reform of the FILP was carried out in April 2001, changing 
the mechanism of fund raising and fund operations. The mandatory deposit of postal 
savings and pension reserves into the FILP was abolished, and these funds could 
discretionarily be invested in the financial markets, in effect mainly in Japanese 
government bonds. In terms of fund operation, the FILP agencies as they were no 
longer entitled to the FILP funds, in principle were now allowed to issue their own 
bonds in the financial market to raise the funding required for their projects. In case 
the FILP agencies were unable to raise the funding on their own, there was a condition 
that allowed the government to raise it on behalf of them by issuing Japanese 
government bonds, only if the projects were considered indispensable in achieving the 
governments overall policy objectives. Even this was in accordance with fiscal 
discipline, where the FILP bonds were to be issued under a new special account, Fiscal 
Loan Fund Special Account, which is segregated from the general account.  
 In April 2003 a state-run public corporation, Japan Post was established based 
on Mr. Hashimoto’s reform blueprint under the aegis of the then Prime Minister, Mr. 
Koizumi (Prime Minister 2001–2006). According to the ‘Basic principles of the 
privatization of Japan Post’ (Cabinet decision, September 2004), one of the three merits 
of the privatization was the channeling of funds from the public sector to the private 
sector, to enhance the utilization of households’ savings and to revitalize the national 
economy. In order to realize this principle, making an ordinary private-commercial 
bank from a public financial institution was the top priority behind creating whole 
framework for privatization. As a result, the postal savings service was converted into 
a Postal Savings Bank, as an ordinary commercial bank that was no longer obligated to 
fund public initiatives. As for the discretionary investment of postal savings, 201 
trillion yen was invested (at the end of fiscal 2005) in securities, mainly Japanese 
government bonds accounting for 71.8%, and deposits to the Fiscal Loan Fund 
accounting for 23.2%. All the deposits to the Fiscal Loan Fund were to be repaid in 
fiscal 2007 (Kaneko & Metoki, 2008, p. 240). The controversial aspects, that is beyond 
the scope of this thesis was that although privatization happened, most of the 
discretionary funds were now invested in government bonds, and that the Postal 
Savings Bank would lead to the financial exclusion, as it no longer obliged by law to 
provide Universal Services in its Postal Savings Services. 
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 Having outlined the evolution and the circumstances under which reforms 
occurred to the FILP and the Postal Savings System, this section will relate it to the 
FILP agencies especially the JHPC and Highways. As according to Iwamoto (2002, 
583) among infrastructure construction projects that the FILP supported, the largest 
welfare loss lies on national motorway construction (of the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation Kosoku Jidosha Kokudo), which was estimated to be about 14.5 trillion 
yen of welfare loss. Iwamoto’s study substantiates the earlier sections ramification; 
that the FILP was a system that worked very well in a postwar reconstruction period, 
but was misdirecting a well-developed market economy. Where the FILP functioned as 
a kind of government intervention to the financial sector, which was under-developed 
and the FILP became crucial in the Post-war reconstruction efforts and infrastructure 
financing. But as the financial sector started to develop, with increased PSP in the 
financial markets, the role of the government should have been restricted, and this 
represents a common problem that the Japanese economy faces at large.  shows the 
amount lent from the FILP for JHPC. Although there were only few years of data that 
were recorded clearly as to giving a break up for which subsector arranged for how 
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much of the loan. Most of the contributions came from the Postal Life Insurance Fund, 
and less than 10% came from government guaranteed bonds. FILP agencies, such as 
the Japan Highway Public Corporation, were also able to issue bonds on the financial 
market.  In this way, the government using the FILP could guarantee the bonds issued 
by the FILP supported agencies, so that the institutions could also smoothly procure 
funds from the financial system. Figure 6.5 provides the flow of funds in the FILP 
system that allowed for the postal savings and private financial institutions to provide 
the financial intermediation in funding the FILP agencies. 
 
Figure 6.5 Fiscal Investment and Loan Program System 
 
Source: http://www.mof.go.jp/zaito/zaito00/p06_09e.html accessed November 18th 2010 
 
 Doi and Hoshi (Iwamoto, 2002, p. 585) estimated that the bad loans of the FILP 
would cost at least 78.9 trillion yen. This staggering figure only reveals the scale of 
NPL and the unqualified funding activities the FILP was involved in; leading to the 
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“fundamental reform of the FILP” in April 2001 carried out by policy makers. As the 
reforms Postal system and FILP reform have already been discussed, the Koizumi 
administration in December 2001 also reformed the special public institutions (tokushu 
hojin) including the JHPC under the government-wide reform program. Incidentally 
the majority of agencies that were affiliated with the FILP were special public 
institutions, and the FILP reform would inevitably lead to all their privatization or 
abolishment. Table 6.8 outlines the lending under the FILP between 1995 and 2008, 
where most of the funding came from the Postal Life Insurance fund, Trust fund 
Bureau, and the government guaranteed bonds respectively.  
 
Table 6.8 Amount of Lending Under FILP Fiscal Year 1995 - 2008 to JHPC 
(¥Billion) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from http://www.mof.go.jp/zaito/zaito00/p35_43e.html#04 accessed 
December 18th 2009 
 
 The government financial institutions (eight agencies) and expressway 
construction (four including the JHPC) received most of the lending. The JHPC 
received as much as 2.118 trillion yen as new lending in 2002, including the other 
highway agencies it adds up to 3.042 trillion yen. In order to measure the size of 
inefficient activities the FILP was involved in the government made some attempts to 
quantify policy costs by introducing a ‘subsidy cost analysis’ in 1999. As the next table 
lists the major 15 FILP agencies and their new borrowing from the FILP in FY 2002, 
that accounted for 96.4% of FILP loans excluding the local governments.  The subsidy 
cost analysis estimates the present discounted value of the subsidies attributed only to 
the existing activities of the FILP agencies, basically assuming that the agencies do not 
launch a new project. This data on Table 6.9, suggests that the JHPC has the largest 
amount of subsidy costs amounting to a 1.794 trillion yen. Iwamoto further suggests 
that apart from huge losses in welfare costs, the budget expenses or policy costs do not 
necessarily result directly in a social waste if the subsidized activity can actually create 
enough social benefits. But in this regard there could be an enormous social waste, 
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when the public sector substitutes the activities of the private sector, distortion caused 
by the government subsidies, and when money is lost through nonperforming loans 
underutilized infrastructure.  
 
Table 6.9 Major FILP Agencies and their Funding (Fiscal Year 2002) 
 
Source: Iwamoto 2002 
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 The JHPC developed a highway network, financed using FILP and user charges 
that worked in a favorable economic environment of rapid economic growth, until the 
mid 1980s. After which the revision of the National Development Arterial Expressway 
Construction Law in 1987, began to trigger inefficiency, welfare loss and a huge debt.  
This was essentially due to the fact that newly planned routes of 3,920 km had high 
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construction costs while there was an inadequate traffic volume to recover spending 
(Kimura & Maeda, 2005, p. 9). With insufficient funds and with small government 
subsidies, the toll fees were revised twice in 1989 and in 1994, and the redemption 
principle was reorganized so as to make planned redemption period longer, that is 30 
years to 40 years.  In 2000, the redemption period was again extended to 45 years and 
then 50 years. The late 1980s was also a turning point in terms of government fiscal 
expenditure; with annual investment in the highway construction by the JHPC passed 
a million yen in FY1989. Public expenditure and construction investment was kept 
high since the early 1990s to late 2000s due to political pressure from the United 
States and later to counter recession, accumulating a large outstanding debt (Kimura 
and Maeda 2005, 9).  To exacerbate the situation, the recession also stalled the growth 
of traffic using the expressways since the latter half of the 1990s, bringing toll 
revenues much below the forecasted figures.   
 All these issues aggravated the financial strain on the JHPC, which became the 
center of controversy as the highway was designated for privatization in December 
2001, when the “Reorganization and Reform Plan of Special Public Corporations” was 
approved at the Cabinet meeting of Prime Minister Koizumi.  The conjecture was that 
if any public service could be provided by the private sector it should be contracted out 
to the private sector so as to improve efficiency and turn around the losses.  More 
specifically the Prime Minister’s established the Committee for Promoting 
Privatization of Four Highway-related Public Corporations that were in charge of the 
construction and management of highways in Japan: Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (1956), Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation (1959), Hanshin 
Expressway Public Corporation (1962), and the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority 
(1970).  The committee addressed many issues, starting from managing the huge 
accumulated debt, the never ceasing highway construction plans, the expensive toll 
rates, the regional imbalance of highways (inadequate in large cities and unused in 
rural areas), the inefficient management of public corporation, the extra costs due to 
the corporation’s family companies, and political intervention in highway construction 
(Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 14).  
 A year later in December 2002, the committee’s final opinion report, 
recommended an organizational reform based on a vertical unbundling principle where 
highway service companies would provide services to an infrastructure holding 
organization.  The committee’s recommendation became the basic plan for the 
privatization of four highway-related public corporations, during joint meeting of 
government and ruling parties; and Privatization Bill was passed in the Diet in June 
2004, as a law providing for:  
(i) Six specific joint-stock highway corporations that are 1/3 government 
owned (permission required for their appointments of presidents, 
their business plans, and so on). These corporations would have the 
power to veto highway construction, although a Panel on 
Infrastructure Development would make the final decision. 
(ii) One independent administrative agency serving as an asset-holding and 
debt-servicing organization established 
The privatization of the four highway public corporations was also based on the 
experiences from the privatization of the Japan National Railway in 1987.  The most 
important characteristics of the organizational reforms of the four expressway public 
corporations it was ensured that there was a regional horizontal unbundling and 
vertical unbundling of services. Apart from the unbundling activities, the government 
sought to be involved in the six joint-stock highway corporations, and its degree of 
intervention was to be comparable to that of NTT and stronger than that for JR. The 
level of managerial autonomy of the corporations was assumed to be largely dependent 
on the details of agreements with the umbrella organization.  
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 Until October 2005, Toll roads in Japan were almost entirely constructed and 
operated by public corporations, which include the JHPC, Metropolitan Expressway 
Public Corporation, Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation, Honshu-Shikoku Bridge 
Authority, and some other local corporations. But ever since, they were privatized, to 
form six expressway companies (East Japan Highway Company (EJHPCC), Central 
Japan Highway Company (CJHPCC), West Japan Highway Company (WJHPCC), 
Metropolitan Expressway Company (MEC), Hanshin Expressway Company (HEC), 
and Honshu-Shikoku Highway Company (HSHC)) and an independent administrative 
entity the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Organization (JEHDRO) 
was established (refer to Figure 6-3 to observe the organizational chart). 
 
Figure 6.6 Organizational Chart of Privatization of Four Highway-Related 
Public Corporations 
 
Source: http: //www.jehdra.go.jp (2007) 
161 
 
Figure 6.7 Reorganized Highway Network in Japan 
 
Note: This picture was made by the authors based on each company’s highway network. 
Solid lines are operating routes. Wavy lines are planned routes. 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi 2008 
 
The other three highway public corporations were also privatized without 
subdivision:  
(i) Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation ! Metropolitan Expressway 
Company Ltd. - provides services in the Tokyo metropolitan area 
(ii) Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation ! Hanshin Expressway 
Company Ltd. – provides services in the Osaka metropolitan area 
(iii) Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority  ! Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Express 
Company Ltd. - was planned to be merged to West Nippon 
Expressway Company after the Honshu-Shikoku Company stabilizes 
its operation and management.   
The new role of the six regionally separated expressway companies is in 
providing administration and maintenance of express the express highways and 
service areas after renting it out from the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt 
486 F. Mizutani and S. Uranishi
These six companies are joint-stock companies but all shares re still held by the
government. In the future, these highway service providing companies will be
privatized but there are several severe restrictions. First, the Highway Company
Law (Kosokudoro Kaisha ho) regulates that the government hold one-third of the
shares of highway service providing companies (Doro Horei Kenkyukai, 2004).
According to the Doro Horei Kenkyukai (2004), the main reasons for partial public
ownership are as follows. The highway network itself is a public asset with public
benefits. Second, the new companies must create management stability in order to
foster trust from the market. Therefore, in order to keep railway management on
the right track, the government holds the option to interfere in the management of
new companies. Other important points are that the new highway providing
companies need approval for various management decisions from the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport. For example, appointing representative
Figure 4. Highway network system in Japan. Note: This picture was made by the authors based on 
each company’s highway network. Solid lines are operating routes. Wavy lines are planned routes.
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Repayment Agency.  Apart form the horizontal unbundling of the Highways there was 
also a vertical separation between the highway service provider and the infrastructure 
holding organization (refer to Figure 6.8).  In order to effectively privatize the four 
public highway corporations the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment 
(JEHDR) Agency as mentioned above was created; this agency essentially holds 
highway facilities and leases it to the expressway companies.  The JEHDR Agency is a 
public organization that not only holds the highway assets of the highway-related 
public corporations but it is also responsible for repaying the debts of the former public 
corporations by collecting highway fees from six companies.  The JEHDR was setup in 
a way that once the repayment was completed in the planned 45 years, the JEHDR 
Agency would be dissolved and cease to exist. 
 
Figure 6.8 The Vertical Re-organization - JEHDR Agency with Service Providing 
Companies 
 
Source: http://www.mof.go.jp/zaito/ 
 
Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency aims to reduce the 
public financial burden related to expressway and assist smooth operations related to 
expressways by the expressway companies through efforts including speedy and sure 
repayment of debts inherited from the four former Japan Highway Public Corporations 
as well as the ones related to such operations as new construction and reconstruction of 
other expressways, other than the holding of expressway assets and lending for 
expressway corporations. East, Central, and West Nippon Expressway Company 
Limited undertake new construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair and other 
management of expressways. The FILP peaked in 1996 at 40.5 trillion yen and ever 
since 2001, when the reforms were induced it now hovers around 15 trillion yen. The 
total Outstanding Amount to the Fiscal Loan fund within the FILP Plan peaked in 
2000 at 417.8 trillion yen. 
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Table 6.10 Expressway Type and Length in Japan (as of FY2007 end) 
Type of National 
Expressways 
Target Opened to Traffic (as of end FY2007) 
National Expressways: 8,520 km   7,531 km 
Ordinary Toll roads:  1,077 km  921 km 
Metropolitan 
Expressways: 
323 km   294 km 
Hanshin Expressways: 264 km   239 km 
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge 
Expressways: 
173 km   173 km 
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 While according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2005, 
cited in Mizutani and Uranishi 2006, 14), the three main purposes for the privatization 
of the four highway public corporations were:  
i. To secure repayment of interest-bearing debts, that amounted to about 40 
trillion yen  
ii. To construct economically viable expressways without increasing the 
burden on the general public, while allowing companies to operate 
autonomously 
iii. To offer flexible prices and rates of services by utilizing the private 
sector’s know-how.  
 The changes in the outstanding debt and balance is shown below in Figure 6.9, as 
it can be observed, the total debt is and investment borrowing are to be brought down 
to zero in the next 40 years. After holding a peak of over 41.6 trillion, this figure is to 
be brought down under the new managements system of JEHDR. The main component 
of the total debt is interest bearing-debts, so it is very likely that interest payment is 
itself quite a substantial part of repayment. These projections are also based on many 
assumptions including: economic growth rates of 1.6% in 2006 ~ 1.9% in 2010 and 1.5% 
in 2011 ~ 0.4% in 2050 (according to MITI calculations), fundraising costs in the future 
of 4% (after FY 2009) a medium vehicular traffic estimate of: 
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Figure 6.9 Changes in the JEHDRA’S Outstanding Balance 
 
Graph created by Author - Source: http: //www.jehdra.go.jp (2007) 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Possession of Debt and Loan of Highway Assets as of 1st April 2006
Source: Source: http: //www.jehdra.go.jp (2007) 
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Unbundling and privatization of Infrastructure services through vertical and/or 
horizontal separation has become a common policy in many public utility industries, 
among developed and developing countries especially since the 1980s. Vertical 
separation in highways however makes it easier to: 
1. Promote a variety of service providing companies that operate under 
governmental franchised markets,  
2. Clarify intra-industry relationships  
3. Using specialized service providing companies that improve efficiency, 
and promote specialized activities.   
Conversely, vertical separation makes it difficult to:  
1. Calculate and set up fair prices and monitor performance at all the levels,  
2. Negotiate arrangements between two organizations and to ensure the 
combined objective of providing equitable and efficient infrastructure 
services.  
3. Transaction costs of coordinating efforts at the various vertical levels. 
But the biggest advantage of vertical separation, especially in reference to 
JHPC was that the newly established highway service providing companies were 
delinked from the financial burden (JHPC debt). What happened to JHPC was also 
believed to be the result of the lessons learnt in the privatization of Japan National 
Railways (JNR) was divided into 6 regional companies and Japan Freight Railway 
Company in 1987. Also in the case of the newly established highway providing 
companies, have a role in constructing their own highways.  This will not allow for 
specialization, and to true vertical separation would demand for the construction of 
highways to be taken care of by a different firm or the infrastructure holding 
organization (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2008, p. 489).  Another difficulty is the decision 
making process and the high transaction costs in setting toll levels, infrastructure 
charges, construction of highways, and profit levels, as negotiations happen between 
highway providing companies and the infrastructure organization.  Something that 
remains unchanged is that even after an agreement of both organizations is reached it 
needs to be approved by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. But as in 
fact each independent expressway company is actually a regional monopoly, the 
traditional regulation method there remains few incentives for expressway companies 
improve their performance. 
According to the JEHDR Agency (p. 488) there are two incentive schemes for 
expressway companies to benefit, out of gaining efficiency in construction and repair, 
and the other through improved management of highways. In regards to reaching 
efficiency in construction, the JEHDR Agency sets standard costs for construction and 
repair and if expressway companies keep costs below the standard, then half the 
difference between actual costs and standard costs is rewarded as a subsidy. The 
second scheme, in terms of rewarding management efficiency, the JEHDR Agency 
calculates toll charge as the difference between the expected toll charge revenues and 
the expected administration costs of expressway companies. Therefore by reducing real 
administration costs below the expected administration costs, the expressway 
companies can make profits with the increased real toll revenues. On the contrary, if 
the opposite happens then the companies will incur loss, in order to avoid this situation 
the expected toll revenues and the expected administration for each year are shown in 
advance. So that this data can be used as targets to attain efficiency in management, 
but again, in case there is continuous profits or continuous loss, the JEHDR will reset 
the infrastructure charges. 
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Figure 6.11 Framework for Implementation of Expressway Business by the 
Agency and the Companies 
 
Source:  http: //www.jehdra.go.jp (2007) 
 
 Although all the efforts in unbundling and privatization of the highways has 
been to improve efficiency, it is yet unclear as to how toll charges can be reduced.  The 
privatization plan of the government is primarily driven on reducing debt and debt 
repayment, and to increase efficiency (and reducing cost) by introducing private 
company’s management practices and their advanced technology deployment such as 
the Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) system. Although the increase of ETC can reduce 
labor, the decrease in cost might not be enough.  As long as there are the remnants of 
the post-war system, in terms of repayment principle and the pooling system of toll 
revenues, it has been observed that the tolls can no longer be reduced. As Mizutani and 
Uranishi suggest (2006) the two possible ideas for reform would be the use of gasoline 
taxes (which is already high) for the construction of highways or to, instead of making 
toll-free highways after 45 years just leaving them as toll-roads forever and reducing 
the tolls charges. 
 
Figure 6.12 Highway Assets Debt Flow 
 
Source:  http: //www.jehdra.go.jp (2007) 
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 Just to explain the differentiation of Highway and road development in Japan, 
this section will seek to describe the way in which they are developed, administered 
and financed. All other regular roads other than highways are generally constructed 
and maintained with auto-related taxes such as the gasoline tax and the ‘auto 
acquisition tax’ (a kind of luxury sales tax at 10%, cited in Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, Inc. website). The revenues from these taxes are 
distributed to the national government and local governments for the improvement of 
regular roads, of which the construction and maintenance are administrated by the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, prefectures, cities and so on, 
respectively. The type of administrative body responsible depends upon the type of 
road and the level they are being handled (refer to Table 6.11). On the other hand, 
highways as earlier sections explained were constructed and maintained mainly by toll 
revenues and government subsidies through the JHPC. The general feature of the 
pricing structure of Japanese highways was that a pooling system of toll revenues is 
used. 
 
Table 6.11 Administration Body and Bearer of Expenses for each Type of Road   
 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi 2008 
 
 In order to build and maintain the other roads, the Japanese national and local 
governments receive more than 10% of their entire revenue from nine automobile 
related taxes. These include sales, property and fuel taxes, which have also risen over 
the years leaving Japanese consumers little understanding of the logic or purpose of 
the system. A significantly simplified outline of this complicated auto tax system 
follows: 
i. The Japanese who purchases a new car pays a 5%  "acquisition tax" (a 
kind of luxury sales tax) on the base price of the vehicle at the time of 
purchase. This tax originated in 1968 when cars for personal use 
were still considered a luxury. That tax instead of becoming abolished 
as more cars were being bought actually increased to 10% since 1997.  
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ii. In addition to regular inspection fees, the Japanese car owner pays an 
annual vehicle property tax, ranging from between US$250 and 
US$900 depending on engine size. On top of this, owners pay an 
annual weight tax amounting to about US$105 on a one-ton vehicle. 
These taxes are supposed to cover road building and road 
maintenance costs, but the budget process offers little explanation as 
to their actual use. 
iii. Then there are high fuel taxes totaling about US$1.69 per gallon or more 
than 50% of the gas price (Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Inc 
 http://www.jama.org/AutoTrends/detail1d69.html?id=224 accessed 
June 18th 2010) 
 As the automobile-taxation system has not changed significantly to match the 
changes in the market and the vehicle environment. On the one hand, automobiles in 
Japan, once a luxury for the elite, are now a necessity for most households. Since 1965, 
where less than 10% of households in Japan owned a car, today almost all households 
own a car and half of them own two cars (refer to Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Inc database website: http://jamaserv.jama.or.jp /newdb/eng/index.html 
accessed July 23rd 2010). As there is a need for tax rates and incentives to reflect the 
change, for example it was not until recently that incentives were used to encourage 
consumers to purchase environmentally friendly vehicles, such as hybrid and fuel cell 
vehicles. 
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 Japan, apart from deploying ETC systems it has been actively involved in the 
deployment of the Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) focusing on in-vehicle 
information systems, with benefits sought in terms of safety and the environment. The 
history of ITS development is relatively new, the precursor being the 1960s research 
program in the U.S. called Electronic Route Guidance System (ERGS). But it has been 
rapidly developing with major projects developed around the world especially since the 
1990s. Now there is even a world congress has been held annually since 1994, with the 
U.S, Europe, and Japan being the drivers of the ITS technology development. ITS as a 
new transportation system utilizes sophisticated communication and electronics 
technologies in order to reduce congestion, improve transportation safety ultimately to 
enhance productivity. Japan has had a similar experience with ITS initiatives as in 
Europe, but Japan has much more vendors of ITS-related products and services, 
manufacturing these devices. These devices are manufactured by electronics device 
manufacturers and sold by them or via automotive manufacturers Vehicle Information 
and Communication System (VICS).  
 VICS is a real-time system that provides information through radio traffic 
reporting services and websites, on weather, road and traffic conditions, and 
navigation assistance to in-vehicle navigation systems. The system has been 
considered a great success with more than 9 million subscribers in 2004. This system 
serves as a catalyst for further ITS deployment in automobiles. Taxi probes equipped 
with GPS and wiper sensors are used by the Japan Road Traffic Information Center to 
obtain information about the transportation system; the information is then analyzed 
and passed along to motorists using VICS. There are also other applications and 
programs being developed in order to assess information like traffic congestion on 
planned route, to decide between alternate routes, accident information, to estimate 
their trip duration and distance, and weather information. With the four primary 
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benefits being saved time, avoiding and regulating congestion, reducing stress, and 
avoided unsafe conditions. 
 In Japan, the Japan Highway Public Corporation installed a mobile radio local-
area network with a 2.4 GHz bandwidth to communicate both data and images to in-
vehicle navigation systems (Nakanishi, 2009, p. 1170). Eventually the free Advanced 
Traveler Information Systems (ATIS/V) for vehicles evolved, supported by the public 
sector providing traffic data using three media channels: radio wave beacon, infrared 
signals, and FM multiplex broadcasting to vehicles using the VICS. The ATIS being 
based on the VICS service started in 1996 in the Tokyo area and covered the entire 
nation by 2003. This onboard navigation service was universally accessible and free, 
the only condition being that the users had to pay a one-time setup fee for installation 
of a VICS compatible on-board devices (includes price of device and royalty).  
 ATIS/V sought to deliver data that was collected (through VICS) directly to the 
travelers in real-time, empowering them to make better choices about routes and 
modes of transportation, in order to increase safety, time savings, and stress free. 
When archived, this historical data provides a mine of information to transportation 
planners with accurate travel pattern information, optimizing the transportation 
planning process (Intelligent Transportation Society of America, cited in Sugawara 
2007, 13). ATIS provides travelers with traffic and transit conditions, presenting 
multimodal options at the right time to improve the quality and convenience of their 
trip and the overall performance of the transportation system. In Japan, 20%  and 30%  
of vehicles with VICS system were expected to reduce traffic congestion by 10%  in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area and 6%  in Japan, respectively (Sugawara, 2007, p. 16). ITS is 
expected to be a solution to problems caused by transportation such as congestion, 
accidents, economic analysis and environmental emissions and to be a strong incentive 
to encourage economic growth.  
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 In 1999 one World Bank Study summed up Japan’s transport system as 
complex but advanced system of road and rail networks totaling more than 1 million 
kilometers and 23.000 kilometers, respectively. The total road length includes about 
12.000 kilometers of high-standard trunk roads (mostly toll roads), and more than 700 
kilometers of tolled urban expressways. The country's rail system includes extensive 
urban commuter railways, as well as a 2000 kilometers network of high-speed 
Shinkansen (bullet train) network. The highway system as of 1995, while competing 
with the railway network to transport customers, handles about 66%  of all passenger 
trips in terms of passenger-kilometers and 53%  of all land-based freight traffic in 
terms of ton-kilometers (Imamura, 2002, p. 138). As this study illuminates the rapid 
pace in which the highway network developed in Japan, it did not heavily depend on 
government subsidies but primarily relied on its own operating revenues through toll 
collection.  
 To address the government’s perceived need to rapidly develop a necessitated 
national road network, in 1952 the government revised the Road Law (Doroho), which 
was the main regulation for road policy, and set up a system for constructing the 
highway network.  Furthermore, the national government enacted new laws such as 
the Road Improvement Special Law (Doro Seibi Tokubetsu Sochiho) and the Special 
Road Improvement Accounting Law (Tokutei Doro Seibi Jigyo Tokubetsu Kaikeho) in 
order to borrow money from postal savings because the national government’s general 
account was insufficient to finance construction of a road network.  The enactment of 
these laws saw a shift in road policy from the traditional view that roads should be free, 
to the idea that tolls should be imposed to support the maintenance and expansion of 
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the road network (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2006, p. 1).  Between 1952 and 1956, highways 
as portions of a toll road system were constructed in 8 places by the national 
government and in 27 places by local governments.  
 Such activity spurred further construction, but progress was not without 
problems, such as difficulties among governments in coordinating administration as 
well as in financing the highways.  This led to a need for a central organization, which 
would systematically construct a highway network.  As a result, the Japan Highway 
Public Corporation Law (Nihon Doro Kodanho) was approved in March 1956, and the 
Japan Highway Public Corporation was established a month later. With the three 
alternatives of management and operation for the JHPC ranging from 
(i) An entirely public corporation (Kosha), these firms run as a corporation on 
market principles, with typical examples including the former Japan 
National Railways (now the JR companies) and the Nippon Telephone 
and Telegram (now NTT). 
(ii) A special company (Tokushu Kaisya), is a joint stock company type invested 
in by the government, where it is more commercial oriented but there 
is a public purpose.   An example of this type is Electric Power 
Development Company. 
(iii) And finally the non-commercialized public corporation (Kodan), while the 
non-commercialized public corporation has a more public purpose, the 
organization is separated from the governmental body in order to 
acquire managerial independence or financial self-support.  Japan 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation is an example of this 
type. 
The Japan Highway Public Corporation, a special corporation with 100% 
national government investment, was established as a non-commercialized public 
corporation as there were uncertainties as to what managerial role the government 
should play. Eventually the Diet deciding on the plan and construction of a highway 
network decided for more governmental intervention, deciding on a non-
commercialized public corporation with a condition that it would be financially self-
supporting and eventually using private investment too.   
Part of the past success in the transformation of the Japanese economy has also 
been the highly effective central government organization in promoting planning 
studies and ensuring the implementation of projects. Another important lesson from 
the lost legend of the JHPC was that it complemented the overall economic situation 
during the high growth period the explosive expansion of traffic strongly supported the 
toll pooling system and the redemption principle with certain level of discipline. At the 
same time the growing demand and appetite for production of motorized vehicles at 
home and mass export would have brought over confidence to the planners in 
developing extravagant projects without really being able to forecast accurately. 
However, in the period of low growth in the maturing economy, the financial structure 
should have ideally been reorganized, reforming the basic function of organizations 
such as JHPC from construction to operation and maintenance. But it also needs to be 
kept in mind that the peak of JHPC operations started in the latter half of the 1950s 
and early1960s, way before the era of privatization, PFI, PPP, and others, and thus it 
may be difficult to draw lessons directly in terms of applicability developing economies 
now.  Nonetheless, objective assessment of its performance does provide valuable 
insights. 
 Ever since 1956 when the Japan Highway Public Corporation was instituted it 
remained crucial in expediting construction of a nation-wide expressway network, until 
October 2005 when it was privatized and separated into three expressway companies. 
The system was built intending tolls to be scrapped and highway services offered for 
free once the construction debts could be repaid.  Although expressway tolls were 
collected respective to their individual routes, once the decision was made to pool them 
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in within the same budget and use it for the construction of other routes, although it 
was based on the concept of equity in the longer run it could not sustain itself.  The 
JHPC and the other three other public corporations were privatized as well to form the 
six highways related companies that were became delinked from the extensive debts 
the JHPC had accumulated. Although the government still had held 1/3 shares of these 
companies, they were expected to bring efficiency, cost-saving, and profitability back 
into the management of highways, in order to repay the debts of national highways 
over the next 45 years, that already reached a prodigious 40 trillion yen. 
 
Table 6.12 Chronology of Japanese Highway Development Legislations and 
Regulatory Bodies 
Year Legislation / Development 
1956 Japan Highway Public Corporation Law enacted, established to manage the construction of pay-
per-use roads. 
1957 National Development Longitudinal Expressway Construction Law – National Expressway Law 
Enacted 
1959 Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation Law enacted 
1962 Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation Law enacted 
1963 Meishin Expressway was the first to open, in 1963, running 71 km between Ritto, Shiga 
Prefecture, and Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture. 
1966 The National Development Longitudinal Expressway Construction Law was revised to 
incorporate plans for a 7,600-km nationwide network 
1970 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority Law enacted 
Establishment of corporations started in the same year. Up to present, 42 corporations have been 
established. 
1972 Nationwide toll pool system implemented instead of redemption of individual roads, and tolls 
would be pooled from all expressways to provide a single source of operating funds. 
1987 National Development Arterial Expressway Construction Law revised, and Japanese government 
approved expanding the network to 11,520 km 
2003 Law Concerning Urgent Special Measures to be taken in FY2003 to Reduce the Debt Burden of 
the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority enacted 
Law Concerning Partial Revision of the National Expressway Law and the Special Measure Law 
for Development of Okinawa enacted 
2004 Four laws concerning the privatization of the four major highway construction corporations 
enacted 
2005 Six expressway companies and Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Organization 
established  
JHPC was privatized and spun off into West Nippon Expressway Co., East Nippon Expressway 
Co. and Central Nippon Expressway Co. as part of reforms spearheaded by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi. As public-run entities, the four predecessor firms had rung up about ¥40 
trillion in debt through never-ending road construction projects. The Koizumi administration 
sought to end such excesses.  
JHPC privatized, the privatization law required the firm to pay off all its debts within 45 years.   
Source: Compiled by the Author, from relevant websites; JEHDR, Ministry of Land Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, Ministry of Finance, Japan Times 
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 The financing success of the JHPC could also be attributed to the 
macroeconomic conditions that existed in postwar Japan and the successful 
intermediation of the FILP in funding public corporations. These conditions ranged 
from the high savings rate in the household sector and private sector, the ubiquity of 
post offices (24,574 branches of Japan Post as of the end of fiscal 2006 ) and products of 
postal savings assets, independent setting of interest rates, and the effective 
intermediation through the FILP into government spending (although there was no 
bond, securities, pension and insurance markets). Another important aspect of the 
effective financing included the absence of a huge deficit in the government budget; in 
fact on the contrary Japan had healthy government finances from the 1950s to 1970s. 
 According to Kaneko and Metoki (2008) the policy lessons where a fiscal policy 
method that are similar to Japan’s postal savings system and FILP could contribute to 
the national development in other countries:  
(i) The first and most important condition is the high saving rate in the 
private sector. The FILP before 2001 was not a system for creating 
savings but a system of channeling them. 
(ii) Secondly, an appropriate network infrastructure is indispensable to 
collect deposits from the ordinary citizens; financial inclusion 
(iii) Government deficits should be small enough not to absorb the private 
savings to finance the deficits. Or fiscal discipline is to be kept in a 
way that strictly separating the general account budget and the 
special account budget of accumulating the people’s savings and 
investing in appropriate programs for national developments. 
With 2001 being the watershed year in terms of bringing the Post war system 
into shambles, as the both the FILP and JHPC were brought to terms as they were 
going to scrapped and privatized respectively. It remains unclear as to how Japan 
would move from a system of mass, rapid financing and development of infrastructure 
services to improving efficiency, maintaining demand and paying back debts. 
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The Japanese experience with highway development and financing is used as a case 
study as it assists in drawing invaluable lessons in public financing and evidence-based 
policymaking (EBP). Japan had rapidly developed its network of highways and 
expressways through a public corporation - Japan Highway Public Corporation (JHPC), 
and using tolls and public finance (including FILP). In the 20 years from the mid 
1960’s, the network was expanded based on highway development legislations, 
principles of equal access, various forms of cross subsidization (including spatial and 
temporal), cost-recovery through user-charges, and toll pooling. These various 
principles, although they allowed for the rapid development of equitably accessible 
highway network, ended up with a huge public debt equaling over Yen 40 trillion in 
2006. The JHPC was further privatized and horizontally and vertically unbundled, 
with a main independent debt recovery Agency (Japan Expressway Holding and Debt 
Repayment Agency – JEHDR) and other management companies that operate on 
leased assets. The mammoth burden of this Agency and the management companies is 
to recover the debt accumulated over the last 45 years, over the course of the next 45 
years. This experience provides a valuable lesson in efficient public financing and the 
establishment of effective institutional and legislative arrangements that fulfill the 
goals of rapid expressway and highway networks. But just developing such public 
assets is not enough: sustainable use of assets and operating on business management 
principles and project finance are equally important in avoiding the accumulation of 
large debts. Analyzing these issues and the principles that led to effective policies and 
institutions on the one hand, and public finance mismanagement on the other, provides 
valuable lessons for public choice in effectively providing and financing infrastructure.  
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As this study sought to comprehend unbundling infrastructure services when 
complemented with financial system development, it could allow new opportunities for   
public-private cooperation in providing more efficient and effective funding 
infrastructure services that were in the public domain (refer to Figure 7.1) as a 
summary of results from this research). According to this study the NHAI is still short 
term oriented, looking ahead at only the next 15-20 years (where debt repayment 
should complete by 2030 for the seven different phases of NHAI). There is an urgent 
need to incorporate a principle-oriented development and financing of this crucial 
infrastructure, whereby in the long term the social and spatial cross-subsidization has 
to give way to sustainability; and to look at the viability of developing a better cost 
recovery system through user charges, according to the increase in traffic volume of 
specific routes. Although the fuel tax/cess revenue is growing, and all the annuity 
payments would be repayed by 2030, increasing the cess (as the government plans) to 
finance highways would not be a wise decision considering the fact that there could be 
a duplicating of charges, as Highway users would be double charged through the oil 
surcharge and user charge while using the facility. Public Choice also logically points 
out to growing corruption, where the government (principal) would succumb to 
economically powerful interest groups (construction companies and lobbies), and not 
effectively regulate the sector (refer to Figure 7.2 for summary of analysis).  
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Figure 7.1 Reform in Institutional, Regulatory Arrangements and Public 
Financing of National Financing of National Highway Financing in India 
 
Source: Author’s Analysis 
Institutional and Regulatory Arrangement 
Financing Domain (Public / Private)  
‘New-Style’ Regulation - Separate regulatory 
entity with independent decision making 
authority: Committee on Infrastructure (COI) 
and Ministry of Roads, Transport and Highway 
(MoRTH), Planning Commission oversees and 
set Highway Development Targets separate from 
Road development Targets 
Creation of NHAI is in charge of National 
Highways Development Plan 
Private companies and developers construct 
Highways through Concession Contracts (BOT 
Tolls or Annuity) or EPC and Competitive 
Bidding 
‘Old-Style’ Regulation - Government 
ownership and line ministry: Ministry of 
Shipping  - Road Plan (Highways part of 
Roads) 
Central Government part of general 
government expenditure, and transfers 
Road and highway budget allocations to 
State government 
The State governments then transfers the 
allocated money to the Public Works 
Department that then builds the highways 
and minimum money is allocated for 
maintenance 
Government borrows from International 
Lenders, sets up Central Road Fund and 
Viability Gap Funding organizations that is used 
to develop National Highways 
Amends laws to allow direct road pricing/tolls, 
concession contracts with private sector 
developers, and private sector financing 
Finance Commission Transfers Budget 
allocation to State Governments 
Roads and Highways built by State Public 
Works Department and Highway Department 
Tolled highways (BOT), Annuity (BOT) 
highways slowly moving towards cost-recovery 
using user-charges based on project financing 
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Figure 7.2 The Current Status and Future Concerns of National Highways 
Financing in India 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
The long-term plan would surely need to look at toll receipts, payouts of 
annuities, and cess. Where India in fact already has one of the lowest costs of transport 
in the world, increasing tolls would definitely need to be considered over time. 
Although there were plans to increase toll a few times, considering the thin profits that 
the trucking sector operates on, they were postponed. There is already a growing 
discontent (especially in the trucking community) about the duplicity of events as  
commuters pay cess for road development and on top of that they pay tolls for the 
section of national highway used.  In fact, where many countries turned to private toll 
roads to generate additional revenues for roads it should be remembered that tolls can 
only be economically viable and collected on roads carrying relatively high volumes of 
traffic. As the International Road Federation (1996) suggests, the broad rule of thumb 
is that, with a 20-year cost-recovery period and a toll of US$0.03 to US$0.06 per vehicle 
km for light vehicles, there are at least 15,000 vehicles per day (vpd) required to cover 
all costs.  This could also be used to cover rehabilitation, operation and maintenance 
costs only with 6,500 vpd, maintenance costs only with 3,500 vpd, and toll collection 
costs only with 1,500 vpd.   
The pressure on the road and highway budget is caused by four main factors: (i) 
government budgets are under increasing pressure from demands by other sectors 
(education, health and social security being the main contenders); (ii) tax payers are 
unwilling to tolerate continual increases in tax rates; (iii) maintenance spending can 
always be deferred with little visible short-term impact; and (iv) road spending ! 
particularly when support for local government roads is included ! has become so 
enormous that it can no longer be fully financed through the government’s budget. The 
above shortage of budgetary resources caused many road agencies to turn towards tolls 
(Heggie, 1999., p. 91). However, a tolled full-standard expressway link will generally 
only cover all costs when: (i) traffic volumes are at least 10,000 to 15,000 vehicles per 
day (vpd) and growing; (ii) average toll rates for private vehicles are $0.03 to $0.06 per 
km; and (iii) the cost recovery period is 20/30 years (International Road Federation, 
1996). At volumes of around 5,000 to 6,000 vpd, revenues will usually cover operation 
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Focus is incorporating self-
sustaining the financing of 
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unbundling More efficient 
cost recovery systems 
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run 
Project financing 
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Allocating finance for 
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Current Status 
Focus is network 
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uninterrupted supply of 
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Cross Subsidization 
(Temporal, spatial, Social) 
Public Funding Support 
(Debt, Ear-marked funds, 
borrowings) 
Inherent danger: how long 
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than one contract period 
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and maintenance, and may make some contribution to initial construction costs on new 
roads, or rehabilitation and upgrading costs on existing roads. The balance of the 
finance has to come from the road budget. Toll roads can therefore play an important 
role as a mechanism for financing high volume roads, but these roads only account for 
between 5 and 20 percent of the trunk road network and 1 and 2 percent of the overall 
road network. 
To sum up, although improved utilization of the road budget and introducing 
tolls − whether through public toll roads or private sector concessions − generates some 
extra revenues,  they will still not eliminate the financing gap in most countries. As the 
budget revenues allocated for roads plausibly remain much below requirements, the 
government has to find other ways to obtain the needed funds.  Creating the highway 
network infrastructure, however, is so important that the investments required are 
also too large to continue being financed through annual budget allocations, compelling 
countries like India to set up the Central Road Fund that has been used largely for 
financing highways. This study has sought to outline the alternatives the state has in 
finding sources to fill the gap in funding. There is an enormous opportunity in shifting 
Highway financing policy towards a market oriented mechanism, on a user-charges or 
fee-for-service basis, or allowing specialized public financing institutions, or where the 
private sector can raise the funds in the financial market to – once the sector develops. 
As Figure 7.2 suggests the infrastructure unbundling activities, through better 
regulation coupled with an expanding financial system, provide more opportunities to 
the public sector in funding the viability gap that exists in infrastructure services 
requiring heavy investment, such as  the highway. The country has still got a long way 
to go to implement an efficient cost-recovery system through user-charges as that 
would sometimes require higher toll rates that would in turn be politically sensitive. 
The financial system also has a long way to go to support the private sector companies 
that would want to raise long-term funds to finance their short-term construction and 
highway development projects. 
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Table 7.1 Provision and Financing Needs of NH Stretches by Nature of Contracts 
Contract 
Type 
Nature or Contract Improving Funding 
Mechanisms and PSP 
BOT - 
Toll 
Competitively bid Concession 
Contracts: Private sector 
raises its own funds to fund 
the project through equity, 
debt and VGF. Private 
Provider recovers cost 
through tolling (price capped) 
and returns assets back to 
the public sector after 
concession period (20 – 30 
years). Concessionaire 
assumes traffic risks and cost 
recovery of project. 
Private Sector (Construction 
Company raises its own 
funds through debt/equity 
mix) 
VGF of 20% 
More quality viability and 
traffic-growth studies. 
Eventual setting up of 
expressways, viable stretches 
with better quality roads would 
require project financing, and 
price caps to become stratified. 
Large investments with long 
gestation would necessitate 
better funding (long term 
instruments as opposed to 
financing), through corporate 
bonds, (setting up bond market 
and secondary market), mutual 
funds, and so on, or 
Infrastructure funding public 
sector intermediaries. 
BOT -
Annuity 
Competitively bid Concession 
Contracts: Private sector 
constructs and funds projects 
on the assumption that the 
public sector repays over 
prescribed period through 
annuities. Government 
assumes traffic risk and only 
sets standards for service 
provision. 
Private Sector (Construction 
Company raises its own 
funds through debt/equity 
mix) 
VGF of 20% 
Improved traffic studies could 
allow private provision through 
BOT- Toll 
Chances for moral hazards as 
firms will only maintain 
minimum service standards as 
they are guaranteed annuity 
payments. 
More long-term funds would be 
required, government could 
think of longer term Highway 
bonds, or bonds raised through 
Infrastructure funding public 
sector intermediaries. 
Would also require better 
regulatory and supervisory 
control of NHAI to assess risks 
adequately 
 
Market: 
Private 
Financing 
Public 
Provision 
EPC 
Contracts 
Public Sector contracts out 
EPC using competitive bids 
and can also contract out 
O&M for the life of the 
Highway, but assumes all 
risks in recovering cost 
including traffic risks 
Author assumes that chances 
of political interference is 
high in determining stretches 
Uses it own funding – author 
presumes MDB Loans, 
earmarked / cess funds and 
recovers cost using toll-charges. 
Buts still requires justification 
as to which stretches are to be 
built and their profitability; 
though obviously initial 
network development is 
justifiable. 
Source: Author’s Analysis 
 
 The NHAI has only recently come to a position where it now intends to borrow 
over Rs 40 Billion during this financial year (2010-11) through insurance companies, 
banks and financial institutions. Recently the NHAI has been able to raise about Rs 25 
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Billion through Highway Bonds (54 EC tax exemption bonds). This is all because the 
MoRTH and the NHAI have become more aggressive in hastening Highway 
development where the plan is to build 35,000km of roads in five years, with an 
ambitious target of building 20km of road each day. This would require a huge amount 
of funds and the investments required for the next five years is expected to reach 
US$ 60 Billion, of which US$ 40 Billion was expected to come from foreign players. 
This plan is now expected to reach Rs 2 Trillion for financing its various highway 
projects by March 2031, being financed by both domestic as well as foreign sources, 
through the PPP model (http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/ July 7, 2010, 
accessed the same day). These are huge investment requirements, compared to what 
the government receives annually through cess revenues (Rs 80 Billion) and toll 
revenues (Rs 20 Billion). The World Bank is now suggesting that in annuity projects, 
the NHAI should offer cash-support of 20-40 per cent of the estimated cost to private 
road developers during construction period, so that there would be more private sectors 
able to fund the viability gap, instead of paying the entire amount as fixed annual fees. 
As Table 7.1 suggests, depending on the nature of the stretch different PPP contracts 
are being used, but a lot has to be done from the public sector side to promote more 
private sector participation.  
The way forward for governments is to set aside the traditional idea that they 
are the only ones in charge of infrastructure development and investments. The basic 
nature of infrastructure to be provided in networks in India, including the National 
Highways system, requires that the focus is on improving the capacities to act in 
networks. They are thus faced with a new, more challenging role: as the manager of 
investment programs of a variety of parties (Teisman, 2008, p. 339). Infrastructure has 
become part of a large and complex system of elements in which the integration of 
different road systems, and the subsequent integration of these road systems with 
other means of transport, has become an important issue. Furthermore, the integration 
of infrastructure hardware and ICT systems has emerged as an important part of new 
investment strategies. If this process of multiple systems integration goes ahead, 
effective infrastructure investments can only be generated by the joint efforts of a 
variety of parties, not only within the government system but also beyond the 
boundaries of the public and private domains. 
Figure 7.3 Infrastructure Investments on the Edge of Public and Private Domains 
 
Source: Teisman, 2008, p. 339 
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If investment decisions and operational decisions of any of the parties 
responsible for parts of the system affect the functioning of the whole system of 
transport, there is a greater incentive to match and attune decisions to achieve synergy. 
In this line of thinking a sharp division between public and private domains prevents 
parties from more effective infrastructure investment strategies. In the private sector 
joint efforts in network configuration and chains of production are already well 
developed. Network management and alliance management are normal elements of 
investment strategies (2008, 336). The performance of one single organization in a 
network or an inadequate relationship between two organizations in the network or 
chain can have a significantly negative impact on the output of the network as a whole. 
Network management entails the spotting of these problem areas and dealing with 
them. Governing in networks means bringing together and maintaining a set of specific 
abilities and skills for a long period of time. Dealing with (information) asymmetries in 
the network and differences in cultures will become an important part of investment 
program strategies, as is already the case with large multinational companies. There is 
a growing role of the government to act as a network convener, in order to master the 
challenges in governing by networks: aligning goals, providing oversight, averting 
communication melt-down, co-ordinating multiple partners, managing the tensions 
between competition and collaboration, and overcoming data deficits and capacity 
shortage (2008, 340). 
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This research goes further than previous works to build a correlation between 
infrastructure and the financial system, leading to a shift in public-private domain. 
First we look at the case in India to provide the normative analysis by outlining the 
developments in regulations and institutions in the financial system, to lead to better 
financial intermediation, that is a move from public borrowing, bank based, repressed 
economy into developing functioning capital markets; and in the future further reforms 
to develop more long-term funding-oriented instruments (bond market - currently 
centered on short term government bonds, insurance and pension market development). 
We review the developments in the infrastructure sectors and arrangements made for 
financing: ear marked funds; cess/fuel tax; SPV’s, such as the India Infrastructure 
Finance Corporation Limited; private sector financing; regulations; user charges; tolls. 
Most of the revenues of JHPC came from tolls, how efficiency was brought the 
financing structure, based on the principle of recovering cost through user charges. 
During the arterial network formation, full-repayment principles and price-cap 
regulations, borrowings from multi-lateral development banks, and later FILP 
investments, allowed for the steady flow of funds. But the eventual privatization of the 
JHPC suggests that the change in legislation in the 1980’s, allowing for spatial cross-
subsidization and pooling of tolls, induced insurmountable debts to accumulate since 
the late 1980s. The cost structure of the JHPC over the 1990’s saw the plummeting of 
non-road services’ costs (that is debt repayment), which led to the eventual 
privatization of the JHPC in 2005. With the privatization the JEHDR through 
horizontal unbundling (that is setting up of regional highway management companies) 
is responsible for the repayment of over 40 trillion yen by 2050. As most of this 
repayment is interest-bearing, the issue is how these firms will be able to spend on 
maintenance and replenish aging and technologically aging stock of highway assets, 
while at the same time making the business profitable. 
In Japan most of the funding for the National Highway development initially 
came from borrowing from the multilateral development banks , and later mostly from 
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the specialized funding agencies through the FILP (including FILP guaranteed 
highway bonds) and through user charges. While in India, after the NHAI was set up, 
financing of the NHDP since the late 1990s came mainly through the cess fund (fuel 
tax through the Central Road Fund), and initially borrowing from multilateral lending 
agencies (World Bank, ADBI, JBIC), private sector financing, and to a small extent 
through tolls (through BOT –Toll and BOT – Annuity projects). Although the future 
funding mechanism is unclear, major steps have been taken to allow the private sector 
to participate. But the author proposes that in order to adequately address the supply 
side constraints, the demand side has to be more precisely assessed through traffic 
volume analysis and forecasting through vehicle ownership and Origin-Destination 
surveys. Once demand is recognized and revealed, it would be much easier for the 
government to garner private sector interest through PPP contracts. Although efforts 
are being made to provide viability gap funding during the initial investment period, 
unless the financial system is well developed, the private sector cannot obtain the scale 
of funds necessary. Corporate bonds, Highway bonds, domestic institutional investors, 
securitization and similar instruments would be required to sufficiently intermediate 
the funding requirements of the construction firms. The general development in 
highway infrastructure regulations is outlined in Japan and India is outlined in Figure 
7.4. Although the timing of establishing the highway laws started around the same 
time in mid-1950s, Japan was very quick in setting up the JHPC and building the 
expressways. Japan’s first major highway was ready by 1963, and consecutively it 
began to develop its arterial expressway plan and construction. Meanwhile, India was 
concentrating on developing its 20-year road plans, and whereas roads network 
expanded tremendously (as they were also part of job-generation programs), highways 
were ignored. It was not until the late 1980s that India started taking up developing 
its arterial highway network seriously, by setting up a highway development and 
regulatory authority. It took another 10 years, after many studies proved that building 
an expansive highway network was urgent, and in order to provide steady flow of funds 
the Central Road Fund was set up in 2000.  
While over the last 50 years Japan rapidly and successfully expanded its 
highway development, the Indian NHDP is still yet to reach peak investment and 
completion of the different phases. The main issues as in Japan would be issues of 
cross-subsidization through price-cap regulations and toll-pooling, and over-reliance on 
the ever-expanding fuel taxes. These funding mechanisms and principles could 
eventually also allow for debts to become part of the system, through over-investment 
in assets, and demand forecasting errors in another 15 to 20 years. This analysis 
exhibits a similar pattern in the phases of national highway development between 
Japan and India, as depicted in Figure 7.5. The process began with the initial vertical 
unbundling of highway infrastructure services for network formation, through setting 
up of a highway public corporation (as in Japan) or highway authority (as in India), 
and guaranteeing a steady flow of funds through specialized funding agencies such as 
FILP in Japan and CRF in India. This initial regulations period, ranging between 5-10 
years, was followed by the actual development of the highways that took around 30 
years. In this regard, Japan served as a good case study as it is in its post-development 
phase, where its experience provides evidence as to what principles are applicable in 
the short run and others that present inherent dangers in the long run. As Japan’s 
case suggests, universal access to public provision of services of general interest and 
the nationwide uniform fare was also responsible for the widening and unequal cost 
burdens, since it did not reflect the regional cost difference. With India still in its early 
phase of highway development that is to completed by 2030, given the time available 
there are a lot of adjustments to be made to achieve more allocative efficiency and 
financial independence in order to allow for a shift in the public-private domain in 
highway infrastructure financing.  
This research suggests that once vertical unbundling takes place and the 
network infrastructure service is developed, inefficiency and cross-subsidization 
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eventually necessitates horizontal unbundling. This was the case in Japan earlier with 
Japan National Railways in 1987, and it was not until 2005 that the JHPC was 
privatized. The privatization of the highway public corporation led to the creation of a 
debt repayment agency and six regional management companies. With the previous 
experience of dealing with the national railways, the government saw that the 
geographical division and creation of regional management companies was best suited 
to manage the regional distribution of demand. Although it has only been five years 
since privatization, the author presumes that elements of yardstick competition are 
being introduced. Under these circumstances the goal is to engage the regional 
companies to achieve profitability by competing with each other, and eventually 
contribute to the repayment of debts. As eventually horizontal unbundling becomes the 
next phase of infrastructure network management, it still remains to be seen how 
India will start preparing for that phase without invoking political controversies. Given 
the phases outlined through this study, the principles of complete-cost recovery to 
ensure financial independence, and reducing the dependence on fuel tax (as it has 
already been proven to be a case of double taxation) and user-charges closer to cost-
recovery would need to be considered.  
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Figure 7.4 Comparative Highway Regulations - Timeline (India – Japan) 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by the Author             Note: Timeline 
not to scale 
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Figure 7.5 Phases in Highway Network Development: Based on Indian – Japan Case Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by the Author             Note: Timeline 
not to scale 
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From the analysis from the previous sections, it is appropriate to concur that all 
though the correlation between the financial sector intermediation and infrastructure 
unbundling (that is between public-private domain) is not strong, when implemented 
in parallel can make a large impact on economic growth. Figure 7.6 suggests the 
general variables that would need to be considered when trying to understand the 
relations between these two sectors. This study identifies key indicators both in the 
infrastructure regulation dimension and the financial sector intermediation 
dimension (refer to Figure 7.7 The Public Choice Framework in Infrastructure and 
Financial Sector Regulation 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
Figure 7.8) that could be used to develop a composite index, given the availability of 
more precise data. This could be used to profile the infrastructure provision and the level of 
financial intermediation in any given economy. The way in which these two dimensions 
relate within the public choice framework is detailed in Figure 7.7; it also reveals how the 
infrastructure sector and the financial system relate to each other in the larger political 
economy, and in particular to the highway and road sub-sector. This analysis has profiled 
these to dimensions for the national highway financing in India (Figure 7.9) and Japan 
(Figure 7.10) before and after the reforms in the highway sector under their respective 
financial structures. Further the two dimensions are then integrated to understand their 
interrelationship as unbundling takes place, as displayed in Figure 7.11 for vertical 
unbundling in India (since late 1980s) and Figure 7.12 for the horizontal unbundling in 
Japan (since mid-2000s).  
The shift in highway infrastructure regulation has been profiled in all these figures, 
and the data from Table 7.2 is used to profile the changes in financial system over time. 
Given the availability of more data for these two dimensions based on the indicators 
proposed would provide a more detailed knowledge of shifts in these two sectors, and 
reconfirm the assumptions of this study (regarding the interrelationship between these two 
dimensions). It can be seen that the gradual financial system deepening and widening in the 
case is only complemented by infrastructure reforms that has allowed more private sector 
participation, while most control has been central. India has quite rapidly widened its 
market, all though long term funding that is bond lending is still small, and dominated by 
the government sector. Highway service provision still is centrally planned, designed and 
owned, PPP’s have been allowed to develop and maintain assets. But in Japan’s case where 
financial intermediation has been well developed with bond and bank markets lending at 
more that 200% of GDP, only suggest that funding through the market would not have been 
much of a problem. But infrastructure provision has moved from centralized, national 
institutions to more regionally managed and regional provision, in the Japanese case. But it 
is crucial that all these processes must be gradual, so as to not bring in economic and 
financial imbalances that contribute to public sector’s rold in balancing efficiency and equity. 
Table 7.2 was used to calculate the bond market size over time for the two countries 
between 1990 and 2009. The data used is only to provide the general view in order to 
understand the size of the financial markets and the way infrastructure can be managed. 
Eventually as indicator based on the ones identified below, could contribute to assessing 
more accurately which levels of financial intermediation through the various instruments 
could contributing to funding infrastructure needs, and across the infrastructure sectors. 
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Financial intermediation indicators could be more precisely developed, say for example the 
size of highway bonds annually issued and outstanding, construction company corporate 
bond size, highway toll securitization data, just to name a few, are beneficial in looking at 
how well infrastructure is being financed through the financial market. This could also 
extend to address the way in which governments fund network infrastructure, and how 
reliant they are on public funds (for example transport and fuel taxes), financial system 
instruments (for example bonds), and cost-recovery funds (for example tolls). This could be 
used to eventually evaluate the financial independence of the related authorities, in the 
relevant sectors so that political interference or public funding (to not affect tax payers) could 
be reduced. 
In terms of financial intermediation, well-developed and functioning financial 
markets support the expansion of infrastructure investment, apart from ensuring that there 
is efficiency in savings-borrowings intermediation associated with information asymmetries 
and ensuring the stability of the political economy. It is crucial to therefore set policies that 
help to foster macroeconomic stability (fiscal management), allow access to financial services 
(financial deepening) and the development of financial markets (intermediation and 
achieving allocative efficiency) (OECD 2006, p. 206). Kaur, G., Lakshmanan, L, Rajesh, R., 
Kumar, N. (2010) identify three types of financing that has been used for financing 
infrastructure although they can be spread across bond markets, internal funds, equity and 
debt, bank loans, grants, government budgets, and development financial institutions: 
• Public finance: government’s provide equity financing through (especially initial 
investments) general budget reserve, earmarked reserves, self-raised funds (e.g. 
divestitures, lincensing fee, and sale, rental or leasing of government assets), and 
inter governmental grants and fiscal transfers. This also includes borrowing from 
international lending agencies, as the government guarantees the public debt 
financing either explicitly or implicitly. 
• Debt financing in the public financing system is through policy loans at concessional 
rates, supplier credits and fixed income securities in the form of tax-secured bonds 
and revenue bonds secured by project-related revenue streams  
• Corporate finance – includes corporate financing through equity financing (from 
retained earnings and shareholders’ equity). Debt financing through commercial 
bank borrowing, subordinated debt  (including convertible debentures and preferred 
stocks, privately placed borrowings, and issuance of fixed income securities.  
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Figure 7.6 The Relation Between Infrastructure and Financial Development: India’s Case in General 
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Figure 7.7 The Public Choice Framework in Infrastructure and Financial Sector 
Regulation 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
 
 
 
Citizens, are also the users, who pay user charges to access infrastructure 
services. They also exercise their right to choose how infrastructure services 
are to be provided, and compel the government to be efficient in allocation. 
Customers fear that firms will use their market power to overcharge, and 
need to be protected by exercising their choice in the political economy. 
Government gradually exits from provider infrastructure services, so that 
it can more easily allow genuine competition, and ensure laws and 
regulations are in place to protect the rights of borrowers and creditors and 
to ensure these rights are adequately balanced. 
In the highway and road sector the challenges relate to planning 
appropriate network expansion, executing the required investment and 
maintenance, and working out how best to pay for it. 
Creation of independent regulatory 
agencies can be viewed as an 
attempt to reconcile the partly 
competing demands for investor 
protection and public legitimacy.  
In the case of highway and roads a 
highway agency or regulator 
decides on the allocation of funds 
and contracts work to private firms. 
Well-developed and 
functioning financial markets 
support the expansion of 
infrastructure investment, 
and play a pivotal role for the 
investment environment. 
Apart from setting up 
policies to foster 
macroeconomic stability, 
improve access to financial 
services and developing 
financial markets. 
Eventually infrastructure is 
financed using a mixture of 
Public, Debt and Corporate 
Financing 
Private participation provides an 
alternative source of financing, 
although they do not pay for the 
services. Firms enter into credible 
commitments (quality and price) 
with the regulator to allow prices to 
cover costs, as they fear that 
governments will use its regulatory 
power to prevent them from 
covering their costs. 
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Figure 7.8 Developing a Composite Index for a Two Dimensional Model Based on 
Infrastructure Provision and Financial Intermediation 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
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Figure 7.9 Profiling the Indian National Highway Regulation and Financial 
Sector Development Based on the Two Dimensional Model 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
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Figure 7.10 Profiling the Japanese National Highway Regulation and Financial 
Sector Development Based on the Two Dimensional Model 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
!"#$%#$&%'()*+$ ,-$(.)/*0 !.12*)*1$
!"#$%&'(#()*+$%,-(. /()*+$%,-(.&0$*,")$% !"#$%&'(#()*+$%,-(.
/()*+$%,-(.&0$*,")$% /()*+$%,-(.&0$*,")$% /()*+$%,-(.&0$*,")$%
3#45.(%16%75$&*$+ 8#.9:#.;(&%75$&*$+
75$&*$+%4/.15+/%
<#0*4#"%=(>5.*4?%
:#.;(4)@%
A$)4*454*1$#"%
A$2()41.)%
<1)49.(>12(.?%
B/.15+/%C)(.%
</#.+()%DB1"")E
123%,#45,)$)#,)64748()(+$%492.6(*452).:4;<+"26<4;$=(:>49"++"?,)6:>4@A(#,$%412+A":(4B(<,#%(:4CD)E+$:*+2#*2+(4B,$3,%,*F45,)$)#,)64/"+A"+$*,"):G
F#0#$()(%<#)(%C$4*"%:*&%GHHH)
H$+4I$+J(.452).,)6>49"++"?,)6:>49$)J49"++"?,)6:4$).45,)$)#,)64*<+"26<4/$A,*$%4I$+J(*:
I.1-4/%*$%J1$&%:#.;(4)%#$&%
'1K()4*>%A$)4*454*1$#"%A$2()41.)
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
F#0#$L)%<#)(%=*$>(%:*&%GHHH)
'(2("10K($4%16%<#0*4#"%:#.;(4)M%
:#.;(4%<#0*4#"*N#4*1$%I.1-4/
8O>())*2(%P("*#$>(%1$%J#$;)%
P(0.())(&%7*$#$>*#"%=?)4(K F#0#$L)%<#)(%C$4*"%:*&%GHHH)
Q?R.*&%<1$4.#>4)S%7.#$>/*)()@%T(#)(%
#$&%,0(.#4*1$%D'*)>.(4*1$#.?%
<1$4.#>4)E
!5R"*>%8$4(.0.*)(%9%A$4(+.#4(&%=4#4(9
1-$(&%:1$101"?
!5R"*>%!.12*)*1$
F#0#$L)%7*$#$>*#"%=?)4(K%'(2("10K($4%*$%4/(%<1$4(O4%16%Q*+/-#?%A$6.#)4.5>45.(
Q*+/-#?%A$6.#)4.5>45.(%P(+5"#4*1$%*$%F#0#$%
'(+.((%16%!.*2#4*N#4*1$
!.*2#4(%<1$4.#>4)
F#0#$()(%<#)(%=*$>(%:*&%GHHH)
<1$>())*1$)S%<1K0(4*4*2(%#$&%
3(+14*#4(&%<1$4.#>4)
192 
 
Table 7.2 Financial Sector Data for India and Japan: Banking Sector, Capital 
Market and Securities Market 
Sources: Authors calculations from data sources below, all accessed 14th December 2010 
(1) www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/.../Key-Indicators-2010.pdf  
(2) http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm  
(3) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD 
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Figure 7.11 Direction in National Highways Regulation and Domestic Financial Intermediation: India 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
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Figure 7.12 Direction in National Highways Regulation and Domestic Financial Intermediation: Japan 
 
Source: Created by the Author 
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Within an economy it is valuable to identify sub-sectors that will benefit from 
using the state’s option (public choice) in allocative efficiency in funding (financial 
intermediation) and regulation (infrastructure unbundling) to allow PSP through 
concession contracts (legislation, competitive bidding and MCA’s). As this research 
observed, although it is difficult to quantify the relationship between the financial 
system and the way infrastructure like the Highway is provided, in general as 
infrastructure provision shifts from public-private domain a well developed and 
intermediating financial system is required. Most developing countries that are 
developing their financial systems, expand and deepen according to their level of 
development and the functional requirements of the economy (that is agriculture based 
economies rely on a bank-based system, while developed economies require a well-
developed securities market. But a financial system with more intermediaries and 
instruments can support long-term funding needs through better intermediation and 
diversifying risk. An efficiency-oriented sector (with high demand, large investments, 
and long gestation periods) like the national highways can only be developed effectively 
when public finance, is complemented through more developed financing markets, 
instruments, and intermediaries.  The improved financial intermediation provides 
financial resources to the private sector to efficiently develop the sector and efficiently 
provide the services, but the role of the public sector remains crucial, as the private 
sector must be governed through regulations and independent authorities. The role of 
the state, although less significant, is crucial as regulator to enable allocation and at 
the same time provide beneficiaries with fair distribution and protection from capture 
and corruption by interested groups – agents including construction companies and 
developers, construction workers (as voter base), and so on. 
The implications of this analysis suggest that the unbundling of infrastructure 
services when complemented with financial system development, could allow new 
opportunities for public-private cooperation in providing more efficient and effective 
funding mechanisms. Although highways account for only 2% of all roads in India they 
carry 40% of the road traffic, and require a steady supply of funds for network 
expansion in an already supply-side-constrained economy. This however initially 
requires heavy investments from the state through public finance; once trends in user-
charges and traffic demand are set, the private sector will be less reluctant in 
competing to provide these services. In fact, where many countries turned to private 
toll roads to generate additional revenues for roads it should be remembered that tolls 
can only be economically viable, and collected on roads carrying relatively high 
volumes of traffic. India in fact already has one of the lowest costs of transport in the 
world, and so increasing tolls would need to be considered in the next twenty years 
time. The long-term plan would surely need to look at toll receipts, payouts of annuities, 
cess and of course funding instruments from a more well developed and regulated 
financial market, especially bonds and pension and insurance funds. Although there 
were plans to increase tolls a few times, considering the thin profits that the trucking 
sector operates on, they were postponed. There is already a growing discontent 
(especially in the trucking community) about the duplicity of events as commuters pay 
cess for road development and on top of that they pay tolls for the section of national 
highway used.  
In India, the establishment of a specialized regulatory authority, NHAI, has 
allowed for the implementation of the National Highway Development Program 
essentially financed through:  
• Fuel tax (on petrol and diesel through Central Road Fund)  
• Borrowing from multilateral development agencies (World Bank, ADB, JBIC); 
• Private sector finance through Public-Private Partnership concession 
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contracts;  
• Charging Tolls - BOT Toll and BOT Annuities concession contracts are the 
most preferred – and companies raise funds through bank lending, while 
funds through equity and from special purpose Vehicles like the IIFCL is 
minimal. BOT PPP’s in the Highway-Road sector have been the highest in the 
world 2007/8.  
The analysis suggests that the shift in infrastructure development and provision 
as it shifts from the public to the private domain needs to be complemented with a shift 
in public finance to funding through more capital-market and specialized long term 
funding instruments (government and corporate bond markets, securitization, 
domestic institutional investors including pension, insurance, and mutual funds and so 
on).  
Compare this to the way Japan developed and financed its Highways through: 
• Initially borrowing from multilateral development institutions as loans 
through multilateral development agencies (World bank), 
• Full cost recovery through user charges – tolls 
• Principles of cross-subsidization (temporal, spatial), through the Japan 
Highway Public Corporation through channeling domestic institutional funds 
through the FILP 
• Floating government bonds and government backed funds through the Fiscal 
and Investment Loan Program.  
 
While a developing country like India grapples with a demand-supply gap in 
infrastructure availability, a developing economy like Japan struggles with the high 
debts in the process of developing high quality infrastructure and the cost of re-
investment to replace or modernize the ageing infrastructure. Japan developed its 
highway rapidly and expanded to over 9,000 km, of which many stretches were 
developed to guarantee equitable access, and not on the basis of traffic demand, cost-
benefit, or the viability of cost recovery. This resulted in the accumulation of huge 
debts of over Yen 40 Trillion and eventually the demise of the Agency that was 
responsible for developing expressways and highways (JHPC), also resulting in 
horizontal unbundling and privatization. As countries develop their highway system 
initially there is a need to find financial intermediation to support such large 
investments with long pay-back (gestation) periods. Japan was a successful case with a 
high savings rate both with households and the private sector, and the intermediation 
through postal savings through the FILP (which was in place till 2001) was 
indispensable for collecting deposits from the ordinary citizens to support public 
undertakings like the JHPC. This initially,  with additional World Bank loans, 
contributed to assisting the financing of the JHPC developing its network. Japan was 
initially an ideal system, as it sought to develop its entire network through toll receipts, 
even without modern financial instruments such securitization and revenue 
amortization. Japan was able to develop its highway system rapidly, while at the same 
time as it achieved financial inclusion (high savings rate and development of domestic 
institutional investors), and the reduction in government deficits (the government did 
not absorb private savings to finance its deficits). When the JHPC was eventually 
privatized most of debts that the new Agency had to inherit were long term bonds was 
amounting to Yen 24 Trillion of the Yen 40 Trillion, while private sector debt and 
private sector bonds were over Yen 3 Trillion. Availability of long-term debt and 
government guaranteed bonds are crucial for creating more highway assets, but this 
also comes gradually as increased vehicle ownership and traffic data reduces private 
sector risk in taking up projects and bidding. 
Since high volumes of traffic only occur on limited parts of the road network – 
typically on no more than 5 to 10 percent of the national road network and 1 to 2 
percent of the total road network – this means that wholly private toll roads can only 
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meet a small part of the road sector’s overall financing needs.  However, since 
expressways are the busiest and most expensive sections of road to build and maintain, 
tolling can make a valuable contribution to the financing of the main trunk road 
network. As seen with the case of Japan, temporal and spatial cross-subsidization is 
crucial especially at the stage of network formation, but more self-sustainability 
principles need to be incorporated into the financing mechanisms over time, or it will 
lead to inefficiency and political influence susceptible of agency capturing the principal, 
and this would require more arm’s-length or independent regulation. But Japan is 
actually on the other side: after successfully developing a network infrastructure over 
roughly 30 years, it started defaulting and overbuilding, without checks and balances. 
It took another 20 years to bring down the system, and it is now a huge public burden 
as the government grapples with recovering the debt. 
India, similarly to Japan, started its Highway development program about two 
decades ago with humble beginnings, but is already close to developing an expressway 
program. But considering the evolution of ideas in terms of the availability of private 
sector funds and participation, the only impediment is seen to be the financial 
intermediation, as it does not have industrial banks or specialized agencies like the 
FILP in Japan to support its massive spending needs on an efficiency sector like the 
National Highways. The Indian government’s more pressing obligations are in 
increasing social spending and alternative spending on other roads that cannot attract 
private investment. With fewer options of obtaining long-term funds the only way is to 
diversify the financial market, especially in terms of being able to provide long-term 
credit and the necessary regulations to maintain stability in those markets. Instead of 
crowding out the financial markets by borrowing to finance its deficits, the government, 
though gradually, has been allowing more private participation in terms of 
intermediating and providing the necessary funds to private participants that require 
long term funds. This also requires more innovative financing mechanisms, such as 
securitization of future tolls, corporate bonds and strengthening SPV’s. In the long run 
there should also be a move towards more BOT-Tolls especially for more viable 
stretches and future Expressways. 
Highway infrastructure investment can be politically contentious, as in Japan, 
where the JHPC was privatized into six private companies on the lines of Japan 
National Railways, and a debt exceeding Yen40 trillion is to be repaid in the next 40 
years. The contentious policies of price-cap, equitable access through cross-
subsidization promoted in the 1970s, and over-estimated traffic demand, have led to 
the over-investment and highways and expressways. This eventually ran against the 
principles of full cost recovery as infrastructure asset creation was not based on real 
demand, but was centered on equitable access. Japan faces the challenge of an aging 
stock of highway assets, and more investments that would be required in the 
maintenance and renewal of assets in line with newer technology, and safety standards. 
Apart from investing more in renewing assets beyond their design life, the capital and 
interest of the existing debt would need to be paid off. 
This study deduced that there are similarities in the early phase of vertical 
unbundling in developing the network infrastructure of national highways in India and 
Japan, but doubts still remain as to what form of regulatory arrangement will evolve in 
India. In India, which has had less than 15 years of experience in implementing the 
different phases of the highway development program, there are already issues of 
spatial cross-subsidization and price-cap regulations that could affect profitability of 
service provision. Although the principle of full cost-recovery would be impossible to 
incorporate in the near future as a rise in the tolls would politically infeasible, the role 
of tolls in funding the other phases (of NHDP) and repayment is largely under-
estimated. In India the cash flow estimates already assume an annual increase in the 
volume of cess-funds, which in the long term might prevent debt accrual, but there 
exists the danger of the eventual over-investment in under-used assets. The key would 
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be to develop a more financially sustainable model that would eventually phase out the 
fuel tax (or use it towards environmental or congestion purposes) and improve cost-
recovery through user charges. 
When implementation of infrastructure unbundling and financial intermediation 
(deepening) are parallel, this would enhance public choice in drawing private sector 
participation in the construction and financing of concession contracts (especially 
Build-Operate-Transfer - Toll). Infrastructure provision in India, as in most other 
emerging countries, has been dominated by government ownership and provision, 
through state departments and state-owned enterprises. Without providing the 
ownership rights (privatization), private sector participation requires incentives 
(profitability) to bid for projects, and options should be available in raising funds 
through the capital and security markets (corporate bonds, insurance and domestic 
institutional investors).  Policy options for India in the: 
• Short term: would be the continuation of the cess for network development 
and to provide equitable access, and slowly encouraging private sector 
participation through concessions using Tolls and viability gap funding until 
long term funding is available in the financial market;  
• Long term: full-cost recovery principle has to be integrated to allow private 
sector to recover costs, through improved regulation, more efficient pricing 
(user charges), and allowing for infrastructure firms to tap long term funds 
from financial markets (instruments and stability). 
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This academic investigation sought to deduce the prospects of financial 
intermediation in the long-term funding of infrastructure. The nature and extent of 
infrastructure regulations required to achieve allocative efficiency in order to make 
investments sustainable, profitable, and allowing for private sector participation, were 
also evaluated. While both financial system intermediation and infrastructure 
development are crucial for economic development, their correlation has not been direct, 
and their interrelation has not been well documented. By evaluating the financing 
needs during the different phases of highway network development, regulations that 
enshrine principles of cost-recovery, equitable access, cross-subsidization, and 
promoting competition in infrastructure services need to be developed. Financial 
reforms to improve financial intermediation can complement infrastructure 
unbundling and provide for long term funding that is required.  
• The study has been unique in choosing public choice to understand the options 
in achieving efficient financing of services of general interest: using the case of 
National Highways in India.  Chose two variables (vectors): domestic financial 
intermediation in improving long term funding and improved infrastructure 
regulation to improve cost-recovery through user charges. 
• Using Public Choice Approach to fill the policy gap in understanding what kind 
of financial system, and instruments support funding in infrastructure such as 
highways. 
• The study of Indian National Highways (which is only developing its Highway 
network now, using innovative methods such as PPP), and the comparative 
study with the Japan Highway system (which is in its post-development phase 
facing privatization and debt recovery and serious in issues in profitability).  
• Developed a two dimensional model to plot the correlation between 
infrastructure provision (between the public and private domain) and financial 
system development (between bank-based credit system and capital market-
based monetary system). 
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• Scenario analysis can be done based on integrating improved cost-recovery 
scenario through user-charges. This could simpler, considering the existence of 
new networking technology (that is Intelligent Transport Systems that also 
includes Electronic Toll Collection) and demand analysis (more studies using 
project finance principles based on vehicle ownership data, origin-destination 
traffic surveys, and traffic forecasting). 
• Intermodal and multi-modal transport studies to ensure competiveness of all 
the modes and integrate systems to make transport more sustainable. 
Road/rail competition is also a growing concern in India where better 
highways would largely benefit large trucks carrying freight: this would call 
for more direct policies that would ensure the profitability of both these 
infrastructure services.  
• Looking at highway construction companies and their market capitalization. 
To evaluate if these companies are slowly moving away from short term 
financing from banks, mutual funds, and viability gap funds provided by 
government institutions specialized in providing infrastructure credit (claimed 
now at a maximum of 40% upfront at the start of project). 
• Scope of project financing in individual stretches of the Indian National 
Highways, to be able to look at the cost/benefits and rates of return. The 
eventual horizontal unbundling of services in order to ensure profitability and 
incentives for PSP and profitability 
• Investigating serious issues such as delays due to land acquisition, 
environmental clearances, project overrun costs, political unrest in certain 
states, pricing to achieve sustainability in maintenance and creation of new 
assets, and so on. 
• Possibly looking at the third dimension (apart from the two dimensions of 
focus in this research) of risk, which is a crucial aspect in both infrastructure 
investment and protecting investors who invest through the financial systems 
and instruments. 
• To compare and evaluate the regulatory reforms and public funding of 
highways (efficiency sector) and all other roads (equity sector), using public 
choice and public finance approaches, especially in the context of Indian 
political economy (for example planning and finance commissions and central 
road fund). 
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